Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 JEFFREY BRADLEY, et al., Case No.: 25-cv-2186-AGS-MMP 13 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 14 v. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR EXPEDITED SITE INSPECTION 15 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 16 Defendants. [ECF No. 15] 17 18 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Expedited Discovery in which 20 Plaintiffs seek leave to conduct a site inspection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 (“Rule”) 34 of two homeless camps in the Safe Sleeping Program that are the subject of 22 this lawsuit. ECF No. 15 at 3. Defendants filed an opposition, to which Plaintiffs replied. 23 ECF Nos. 20, 23. The Court found the motion suitable for determination on the papers and 24 without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). ECF No. 14. For the reasons 25 set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the motion. 26 I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiffs are eight unhoused people with disabilities who reside at two homeless 28 camps designated under Safe Sleeping Program operated by Defendants City of San Diego 1 (“City”) and its contractors, Defendants Dreams for Change and Downtown San Diego 2 Partnership. ECF No. 15-1 at 3; First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 12 ¶ 1. The 3 Safe Sleeping Program is a free, voluntary, and temporary campsite program where 4 participants experiencing homelessness reside temporarily at one of the two camps located 5 at Park Boulevard and Wieber Avenue (“O lot”) and 26th Street and Pershing Drive (“B 6 lot”). ECF No. 15 at 3; ECF No. 20 at 5. Plaintiffs allege residents stay for months or years 7 at a time, are assigned individual tents, and may come and go as they please while living 8 in the Safe Sleeping Program except when nighttime curfew is enforced. FAC ¶ 35. 9 Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and putative class members,1 contend the camps are 10 unsafe, “uninhabitable, inhumane, and inaccessible” and assert disability discrimination 11 and violation of their civil rights under California and federal law, seeking injunctive, 12 declaratory, and compensatory relief. ECF No. 15-1 at 3; see FAC ¶ 36. 13 Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in August 2025 and the operative FAC on January 12, 14 2026. ECF Nos. 1, 12. Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC, which Judge Schopler 15 denied in substantial part. ECF Nos. 16, 17, 19, 36. Plaintiffs have until June 8, 2026 to 16 file a Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 36. 17 In the instant motion, Plaintiffs request leave of court to conduct site inspections of 18 two homeless camps pursuant to Rule 34 prior to the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference. ECF 19 No. 15 at 3. Plaintiffs served a proposed Request for Inspection of both camps indicating: 20 During said inspections, plaintiffs may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property. Plaintiffs will make the utmost effort to ensure 21 that the privacy rights of individuals living at either camp location are 22 protected, and plaintiffs will avoid taking any photographs that show any resident without the resident’s express permission. 23 24 25 1 Plaintiffs seek to represent a putative class of “all present and/or formerly homeless 26 persons who reside, formerly resided, will reside, and/or seek to reside in one or both of 27 the Camp B and/or Camp O locations pursuant to the City of San Diego’s ‘Safe Sleeping Program.’” FAC ¶ 17. 28 1 ECF No. 15-2 at 6. Plaintiffs contend they need early discovery to develop evidence for a 2 preliminary-injunction motion and to document current camp conditions within 3 Defendants’ exclusive control. ECF No. 15 at 3. In support of their request, Plaintiffs 4 highlight two tent fire incidents at the O lot and detail how camp security denied their 5 counsel access to residents, including those with mobility impairments. ECF No. 15-1 at 6 4. These facts, Plaintiffs contend, demonstrate the urgency of prompt inspection. See id. 7 Plaintiffs further assert good cause exists because inspections will be permitted in the 8 ordinary course, may streamline the case by narrowing or confirming issues, and the timing 9 will not impose undue hardship on Defendants. Id.; ECF No. 15 at 3. 10 Defendants do not dispute the relevancy of the site inspections; nor do they assert 11 any specific prejudice or hardship if the inspections occur now as opposed to later in the 12 case. See ECF No. 20. Rather, Defendants oppose based on privacy concerns, the length 13 and scope of the inspection, and lack of sufficient notice. Id. at 4–5. Defendants explain 14 individuals participating in the Safe Sleep Program agree to the following condition: 15 Under absolutely no circumstances may the participant(s) invite any visitors or any guests onto the site. Clients from B lot are not permitted to be at O lot 16 or access O lot facilities under ANY circumstances, and vice versa. Similarly, 17 clients from O lot cannot visit or be at B lot for any reason.

