Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD L., Case No.: 23-cv-640-DDL 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Acting ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT 15 Commissioner of Social Security, TO SECTION 206(b) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 16 Defendant. 17 [Dkt. No. 37]

18 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s April 18, 2026, amended Petition for 19 Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 206(b) of the Social Security Act [Dkt. No. 20 37 (“Mot.”)]. Having reviewed the motion, Defendant’s May 6, 2026 response [Dkt. 21 No. 39 (“Response”)], and Plaintiff’s May 12, 2026 Reply to Defendant’s Response 22 [Dkt. No. 40 (“Reply”)], the Court finds the motion suitable for disposition without 23 argument. Civ. L.R. 7.1.d.1.1 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, for the reasons 24 25 26 1 Plaintiff was informed of the instant motion and does not oppose the request. Dkt. 27 No. 37-2, Declaration of Alexandra Manbeck In Support of Plaintiff’s Application for Rule 206(b) Attorney’s Fees (“Manbeck Decl.”) at ¶ 13; see also Dkt. No. 37-1, 28 1 set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART. 2 I. BACKGROUND 3 On April 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Commissioner of 4 Social Security, seeking judicial review of the denial of his “claim for Disability 5 Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title II and Title XVI 6 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.” 7 Dkt. No. 1. 8 On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 9 17. 10 On September 19, 2024, the Court issued an Order Affirming in Part and 11 Reversing in Part Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Dkt. No. 26. 12 On November 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for the Award and Payment 13 of Attorney Fees and Expenses Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. Dkt. 14 No. 28. The motion was opposed by Defendant on December 4, 2024. Dkt. No. 15 30. On April 28, 2025, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in 16 Part Plaintif’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access 17 to Justice Ace. Dkt. No. 33. The Court awarded Plaintiff attorney’s fees and 18 expenses in the amount of $12,179.44. 2 Id. 19 On October 24, 2025, on remand, Plaintiff prevailed and the Commissioner 20 awarded Plaintiff approximately $159,694.00 in past due benefits with $39,923.50 21 22 23 Declaration of Richard Tat Lieu (“Lieu Decl.”).

24 2 Plaintiff addressed the EAJA award in his March 23, 2026 Ex-Parte Motion for 25 Attorney Fees Pursuant to Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act [see Dkt. No. 34 at 2-4] and noted that “[u]pon receipt of payment, Plaintiff's attorney shall refund 26 the EAJA fee in the amount of Twelve Thousand One Hundred and Seventy Nine 27 Dollars and Fourty [sic] Four Cents ($12,179.44).” However, Plaintiff does not mention the EAJA payment in the instant motion or state that Plaintiff’s counsel will 28 1 withheld for attorney’s fees. Mot. at 3; see also Dkt. No. 37-9 at 4-5. 2 On March 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Attorney Fees 3 Pursuant to Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act. Dkt. No. 34. On March 25, 4 2026, Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Ex-Parte Motion for Attorney’s Fees 5 Pursuant to Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act. Dkt. No. 35. On April 2, 6 2026, the Court issued an Order Denying Without Prejudice Plaintiff’s Ex Parte 7 Petition for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act 8 because Plaintiff failed to 9 provide[] the Court with a declaration from his counsel, a copy of the relevant fee or retainer agreement, Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing rate or 10 records, or any additional information the Court c[ould] use to evaluate 11 the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s motion. The motion also fail[ed] to address whether Plaintiff’s counsel provided Plaintiff with notice of the 12 motion and an explanation of Plaintiff’s right to file a response or 13 objection to the motion. 14 Dkt. No. 36. 15 On April 18, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended Petition for Attorney’s Fees 16 Pursuant to Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act. Mot. On May 6, 2026, 17 Defendant filed a response to the motion. Response. On May 12, 2026, Plaintiff 18 replied to Defendant’s response. Reply. 19 II. PARTIES’ POSITIONS 20 Plaintiff’s Position 21 Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court awarding attorney fees pursuant to 42 22 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $39,923.50 and $18,278.00 in outstanding 23 benefits since he only received $100,000 of his $118,278.00 reward. Mot. at 2. 