gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-00892 · 2026-05-29 · Unknown

Rigoberto Fierros Pedroza v. Christopher J. Larose, et al

Proceeding
original
Outcome
writ denied — Petition is DENIED.
Area
civil
Panel
Benjamin J. Cheeks (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:29Z · confidence high

The court considered a second, successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an immigration detainee seeking release or a bond hearing after an Immigration Judge denied bond following a hearing ordered by the court in a prior case. The court denied the petition, finding it barred by the abuse of the writ doctrine and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

What the court decidedThe model
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus denied
“Accordingly, the present Petition is DENIED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the abuse of the writ doctrine to dismiss the successive petition because the petitioner had already obtained the specific relief sought (a bond hearing) in the prior case and failed to demonstrate new grounds or prejudice. Additionally, the court correctly identified that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing the Immigration Judge's adverse bond determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which is a prerequisite for federal habeas review in immigration detention cases.

The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is procedurally sound in its application of the abuse of the writ doctrine, correctly noting that the petitioner received the relief sought in the prior case. However, the order is 'sound with gaps' because it relies on the general exhaustion principle without citing the specific Ninth Circuit precedent (such as Rodriguez v. INS or similar cases) that mandates exhaustion of administrative remedies (appeal to the BIA) as a jurisdictional prerequisite for federal habeas review in immigration detention cases. While the result is correct, the legal basis for the exhaustion requirement is stated as a general rule rather than citing the binding circuit authority that governs this specific procedural requirement.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RIGOBERTO FIERROS PEDROZA, Case No.: 26-cv-892-BJC-VET 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 13 v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al, 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is the second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 19 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by Petitioner, Rigoberto Fierros Pedroza. The first Petition was 20 filed on December 8, 2025, in case number 25-cv-3479. In that Petition, Petitioner, 21 represented by counsel, requested immediate release from custody or that the Court order 22 Respondents to conduct a bond hearing. The Court granted the Petition on January 13, 23 2026, and ordered Respondents to hold a bond hearing no later than January 27, 2026. On 24 January 23, 2026, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) conducted a bond hearing pursuant to this 25 Court’s Order and denied Petitioner bond, finding that he did not meet his burden to show 26 he was not a flight risk. 27 On February 11, 2026, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the current Petition for 28 | ||hearing pursuant to the first Petition, Petitioner asserts that his prolonged detention since 2 || October 31, 2025, without a bond hearing violates the Sth Amendment and Zadvydas vy. 3 || Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). ECF No. 1 at 7. Petitioner seeks his immediate release, or a 4 ||bond hearing. Jd. at 8 5 A successive petition that raises identical grounds for relief as a prior petition must 6 || be dismissed unless the petitioner can show (1) cause for bringing a successive petition and 7 prejudice would result or (2) that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result 8 || from failure to entertain the claim. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991); 9 || Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963). The government bears the burden of 10 || pleading abuse of the writ. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 477. 11 Respondents contend that the second Petition must be dismissed because Petitioner 12 || was previously granted the relief he sought and “nothing has changed in the 8 weeks 13 || between the filing of the December Petition and the February Petition.” Return ECF No. 14 |/4 at 2. In addition, Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative 15 ||remedies because he did not appeal the IJ’s determination that he is a flight risk. /d. at 3. 16 || Petitioner has not filed a Reply to the Government’s Return. 17 The Court finds that Respondent has met their burden to demonstrate that the current 18 || Petition must be dismissed under the abuse of the writ doctrine. Petitioner was granted the 19 || relief he sought in the first Petition, yet he has now filed a second and successive Petition 20 |/raising identical grounds for relief. In addition, Petitioner has not exhausted his 21 || administrative remedies because he has not appealed the IJ’s determination that he is a risk 22 || of flight. Accordingly, the present Petition is DENIED. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494- 23 ||95. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 || Dated: May 29, 2026 27 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks 28 United States District Judge