gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-03095 · 2026-05-28 · Unknown

Rose Julia Douglas v. Credit Acceptance Corporation

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Robert Steven Huie (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:30Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and her complaint against a credit reporting defendant. The court granted the motion to proceed IFP and determined the complaint survived sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Granted
“The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2].”
agree with court
The plaintiff demonstrated an inability to pay the filing fee by showing that her monthly expenses exceeded her income and that she had no assets. This satisfies the statutory requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) that the plaintiff is unable to pay fees or give security. The court correctly applied the principle that a plaintiff need not be absolutely destitute to qualify.
Complaint Survives Sua Sponte Screening
“The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint survives the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).”
agree with court
The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard to the IFP complaint. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant furnished inaccurate information to consumer reporting agencies and failed to provide a meaningful description of its investigation, asserting claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face at the screening stage.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory requirements for IFP status and the screening standard for IFP complaints. It applies the correct legal standards from binding Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. The factual findings regarding the plaintiff's financial status support the grant of IFP status, and the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient to survive the initial plausibility screening. The reasoning is complete and directly answers the motions before the court.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSE JULIA DOUGLAS, Case No.: 26-cv-3095-RSH-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 14 CREDIT ACCEPTANCE [ECF No. 2] CORPORATION, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 19 On May 18, 2026, Plaintiff Rose Julia Douglas, proceeding pro se, commenced this 20 action by filing a complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 21 1 (“Compl.”); 2. For the reasons below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP motion. 22 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 23 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 24 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 25 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 27 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 28 prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 1915(a). See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Section 2 1915(a)(1) allows federal courts to authorize commencement of a suit ‘without prepayment 3 of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit’ demonstrating ‘that the 4 person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.’”) (quoting 28 U.S. Code § 5 1915(a)(1)); see Hymas v. United States DOI, 73 F.4th 763, 766 n.3 (9th Cir. 2023) 6 (“§ 1915(a)(1) applies to all persons notwithstanding its ‘prisoner possesses’ language.”) 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 In her IFP application, Plaintiff states that she is a disabled veteran supporting three 9 children. ECF No. 2 at 5. Plaintiff reports that she has not been employed during the past 10 two years, has no savings in any financial institution, and has no other assets. Id. at 2–3. 11 According to her application, Plaintiff receives $4,100 per month in VA disability benefits 12 and has monthly expenses totaling $4,250. Id. at 2, 4. Based on these representations, the 13 Court concludes Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that she is unable to pay the filing 14 fee at this time for this action. Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960) 15 (“One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis statute.”). 16 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 17 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte review and dismissal should the Court determine, inter alia, 19 that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) 21 (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by 22 prisoners.”). 23 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 24 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 25 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 26 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 27 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 28 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 1 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 2 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 3 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 4 In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant furnished information regarding 5 an auto-loan account purportedly associated with Plaintiff to consumer reporting agencies, 6 including Experian. Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges she disputed the accuracy of that 7 information and requested the method used to investigate her dispute. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10. 8 According to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to provide a meaningful description of its 9 investigation and continued to furnish allegedly inaccurate information. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. 10 Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, including for violations of 15 11 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(7). At this preliminary stage, the Court 12 concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to “meet the low threshold for 13 proceeding past the screening stage.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 14 2012). 15 III. CONCLUSION 16 For the reasons set forth above: 17 1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF 18 No. 2]. 19 2. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint survives the sua sponte 20 screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court accordingly DIRECTS the Clerk 21 to issue a summons and forward it to Plaintiff, along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285, 22 a certified copy of the Complaint, and a certified copy of this Order. Plaintiff is directed 23 complete the Form 285 as completely and accurately as possible and return it to the U.S. 24 Marshal according to the instructions provided by the Clerk with the form. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 3. Upon receipt of Plaintiffs complete Form 285, the U.S. Marshal is 2 || ORDERED to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendant as directed 3 || by Plaintiff her Form 285. All costs of service will be advanced by the United States. See 4 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 28, 2026 Jekut C / ‘ g Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Cites, in this corpus