24 Plaintiff argues that twenty-five percent (25%) of his past-due benefits ($118, 25 278.00) is $39,923.50 and that since his counsel did not receive any fee award 26 pursuant to Section 406(a) of the Social Security Act, “counsel is owed the 27 maximum fee amount of $39,923.50.” Id. at 14-15. 28 /// 1 Defendant’s Position 2 Defendant states that it “neither supports nor opposes Counsel’s request for 3 attorney’s fees in the amount of $39,923.50, under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).” Response 4 at 2. Defendant notes that “[i]t is for the Court to decide if the request for attorney’s 5 fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable under the law.” Id. Defendant 6 requests that the Court order that “Counsel reimburse Plaintiff fees they previously 7 received under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.” Id. at 3. Defendant asks the Court 8 to deny Plaintiff’s request for the remaining $18,278 he alleges that he did not 9 receive from his benefit award. Id. Defendant contends that “[t]he court has no 10 jurisdiction over the payment center’s payments to the Plaintiff and Plaintiff should 11 exhaust his administrative remedies if he feels outstanding amounts are still owed.” 12 Id. 13 Plaintiff’s Reply 14 Plaintiff replies that the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) cannot be 15 permitted to issue an administrative decision granting benefits and then fail to 16 provide said benefits. Reply at 2. Plaintiff notes that the failure to issue his full 17 benefits “is causing severe and irreparable harm.” Id. Plaintiff argues that the 18 Court has inherent power to order this equitable remedy and that Defendant’s 19 failure to specify which administrative remedies are available is because there are 20 no such remedies. Id. at 3-4. 21 III. LEGAL STANDARD 22 There are three different fee-shifting statutes that may apply in Social 23 Security cases: 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), and the Equal Access to 24 Justice Act. Section 406(a) allows for an award of attorney’s fees for services 25 before the United States Social Security Administration. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a). 26 Section 406(b) allows for an award of attorney’s fees for services before a Federal 27 Court. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The EAJA allows a court to reimburse individuals for 28 attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in court and certain administrative 1 proceedings involving government agencies. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2018 & Supp. I 2 2019). Unlike Section 406(a) and 406(b) fees, which are drawn from the claimant’s 3 past-due benefits, EAJA fees are paid out of agency funds. See 28 U.S.C. 4 § 2412(d)(4). A federal court may award an attorney fees under both the EAJA 5 and Section 406(b), but when an attorney is awarded fees under both the EAJA 6 and Section 406(b) for the same work, the attorney must refund the amount of the 7 smaller fee to the claimant. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002).3 8 Pursuant to Section 406(b), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment 9 favorable to a [social security] claimant, ... the court may determine and allow as 10 part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 11 percent of the total of the past-due benefits.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “Because 12 §406(b) by its terms imposes a 25% cap on fees only for representation before a 13 court, and §406(a) has separate caps on fees for representation before the 14 agency, … the statute does not impose a 25% cap on aggregate fees.” Culbertson 15 v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53, 55 (2019). 16 “Within the 25 percent boundary, ... the attorney for the successful claimant 17 must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Gisbrecht, 18 535 U.S. at 807. In ruling on a fee motion under Section 406(b), the Court must 19 first look to the contingency fee agreement and then test for reasonableness. See 20 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). To determine 21 reasonableness, the Court may consider “(1) the character of the representation; 22 (2) the results achieved; (3) whether the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) 23 whether the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent 24 on the case; and (5) the attorney's record of hours worked and counsel's regular 25 hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases.” Barry H. v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 26 27 3 Unless otherwise noted, internal quotation marks, ellipses, brackets, citations, 28 1 5985501, at *1 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 13, 2023). The Court should also consider 2 whether inferior representation justifies an award of less than 25% such as “any 3 delay in the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting the fee; whether 4 the benefits of the representation are out of proportion to time spent on the case; 5 and the risk counsel assumed by accepting the case.” Bartle v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 6 5811845, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 7, 2023). 