ERIC WILLIAM OLIVERIO-STILL, et al. v. AVMAC LLC
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Myron James Lorenz (author)
Analysis
The court considered the Named Plaintiff's unopposed motion for approval of a settlement of FLSA collective action claims. The court denied the motion without prejudice because the settlement contained a provision allowing modification by counsel, failed to secure the consent of all 58 opt-in plaintiffs, and included an excessive award for the Named Plaintiff.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Named Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of FLSA Collective Action Settlement“For the foregoing reasons, Named Plaintiff's motion for approval of FLSA collective action settlement is denied without prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that FLSA settlements require court approval to ensure fairness and that the proposed settlement failed to meet this standard. Specifically, the settlement's provision allowing modification by counsel circumvented the requirement for judicial approval of the final terms. Furthermore, the settlement attempted to bind 58 opt-in plaintiffs who had not consented to the agreement, violating the principle that opt-in plaintiffs retain individual party status and cannot be bound by a settlement they did not agree to. The court also noted the excessive nature of the Named Plaintiff's award given the lack of discovery. These reasons are legally sound and supported by the cited authorities. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly applies the legal standard for FLSA settlement approval, citing relevant Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authorities. The court identifies specific defects in the proposed settlement (modification clause, lack of opt-in plaintiff consent, excessive award) that justify denial. The reasoning is clear and directly addresses the motion.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC WILLIAM OLIVERIO-STILL, Case No.: 24-cv-0870-L-DEB et al., 12 ORDER DENYING NAMED Plaintiffs, 13 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR v. APPROVAL OF FLSA 14 COLLECTIVE ACTION AVMAC LLC, 15 SETTLEMENT Defendant. 16 [ECF No. 27] 17 19 20 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Eric William Oliverio-Still’s (“Named 21 Plaintiff”) unopposed motion to approve the settlement of wages and hours claims he 22 asserts under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) on his own behalf and on behalf of 23 those similarly situated. (ECF No. 27.) The Court decides the matter on the papers 24 submitted without oral argument. See Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, 25 the motion is denied. 26 Named Plaintiff filed this action as a putative FLSA opt-in collective action under 27 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of himself and other employees similarly situated. He 28 claims that while he worked for Defendant AVMAC LLC as a non-exempt employee, 1 Defendant underpaid his wages by failing to include all forms of remuneration, including 2 cash in lieu of fringe benefits, into the regular rate of pay used to calculate overtime, sick 3 time, and premium wages. (ECF No. 12, “Compl.”) He also claims he was not paid for 4 all the hours worked. 5 Title 29 Section 216(b) “gives employees the right to bring a private cause of 6 action on their own behalf and on behalf of ‘other employees similarly situated’ for 7 specified violations of the FLSA.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 8 69 (2013).1 A suit brought on behalf of other employees is known as a “collective 9 action.” Id. at 69; Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989). 10 [T]he collective action mechanism is … tailored specifically to vindicating federal labor rights. The FLSA is a remedial statute with broad worker- 11 protective aims. The collective action mechanism is a means of serving 12 these aims.
14 Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2018). 15 Named Plaintiff entered into a settlement with Defendant of all FLSA claims 16 alleged in this action. (ECF No. 27-2, Ferraro Decl. Ex. 1, Collective Action Settlement 17 Agreement (“Settlement”).) “FLSA claims may not be settled without approval of either 18 the Secretary of Labor or a district court.” Seminiano v. Xyris Enterprise, Inc., 602 Fed. 19 App’x 602 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Nall v. Mal-Motels, Inc., 723 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th 20 Cir. 2013)). Approval is required in light of the FLSA’s worker-protective aims and 21 requires “scrutinizing the settlement for fairness.” Nall, 723 F.3d at 1306; see also id. at 22 1307 (discussing Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945).) 23 The Settlement includes a provision permitting modification of its terms by 24 agreement of counsel. (Settlement ¶ 10.7.) Because settlement of FLSA claims requires 25 / / / / / 26 27 1 Unless otherwise noted, internal quotation marks, citations, footnotes, ellipses, and 28 1 approval of either the Secretary of Labor or a district court, the Court cannot approve an 2 agreement which circumvents this requirement. 3 In the alternative, the proposed agreement would settle this action as a collective 4 action, including 58 other employees who opted into this action. (Settlement ¶ 1.6.) 5 “[P]articipation in the collective action is a statutory ‘right’ held equally and individually 6 by each party plaintiff, whether originally appearing in the complaint or later opting in.” 7 Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1108. By filing a consent to join, aggrieved workers become 8 parties plaintiff to the collective action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). After a plaintiff opts into a 9 collective action, there is no distinction between the original and opt-in plaintiffs. 10 Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1108. “The FLSA leaves no doubt that every plaintiff who opts 11 into the collective action has party status.” Id. Accordingly, a collective action is 12 a kind of mass action, in which aggrieved workers act as a collective of individual plaintiffs with individual cases—capitalizing on efficiencies of 13 scale, but without necessarily permitting a specific, named representative to 14 control the litigation, except as the workers may separately so agree.
16 Id. at 1105 (emph. in orig.). 17 Fifty-eight individuals have opted into this action (ECF No. 26, “Notice of Consent 18 to Join”) and became party plaintiffs. However, only Named Plaintiff signed the 19 Settlement. (Settlement at 12.) No evidence has been provided to show that all Plaintiffs 20 agree to the Settlement, and the consent-to-join forms do not stipulate that Named 21 Plaintiff controls this action. (See Notice of Consent to Join.) If the Settlement is 22 approved, judgment will be entered and this action dismissed as to all Plaintiffs, 23 including any who do not agree. (Settlement ¶¶ 1.16, 1.20, 1.29, 5.2, 10.15.) This 24 outcome would be contrary to the individual party status of each opt-in Plaintiff. Named 25 Plaintiff’s motion is therefore denied. 26 Finally, the proposed $10,000 Named Plaintiff award in addition to his pro rata 27 share of the net settlement (Settlement ¶¶ 1.28, 2.2.1) appears excessive, as this action 28 has settled before formal discovery. Named Plaintiff has not been deposed, nor has he 1 || been called upon to sign any affidavits, except for the declaration in support of his 2 || proposed award. (ECF No. 27-3.) 3 For the foregoing reasons, Named Plaintiff's motion for approval of FLSA 4 collective action settlement is denied without prejudice. Any renewed motion for 5 || settlement approval must by accompanied with a redlined copy of the proposed 6 || settlement showing all changes to the Settlement filed at ECF No. 27-2. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: June 1, 2026 (fee oop 11 H . James Lorenz 1D United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28