Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 PWG REALTORS, as a fiduciary of the Case No.: 26-cv-2657-RSH-SBC PWG REALTORS EMPLOYEES 11 WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 12 TRUST; and WAYNE GREEN, as a APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF participant in the PWG REALTORS TIME TO RESPOND TO 13 EMPLOYEES WELFARE BENEFIT COMPLAINT 14 PLAN and TRUST, [ECF No. 8] 15 Plaintiffs, 16 v. 17 CITY NATIONAL BANK, N.A., in its 18 capacity as trustee of the PWG 19 REALTORS EMPLOYEES WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN and TRUST, 20 Defendant. 21 22 Before the Court is an ex parte application by defendant City National Bank, N.A. 23 for an extension of time to respond to the Complaint. Plaintiffs PWG Realtors and Wayne 24 Green oppose. The matter has been fully briefed, and the Court determines that the issue 25 presented is suitable for disposition without oral argument or a noticed motion. Civil Local 26 Rule 7.1.d.1. 27 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs filed this action on April 27, 2026, alleging breach of fiduciary duty under 3 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and related claims. ECF 4 No. 1. On April 30, 2026, Plaintiffs effectuated service on Defendant. ECF No. 4 at 3. 5 Defendant’s response to the Complaint was therefore due on May 21, 2026. See Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). On Friday, May 22, 2026, Plaintiff requested entry of default from 7 the Clerk of Court. ECF No. 5. On Monday, May 25, 2026, the Memorial Day holiday, 8 Defendant appeared through counsel and filed its application for an extension of time to 9 respond. See ECF Nos. 6, 8. On May 27, 2026, the Clerk’s Office entered default at 10 Plaintiffs’ request. ECF No. 10. The same day, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion 11 for extension of time. ECF Nos. 11, 12. 12 II. ANALYSIS 13 Defendant seeks an extension of 16 days, from May 21, 2026 to June 5, 2026. ECF 14 No. 8 at 2. Defendant explains that it had believed that it had not been served until May 3, 15 2026, when it was served through an online portal; that it had been actively engaged in 16 searching for counsel since May 3, 2026; that on Friday, May 22, 2026, in the course of 17 discussing whether to engage its present counsel, it learned that Plaintiffs’ proof of service 18 reflected service on Apil 30, 2026; that it immediately requested an extension of time to 19 respond from Plaintiffs’ counsel, but was denied the request; and that same Friday evening, 20 Defendant engaged its outside counsel, who filed their appearance and request for 21 extension of time over the ensuing holiday weekend. Id. at 1-2. Defendant supports this 22 explanation with reasonably detailed declarations. ECF Nos. 8-1, 8-2. One of the 23 declarations, by Defendant’s associate general counsel, also explains that around the date 24 of service, Defendant’s other in-house attorney, primarily responsible for employment- 25 related litigation, separated from the company, resulting in the declarant’s immediate need 26 to manage dozens of new matters. ECF No. 8-2 ¶ 10. 27 1 Plaintiffs oppose the extension, arguing that Defendant was aware of this dispute 2 long before the Complaint was filed, and did not respond to pre-lawsuit demands. ECF No. 3 11 at 5. Plaintiffs also fault Defendant for reaching out by email about an extension through 4 not-yet-retained counsel, and after receiving a refusal from Plaintiffs, for not engaging in 5 a further telephonic or in-person meet-and-confer before filing a request for additional 6 time. Id. at 5, 9. 7 This Court may grant an extension of time, even after the time has lapsed, upon a 8 showing of “good cause” and “excusable neglect.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). “This 9 rule, like all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ‘[is] to be liberally construed to 10 effectuate the general purpose of seeing that cases are tried on the merits.’” Ahanchian v. 11 Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rodgers v. Watt, 12 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1983)). “To determine whether a party’s failure to meet a 13 deadline constitutes ‘excusable neglect,’ courts must apply a four-factor equitable test, 14 examining: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay 15 and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether 16 the movant acted in good faith.” Id. at 1261. 17 Plaintiffs concede, in candor, that there is “no measurable prejudice” from the 18 requested extension, and that “the length of delay is short.” ECF No. 11 at 13. The Court 19 agrees with Plaintiffs as to these two factors. The requested extension of 16 days, in the 20 circumstances presented here, is not unreasonable. Although by no means to be taken for 21 granted, such extensions are frequently agreed to by opposing parties and routinely granted 22 by courts. The Court finds no evidence of bad faith, and disagrees with Plaintiffs that the 23 manner in which Defendant sought an extension of time from the Court, or the fact that 24 Defendant did not respond to demand letters, is inconsistent with good faith. It is clear from 25 the record that Defendant, in determining the due date for its response, made a mistake of 26 inadvertence rather than one of judgment or tactics; and Defendant’s attorneys, once 27 retained, acted as promptly as possible. Although the reasons provided by Defendant for 1 ||missing the deadline would not—standing alone and without consideration of the other 2 || factors—require granting an extension, the Court determines upon weighing the relevant 3 || factors that such an extension is warranted here. 4 The Court reaches this conclusion also mindful of considerations of judicial 5 ||economy and case management. Plaintiffs likely have in mind the “end game” of obtaining 6 default judgment, but it is well established that default judgment is “ordinarily 7 || disfavored” and that “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably 8 || possible.” See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs’ ERISA 9 || action, which seeks wide-ranging relief on behalf of a retirement plan, does not lend itself 10 |/to resolution on a motion for default judgment that is short or simple. In granting 11 Defendant’s request, the Court is foregoing future litigation over setting aside a default 12 and/or over entry of default judgment, that may be costly and time-consuming but end up 13 precisely at the same result—namely, allowing Defendant the chance to defend itself on 14 merits through counsel, who stand ready to defend it despite the fact that their 15 || appearance was tardy by a matter of days. 16 || IT. CONCLUSION 17 Defendant’s application [ECF No. 8] is therefore GRANTED. Defendant’s period 18 || of time to respond to the Complaint is extended nunc pro tunc through June 5, 2026. In 19 || light of this disposition, the Clerk of Court shall VACATE the default [ECF No. 10] that 20 || was entered on May 27, 2026 after Defendant’s application to extend time was filed. 21 The Court declines to enter a fee award against Defendant, the prevailing party on 22 || this motion, or to impose the other limitations requested by Plaintiffs on Defendant’s ability 23 || to respond to the Complaint. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: May 29, 2026 fehut S bow %6 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 27 28