18 ECF No. 20 at 2.2 According to Defendants, “[t]he hundreds of participants in Safe 19 Sleeping are entitled to the benefit of the condition” and permitting a “site inspection 20 violates this condition and their expectation of privacy.” Id. at 3. Based on these privacy 21 concerns, Defendants argue participants must have “sufficient, advanced notice of the date, 22 time, and terms of the inspection” with a “reasonable opportunity to temporarily vacate the 23 premises during the inspection” and further contend the inspection “should be very limited 24 in scope.” Id. In addition, Defendants assert participants are entitled to use all common 25 26 27 2 Although Defendants did not include a declaration attesting to this condition, the Court 28 1 areas and bathrooms at any time, and therefore there should be no photographs, video, or 2 audio recordings taken during a site inspection. Id. at 4. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Rule 34 authorizes a party to “serve on any other party a request within the scope of 5 Rule 26(b) . . . to permit entry onto designated . . . property possessed or controlled by the 6 responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, 7 test, or sample the property or any designated object or operation on it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 34(a)(2). 9 Rule 26(b)(1), in turn, defines the scope of discovery as follows: 10 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the 11 case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the 12 amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 13 whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 14 benefit.

15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible 16 in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. 17 As both parties acknowledge, discovery is generally not permitted until after the 18 parties have conferred pursuant to Rule 26(f), which has not yet occurred in this case. See 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1); ECF No. 15-1 at 3; ECF No. 20 at 4. The parties agree the Court 20 should assess Plaintiffs’ request for early discovery under the “good cause” standard 21 discussed in Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electrom Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 22 2002). ECF No. 15-1 at 3; ECF No. 20 at 4. “Good cause may be found where the need for 23 expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the 24 prejudice to the responding party.” Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276; see also Am. LegalNet, 25 Inc. v. Davis, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citation omitted). The Court 26 weighs the following non-exclusive factors in considering whether early discovery is 27 appropriate: “(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the 28 discovery requests; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden 1 on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical 2 discovery process the request was made.” Id. at 1067 (citation omitted). 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 The relevance of the requested discovery—here, site inspections of the two Safe 5 Sleeping camps—is not at issue. Thus, like in Semitool, “[t]he issue is whether there is 6 good cause to provide immediate access to the requested discovery rather than postponing 7 its ultimate production during the normal course of discovery.” 208 F.R.D. at 276. 8 Upon weighing the above factors, and in consideration of the administration of 9 justice, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have established their need for the expedited site 10 inspection of the O lot outweighs the prejudice articulated by Defendants of providing 11 immediate access. See id. 12 A. Whether to Seek an Early Injunction and the Purpose for Requesting the Expedited Discovery 13 14 Plaintiffs seek early discovery to determine whether to seek a preliminary injunction, 15 which is relevant to both the first and third factors of the “good cause” analysis identified 16 above. See Am. LegalNet, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. 17 “Although a motion for a preliminary injunction is not pending, expedited discovery 18 may be justified to allow a plaintiff to determine whether to seek an early injunction.” 19 Intrepid Automation, Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp., No. 24-cv-2262-AGS-DDL, 2025 WL 712652, 20 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2025) (citation modified); see also Dunsmore v. San Diego Cnty. 21 Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 20-cv-406-AJB-DDL, 2023 WL 215724, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 22 2023) (“Good cause is often established in cases where a preliminary injunction is or may 23 be sought.”); Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26(d) 24 (Discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference “will be appropriate in some cases, such as 25 those involving requests for a preliminary injunction or motions challenging personal 26 jurisdiction.”). “But expedited discovery is not automatically granted merely because a 27 party seeks a preliminary injunction.” Am. LegalNet, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. “Expedited 28 discovery must be narrowly tailored to obtain information relevant to the determination of 1 whether an injunction should issue.” Intrepid Automation, 2025 WL 712652, at *2 (citation 2 modified). 