Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEVIN JOSUE ARANDA MARTINEZ, Case No.: 26-cv-2905-JES-AHG 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 WARDEN, Otay Mesa Detention Center; FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, ICE San 15 Diego Field Office; TODD M. LYONS, 16 Acting Director, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 17 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland 18 Security; and MERRICK GARLAND, United States Attorney General, 19 Respondents. 20 21 22 23 24 Before the Court is Petitioner Kevin Josue Aranda Martinez’s Amended Petition for 25 Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), now the operative 26 petition in this matter. ECF No. 7. Per the Court’s order, Respondents responded to the 27 28 1 Petition. ECF No. 9 (“Return”). Petitioner filed an optional Traverse. ECF No. 10. For the 2 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner, a native of Honduras, entered the United States in January of 2019. Pet. 5 at 2. He was arrested by Border Patrol, placed in removal proceedings, and paroled into the 6 country. Id. 7 While living in the country, Petitioner applied for a Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa. 8 Id. He received a work permit and a Social Security number. Id. at 3. He has attended all 9 his court dates and has no criminal history. Id. 10 On February 22, 2026, Petitioner was re-detained. Id. He was not given any notice, 11 information, or opportunity to be heard regarding his re-detention. Id. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 14 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 15 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 16 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 17 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 18 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 19 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 20 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 21 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 22 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 23 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 24 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 In his petition, Petitioner argues that his re-detention and the manner in which it was 27 carried out violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative 28 Procedure Act. Pet. at 3-7. In their return, Respondents briefly argue that Petitioner is 1 subject to mandatory detention, but acknowledge that this Court and courts in this district 2 have reached the opposite conclusion under similar facts. Return at 2. As such, 3 Respondents state that they “do[] not oppose the petition and defer[] to the Court on the 4 appropriate relief.” Id. 5 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from 6 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of 7 law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause 8 applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is 9 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from 10 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 11 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering 12 a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner 13 and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 14 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 15 Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of 16 parole. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. 17 Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 18 2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public 19 benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1226(a). Id. Courts have recognized that typically, the term “released on their own 21 recognizance” refers to conditional parole. Id.; see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 22 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘released on 23 recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)”); Castellon, 2025 24 WL 2373425, at *4; Faizyan v. Casey, No. 3:25-CV-0884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, 25 at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025). 26 Courts have held that such parole status entitles the petitioner to certain due process 27 rights under both procedural due process and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 28 See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under 1 APA); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding 2 violation under procedural due process). Similarly, for conditional release under § 1226(a), 3 the court in Pinchi explained similar procedural due process rights: 4 [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a 5 danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining 6 at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the 7 noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 8 would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release 9 [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is 10 not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. 11 Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE 12 officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release 13 [Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court 14 must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither. [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that 15 her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions 16 of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain 17 neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. . . . Accordingly, 18 [Petitioner’s] private interest in retaining her liberty is significant.

19 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034-35 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Several district courts 20 have followed suit and found due process violations. See C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25- 21 CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding due 22 process violation where petitioner was originally released on OREC); Leiva Flores, 2025 23 WL 3228306, at *5 (similarly finding procedural due process violation for petitioner 24 released on OREC and requiring hearing before detention); Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, 25 at *7 (same). 26 The Court agrees with all the foregoing courts and similarly holds that Petitioner has 27 procedural due process rights arising from his parole. As this Court explained in Sanchez 28 1 || v. ZaRose, due process requires not only notice and opportunity to be heard, but also that 2 || the notice and opportunity be meaningful. No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629 3 *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). Here, Petitioner alleges that he was not provided with an 4 opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation of his release. Pet. at 2. Respondents do 5 ||not argue otherwise. See generally Return. Further, without changed circumstances or 6 || another factor justifying re-detention, any notice and opportunity to be heard that did occur 7 || could not have been meaningful. See Rios v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2866-JES-VET, 2025 WL 8 ||3141207, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“An alien's opportunity to be heard regarding a 9 change in his status is only meaningful if the government comports with its own internal 10 ||standards regarding parole revocation. DHS has the authority to revoke an alien's 11 || supervised release ‘at any time’ on a discretionary, but not unlimited, basis.”). Accordingly, 12 Court finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they re- 13 detained him on February 22, 2026. 14 IV. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas 16 ||corpus. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process ground and concludes 17 ||that Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s parole violates procedural due process, 18 Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to 19 conditions of his preexisting release that existed at the time he was re-detained. The 20 || Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by May 28, 2026, confirming that 21 || Petitioner has been released. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: May 26, 2026 24 Aa Sin, 26 United States District Judge 27 28 «