Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MERRICK JOSE MOORE, Case No.: 26-CV-551 JLS (LR) CDCR #H82249, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILING TO v. SATISFY FILING FEE 14 REQUIREMENT UNDER 28 U.S.C.

15 § 1914(A) AND AS FRIVOLOUS JEREMIAH JAMES DURAN, et al., UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Merrick Jose Moore’s Civil Rights Complaint 20 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1), originally filed in the Eastern District 21 of California on January 10, 2026. The case was transferred to this Court on January 27, 22 2026. ECF Nos. 3–4. Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to cruel and unusual 23 punishment and excessive use of force while housed at the Richard J. Donovan 24 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. Compl. at 1–6. For the reasons 25 stated below, the Court DISMISSES the case. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 I. FAILURE TO SATISFY FILING FEE REQUIREMENT 2 First, Plaintiff has not paid the $405 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 3 or moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 4 generally Docket. Therefore, his case is subject to dismissal on this basis. 5 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 6 Second, the Complaint fails to surpass screening under the Prison Litigation Reform 7 Act (“PLRA”), which requires courts to review complaints filed by anyone “incarcerated 8 or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 9 delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, 10 pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing” and 11 regardless of whether the prisoner prepays filing fees or moves to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1915A(a), (c). Specifically, the Court is required to review prisoner complaints which 13 “seek[] redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental 14 entity,” and to dismiss those, or any portion of those, which are “frivolous, malicious, or 15 fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or which “seek monetary relief 16 from a defendant who is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 17 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). 18 Plaintiff’s Complaint in this action is subject to sua sponte dismissal under the 19 doctrine of res judicata, which bars a party from relitigating claims that were raised or 20 could have been raised in a prior action. Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 21 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001). Res judicata precludes a subsequent suit when there is: “(1) 22 an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between the 23 parties.” Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) 24 (citation omitted). The Court may consider the res judicata effect of a prior proceeding sua 25 sponte. See Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1992). 26 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges five causes of action against RJD personnel, including 27 Defendants Duran and Manquero. Compl. at 1–5. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ 28 conduct involved excessive force, violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and 1 retaliation. Id. at 5, 7. These claims are duplicative of another civil action that has already 2 been adjudicated. See Moore v. Duran, et al., No. 23-CV-194 (GPC) DDL (S.D. Cal.). 3 There, Plaintiff filed a remarkably similar complaint on February 1, 2023. See Moore, 4 No. 23-CV-194 (GPC) DDL, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2023). The complaint alleged 5 that on March 1, 2018, RJD personnel, including Defendants Duran and Manquero, used 6 excessive force and violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 5, 7. 7 The complaint further alleged that RJD staff violated his constitutional rights by retaliating 8 against him and “disregard[ing] . . . his safety and welfare” on or about January 7, 2018. 9 Id. at 8. 10 On July 11, 2025, a jury in that case “returned special verdicts for the relevant 11 Defendants.” Moore, No. 23-CV-194 (GPC) DDL, ECF No. 170, at 2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 12 2025). “Specifically for Defendant Manquero, the special verdict found him ‘liable for use 13 of excessive and unnecessary force against Plaintiff; for acting maliciously and sadistically 14 for the purpose of causing harm, and not in a good faith effort to maintain and restore 15 discipline; and for causing harm to Plaintiff, finding that Defendant Manquero acted with 16 malice, oppression, or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. “Nominal and 17 punitive damages were awarded.” Id. “After the judgment had been entered, the Parties 18 reached a post-judgment agreement.” Id. This included “an agreement to not seek costs, 19 for Plaintiff to waive his rights to collect the awarded $1,000 in punitive damages, and for 20 the CDCR to pay Plaintiff $1,500 in satisfaction of the judgment and as a release of all 21 claims connected to the Complaint.” Id. (citation omitted). Following that post-judgment 22 agreement, the Court granted a motion to vacate the judgment against Manquero and 23 dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at 5. 24 In the present case, Plaintiff alleges the same claims that were already raised and 25 adjudicated in his initial case. Therefore, even if Plaintiff had satisfied the filing fee 26 requirement, he may not relitigate the claims referenced in his Complaint, as he raised the 27 same claims in a previously filed § 1983 action. Because the claims raised in this action 28 are the same as those alleged in Moore v. Duran, et al., No. 23-CV-194 (GPC) DDL (S.D. 1 Cal.), a § 1983 suit which resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and there is privity 2 ||between the parties in both cases, see Headwaters, 399 F.3d at 1052, the Court finds 3 || Plaintiff's reassertion of those claims in this newly-filed § 1983 action is precluded by res 4 ||judicata principles. See Howard y. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A 5 || judicially approved settlement agreement is considered a final judgment on the merits.’’). 6 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this subsequently filed case as frivolous under 7 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 8 || 1995) (“There is no abuse of discretion where a district court dismisses under § 1915(d) a 9 || complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” (internal quotation 10 ||marks and citation omitted)). Since res judicata constitutes a defect that cannot be cured, 11 dismissal is without further leave to amend. See Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for 12 || the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing futility of amendment as 13 proper basis for dismissal without leave to amend); Cornejo v. Minglana, No. 23-cv- 14 || 05383-JSW, 2025 WL 870415, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2025) (denying leave to amend 15 claims barred by res judicata as futile). 16 CONCLUSION 17 In light of the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES the entire above-captioned action. 18 || As this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: June 1, 2026 tt □ 21 pen Janis L. Sammartino 9 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 4