7 IV. DISCUSSION 8 With the foregoing considerations in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s fee 9 request. To reiterate, Plaintiff’s past due benefits are $159,694.00; and counsel 10 requests a twenty-five percent fee of $39,923.50. See Mot. at 14-15. This amount 11 is in accordance with the statutory maximum; it is also equivalent to the twenty-five 12 percent fee Plaintiff agreed to when he retained counsel. See 42 U.S.C. § 13 406(b)(1)(A); see also Manbeck Decl. at Exh. 4. Counsel argues that this amount 14 is appropriate “in view of the inherent risks in this action and the excellent results 15 obtained for Plaintiff.” Mot. at 15. Plaintiff also requests an order awarding him 16 outstanding benefits of $18,278.00 since he only received $100,000.00 in back 17 pay. 4 Mot. at 12; see also Lieu Decl. at ¶ 15. 18 A. Fee Request 19 1. Nature of Representation and Result Achieved 20 As an initial matter, under Gisbrecht, the Court should give effect to the 21 parties’ agreement unless the record reveals a basis for doing otherwise. 535 U.S. 22 at 807. Here, the Administration ultimately deemed Plaintiff disabled, entitling him 23 to $159,694.00 in past-due benefits – a favorable result. As to the nature of the 24 25 26 4 The Court is somewhat unclear as to how Plaintiff arrived at the $18,278 dollar 27 amount. If Plaintiff received $100,000 from a $159,694 award and $39,923.50 of the remainder ($59,694) goes towards attorney’s fees, a total of $19,770.5 remains 28 1 representation, the Court observes that counsel has represented Plaintiff on a 2 contingency basis. During the more than three years between counsel’s 3 engagement and Plaintiff’s entitlement to disability benefits, counsel has not been 4 paid. See Thomas v. Colvin, No. 1:11CV01291, 2015 WL 1529331, at *3 (E.D. 5 Cal. Apr. 3, 2015) (noting the “contingent-fee nature of this case and counsel’s 6 assumption of risk in agreeing to represent Plaintiff under such terms” supported 7 a request for 25 percent of benefits, and awarding the same). The Court finds 8 these factors weigh in favor of the requested fee award. 9 2. Whether Counsel’s Requested Fee Is Excessive 10 The Court has also considered whether counsel’s requested fee is excessive 11 in comparison to the work performed or to prevailing market rates. In this regard, 12 the Court has reviewed the billing records submitted in support of the requested 13 fees. See generally Manbeck Decl. Although the Court’s reasonableness 14 determination is not – and should not be – premised on a simple hourly rate 15 calculation, an assessment of counsel’s effective hourly rate for the work 16 performed nevertheless provides a useful guide as to whether the requested fee 17 is excessive or represents a windfall in comparison to the work performed. 18 Counsel’s billing records demonstrate that counsel expended 266.75 attorney 19 hours on the instant litigation. Mot. at 13; Manbeck Decl. at ¶¶ 7-8. Dividing the 20 requested fees ($39,923.50) by the number of hours expended (266.75) yields an 21 effective hourly rate of $150.5 This rate is at the very low end of the range of hourly 22 rates approved by other courts in the Ninth Circuit. See Brazile v. Comm’r of Soc. 23 Sec., No. C18-5914JLR, 2022 WL 503779, at *2-4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 2022) 24 (hourly rate of $2,000); Steven M. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:18-CV- 25 26 27 5 The effective hourly rate is $144.26 if it includes the ten hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent drafting the reply to the instant motion ($39,923.50 divided by 276.75 hours). 28 1 00459-HZ, 2020 WL 249990, at *2 (D. Or. 2023) (hourly rate of $1,900); Timothy 2 M. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:21-CV-01708-AR, 2023 WL 1071604, at *2 3 (D. Or. Jan. 27, 2023) (hourly rate of $1,863.01); White v. Berryhill, No. CV 04- 4 00331-AS, 2017 WL 11634804, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2017) (hourly rate of 5 $1,612). The Court thus finds this factor weighs in favor of the requested fee award. 6 3. Policy Considerations 7 The Court has also considered the public interest in incentivizing qualified 8 attorneys to represent disability claimants. As the court in Crawford recognized, 9 attorneys for claimants “assume[] significant risk in accepting these cases, 10 including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or that there would be a long 11 court or administrative delay in resolving the cases.” 