3 Plaintiffs contend early site inspections are essential to “develop evidence in support 4 of their claims for preliminary injunction” and “to document the current conditions of the 5 camps which are under the exclusive management and control of the defendants.” ECF No. 6 15 at 3. Plaintiffs further explain the “pressing need for a prompt inspection [is] due to the 7 fire danger at the camps” including due to the close proximity of the tents. ECF No. 15-1 8 at 4. Plaintiffs provide a declaration from Plaintiff Abood, who witnessed another Safe 9 Sleeping participant’s tent catch fire in early 2025 while a resident in the O lot. ECF No. 10 15-3 ¶¶ 2–3. According to Plaintiff Abood, the fire originated when a participant was 11 burning candles for warmth, which “is a common practice at the camp because the tents 12 can get cold and there is no heating available.” Id. ¶ 6. She further estimates the tents were 13 positioned approximately two feet apart. Id. ¶ 5. According to Plaintiffs, this fire was not 14 an isolated incident. Plaintiffs also reference counsel Ann Menasche’s declaration 15 regarding her interview with a putative class member, an O lot resident, about a tent fire in 16 January 2026. ECF Nos. 15-3, 15-4. Although counsel attached the proposed declaration 17 as an exhibit, she was unable to obtain the putative class member’s signature prior to filing. 18 ECF No. 15-4 ¶¶ 4–6. Attorney Menasche further attests camp security denied her access 19 to the O lot to meet with participants after consulting with Defendant Downtown 20 Partnerships. Id. ¶ 6. This restricted access, Plaintiffs argue, reinforces the urgency of the 21 requested inspection. ECF No. 15-1 at 4. 22 In response, Defendants do not dispute the incidents of fire or the close proximity of 23 the tents. ECF No. 20 at 5. Rather, they contend Safe Sleeping prohibits the use of candles 24 or engaging in activities that could pose a fire hazard, and as the fires were controlled and 25 did not spread to other living spaces, they are “not evidence that participating in Safe 26 Sleeping poses a bigger risk of injury from an uncontrolled fire than living anywhere else 27 in San Diego, including in or near a homeless encampment.” Id. Defendants also cite the 28 1 condition prohibiting participants from inviting any visitors or guests onto the camp sites 2 as the reason counsel was not permitted entry. Id. at 2–3. 3 Plaintiffs have established good cause to conduct an early inspection of the O lot 4 only. Though Plaintiffs seek generally to develop evidence to determine whether to seek a 5 preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs’ rationale supporting the expedited nature of the 6 requested site inspection is risk of fire danger. As no evidence before the Court addresses 7 the B lot, Plaintiffs have established the need for immediate site inspection as to the O lot 8 only. Thus, on this record, both factors of the purpose for expedited discovery, as well as 9 whether to seek an early injunction, support permitting an expedited inspection of the O 10 lot only. See Dunsmore, 2023 WL 215724, at *2 (recognizing expedited discovery should 11 be “narrowly tailored to obtain information relevant” to determining whether to seek an 12 injunction) (citation omitted). 13 B. The Breadth of The Site Inspection and Burden on Defendants to Comply 14 Plaintiffs represent the site inspection will be conducted by their counsel and two 15 experts and may include inspecting, measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or 16 sampling the property. ECF No. 23 at 5–6; ECF No. 15-2. Though Plaintiffs initially did 17 not provide a duration, they estimate in their reply brief that inspection of the O lot will 18 take four hours. ECF No. 23 at 5. 19 Defendants oppose the site inspections based on lack of sufficient notice, the length 20 and scope of the inspection, and concerns regarding the participants’ privacy. See ECF No. 21 20 at 1, 3–4. The Court finds these arguments are relevant to the factors of “the breadth of 22 the discovery requests” and “the burden on the defendants to comply with the requests[.]” 23 See Am. LegalNet, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (citation omitted). 24 First, the Court rejects Defendants’ contention Plaintiffs failed to provide “statutory 25 notice.” ECF No. 20 at 1. Defendants argue they received “shortened” notice based on the 26 dates included in the proposed inspection notice. Id. at 4. However, because the inspection 27 date was merely proposed and never formally noticed by Plaintiffs or authorized by the 28 Court, Defendants’ objection based on “shortened notice” lacks merit. 1 Defendants next assert the proposed inspection scope is overly broad and, without 2 elaboration, suggest a one-hour limitation. ECF No. 20 at 4. Defendants contend to ensure 3 participants’ access to common areas and bathrooms, the participants are entitled to 4 “sufficient, advanced notice of the date, time, and terms of the inspection” as well as “a 5 reasonable opportunity to temporarily vacate the premises during the inspection.” ECF No. 6 20 at 3. 7 The Court agrees and therefore imposes conditions tailored to accommodate both 8 Plaintiffs’ inspection needs and the participants’ ability to access common areas and 9 bathrooms. The parties shall submit a joint protocol outlining the time, date, and scope of 10 the inspection. To that end, Defendants must provide Plaintiffs’ counsel with a map or 11 layout plan of the O lot within ten (10) days of this Order. To minimize any disruption, the 12 parties shall schedule the inspection to avoid periods of peak facility use. The Court will 13 also require the parties to provide public notice of the inspection within the O lot at least 14 fourteen (14) days in advance, including separate notice in the common areas, bathrooms, 15 and the entrance to the O lot. The notice must specifically state if and when a common area 16 or bathroom is expected to be temporarily inaccessible during the inspection. 17 Finally, Defendants raise substantial privacy concerns, asserting “participants in 18 Safe Sleeping should not be treated like their lives are on display for any reason.” ECF No. 19 20 at 3. As Defendants highlight, all participants in the Safe Sleeping Program agree to 20 prohibit visitors, so permitting counsel and experts to inspect the camps exceeds the 21 participants’ customary expectations. Notably, none of the privacy concerns relate to the 22 timing of the inspection. Further, given the nature of the Safe Sleeping Program— 23 participants reside at the campsites temporarily while they look for long-term housing— 24 specific protective measures are appropriate regardless of when the inspection occurs. 