586 F.3d at 1152. Even if 12 successful, counsel may have to “wait[] a long, long time for payment.” Id. Giving 13 effect to the parties’ negotiated fee agreement compensates the attorney not only 14 for the time expended but also for the risks assumed, and ensures their willingness 15 to undertake those risks again in future cases. See id.; accord Streeter v. Kijakazi, 16 No. 1:18-cv-01276-SKO, 2021 WL 4065545, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2021) (“[t]he 17 goal of fee awards in this context is to provide adequate incentive to represent 18 claimants” while protecting claimants from “depletion” of the benefits recovered). 19 The Court finds this factor also weighs in favor of granting counsel’s fee request. 20 4. Whether Any Reduction in the Amount of Fees Requested Is Necessary 21 Finally, the Court has also evaluated whether any other circumstances 22 warrant a reduction in the requested fees. The Administration’s ultimate 23 determination that Plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits demonstrates that the 24 case was meritorious, and the record does not reveal any inordinate delay caused 25 by counsel, work that was substandard, unnecessary, or duplicative, or other 26 indications that counsel’s fee is excessive. 27 5. Conclusion Regarding Reasonableness of Counsel’s Fee 28 In summary, because of counsel’s efforts, Plaintiff received a favorable 1 decision and an award of past-due benefits of $159,694.00. Counsel’s requested 2 fees are less than both the 25 percent statutory maximum and the amount that 3 Plaintiff agreed in advance to pay for a successful outcome. The Court has found 4 no evidence of delay or other factors that would necessitate reducing the 5 requested fees. Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel’s request for attorney’s 6 fees request is reasonable and GRANTS the request for attorney’s fees pursuant 7 to 42 U.S.C. § 206(b). 8 B. Counsel Must Refund Fees Received Pursuant to the EAJA 9 The EAJA also permits an attorney to receive fees for successful Social 10 Security representations. See Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 11 1215, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2012). However, unlike fees recovered pursuant to 12 Section 406(b), which are paid by the claimant, EAJA fees are paid by the 13 government. Id. at 1218. While “[f]ee awards may be made under both 14 prescriptions, . . . the claimant’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount 15 of the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (quoting Pub. L. No. 99–80, § 3, 99 16 Stat. 183 (1985)). Accordingly, counsel must refund Plaintiff for any EAJA fees 17 that counsel has received for work before the Court.6 18 C. Outstanding Benefits 19 Plaintiff’s request for an order requiring the SSA to pay $18,278.00 in past 20 benefits due is DENIED. The relief requested is separate and distinct from the 21 22 23 6 [A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action 24 (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial 25 review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the 26 position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 27 circumstances make an award unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A). 28 1 |/issue of attorney’s fees, and the Court does not have sufficient information to rule 2 ||on such a request. Additionally, it is unclear if the Court has jurisdiction to order 3 ||such payment. Plaintiff states that he only received $100,000.00 but does not state 4 ||what efforts, if any, he made to recover the remaining $18,278.00 he believes he 5 owed. Lieu Decl. at J 15.; see also Mot. at 12. Plaintiff does not state what the 6 ||response, if any, was from the SSA. ___ Plaintiff does not identify the administrative 7 options that were available to him to obtain the outstanding funds and whether he 8 ||exhausted any such remedies. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the Court should rely 9 its “inherent powers to order equitable remedies of full payment.” Reply at 2. 10 || Defendant's one line response that “[t]he court has no jurisdiction over the payment 11 ||center’s payments to the Plaintiff and Plaintiff should exhaust his administrative 12 ||remedies if he feels outstanding amounts are still owed” is equally lacking as no 13 ||law, authority, or citations are provided in support of the statement. Response at 14 |/3. 15 V. CONCLUSION 16 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS counsel’s motion for attorney’s 17 ||fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 206(b) and APPROVES an award in the amount of 18 $39,923.50 to Law Offices of Alexandra T. Manbeck, P.O. Box 827, State College, 19 ||/PA 16804. The Court further ORDERS Plaintiff's counsel to refund Plaintiff 20 ||$12,179.44 in EAJA fees that counsel previously received. Plaintiff's request for 21 order requiring the SSA to pay $18,278 in past benefits due is DENIED 22 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 23 ||IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||Dated: June 2, 2026 ait 25 Tb Lh, 26 Hon. David D. Leshner 27 United States Magistrate Judge 28