25 Indeed, Plaintiffs have already agreed to “make the utmost effort to ensure that the privacy 26 rights of individuals living at either camp location are protected” including “avoid[ing] 27 taking any photographs that show any resident without the resident’s express permission” 28 and “delet[ing] all photographs where residents or identifying information were 1 accidentally captured.” ECF No. 15-2 at 6; ECF No. 23 at 5. The Court extends this 2 prohibition to video and audio recordings as well. In addition, to minimize any disruption 3 to other participants, Plaintiffs shall not conduct interviews with program participants 4 during the inspection. However, Defendants’ counsel will facilitate the provision of 5 information to Plaintiffs’ counsel and experts, as reasonably necessary, during the 6 inspection. 7 Counsel shall meet and confer to have a protective order entered prior to the 8 inspection. In addition, counsel shall negotiate an inspection protocol that includes specific 9 parameters for the inspection (date, time, duration, and scope) and concrete privacy 10 safeguards. Counsel for the parties are best positioned to craft procedures that facilitate 11 Plaintiffs’ access while minimizing the burden on Defendants and respecting the 12 participants’ needs and the program’s operation. 13 C. How Far in Advance of The Typical Discovery Process the Request was Made 14 15 Finally, the Court considers the factor of “how far in advance of the typical discovery 16 process the request was made.” Am. LegalNet, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. Plaintiffs filed this 17 action in August 2025. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court recently 18 denied in substantial part and granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. ECF No. 19 36. While the pleadings may not be fully set yet, some claims survived the motion, and 20 Plaintiffs’ allegations of unsafe and dangerous conditions—particularly the documented 21 risk of fire at the O lot—present significant concerns underscoring the need for early 22 inspection. See Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276 (“The issue is whether there is good cause to 23 provide immediate access to the requested discovery rather than postponing its ultimate 24 production during the normal course of discovery.”); c.f. Synopsys, Inc. v. AzurEngine 25 Techs., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1076 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (finding “no evidence that the 26 data is otherwise at risk of spoliation” weighed against expedited discovery). 27 The Court has also carefully considered Defendants’ opposition. On this record, 28 Defendants do not dispute the relevance of the discovery sought and have articulated no 1 specific prejudice or burden resulting from the timing of the inspection. Consequently, “the 2 Court is unable to discern any real prejudice to Defendants in advancing discovery by a 3 modest amount of time.” Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 277. While the inspection will require 4 logistical coordination, the minimal burden and expense to Defendants is substantially 5 outweighed by the potential value of early fact development of the O lot’s conditions. 6 Moreover, there is no other way for Plaintiffs to obtain the evidence, which is exclusively 7 with Defendants’ control. See, e.g., Alvarez v. LaRose, No. 20-cv-782-DMS-AHG, 2020 8 WL 5594908, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020) (recognizing “firsthand observation of 9 conditions” of a facility through a site inspection “is likely to yield information that could 10 not be readily obtained through secondhand accounts”) (quoting Chunn v. Edge, No. 20- 11 cv-1590-RPK, 2020 WL 1872523 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020)). 12 In sum, the Court finds Plaintiffs have established good cause for early inspection 13 of the O lot rather than postponing the inspection to the normal course of discovery. See 14 Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276. 15 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 16 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion 17 for an early inspection of the O lot and ORDERS as follows: 18 1. No later than June 8, 2026, Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs’ counsel with: 19 a. A map or layout plan of the O lot; and 20 b. Proposed dates for a site inspection of the O lot at least 30 days and no 21 more than 60 days from the date of this Order. 22 2. Counsel shall meet and confer by videoconference or in person to establish 23 the precise date, time, scope, and duration of the inspection. To address Defendants’ 24 concerns about uninterrupted access to common facilities and restrooms, counsel shall 25 consider whether the inspection should be conducted in a single session (not to exceed two 26 hours) or scheduled over two shorter sessions (up to one hour each). 27 3. The parties shall set the inspection of the O lot to occur at a mutually 28 convenient time based on the dates provided by Defendants. l 4. The parties shall provide written notice to O lot participants at least fourteen 2 ||(14) days before the inspection. Such notice must include the inspection’s date, time, and 3 scope and must be posted in common areas, bathrooms, and the entrance to the O lot. The 4 ||notice must specifically identify if and when a common area or bathroom will be 5 || temporarily inaccessible during the inspection. 6 5. Plaintiffs shall not take photographs, video, or audio recordings depicting any 7 || Safe Sleeping participant without that person’s express permission. Any accidental capture 8 an unpermitted person must be immediately deleted. 9 6. Plaintiffs shall not conduct interviews with Safe Sleeping participants during 10 inspection. Defendants’ counsel shall cooperate in providing relevant factual 11 ||information to Plaintiffs’ counsel and experts as reasonably necessary during the 12 inspection. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: May 29, 2026 Me aha. th. 9hotrid- 15 HON. MICHELLE M. PETTIT United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28