Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CRECENCIO HERNANDEZ, Case No.: 26-cv-2676-JES-DDL 12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, 15 Secretary of DHS; TODD LYONS, 16 Director of ICE; and CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden of Otay Mesa 17 Detention Center, 18 Respondents. 19 20 Before the Court is Petitioner Crecencio Hernandez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 21 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed on April 27, 2026. ECF No. 1 22 (“Pet.”). Pursuant to the Court’s order, Respondents filed a Return to the Petition. ECF No. 23 10 (“Return”). After due consideration and for the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES 24 WITHOUT PREJUDICE the petition. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who became a lawful permanent resident 27 of the United States in 2006. Return at 2. On June 25, 2020, Petitioner was convicted of 28 arson and sentenced to 16 months in prison. Id. On November 14, 2024, Petitioner was 1 convicted for Assault by Means of Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury and 2 sentenced to three years in prison. Id. 3 Petitioner was detained by Respondents on June 25, 2025, on grounds of 4 Respondents charging him with deportability/removability under 8 U.S.C. § 5 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for his criminal convictions. Id. Petitioner was ordered removed on 6 November 21, 2025, and appealed his order of removal. Id. at 3. His appeal is still pending. 7 Id. 8 On February 27, 2026, Petitioner was granted a bond hearing, at which bond was 9 denied. Id. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 12 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 13 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 14 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 15 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 16 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 17 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 18 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 19 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 20 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 21 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 22 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 Petitioner argues that he is entitled to release under Zadvydas because he has been 25 detained by Respondents for more than a year. Pet at 2. In the Return, Respondents argue, 26 27 28 1 inter alia, that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that the only proper 2 remedy for his prolonged detention is a bond hearing, which has already been granted. 3 Return at 3-4. 4 Respondents are correct. While Petitioner raises a Zadvydas claim for release, 5 Zadvydas v. Davis applies to individuals subject to a final order of removal. See 533 U.S. 6 at 680. Because Petitioner has appealed his order of removal, it is not yet final. What’s 7 more, Zadvydas claims typically arise after the six-month period of presumptively 8 reasonable detention ends following a final order of removal. See id. On the face of the 9 Petition, the only remedy that could be available to Petitioner is a bond hearing. 10 District courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 11 319 (1976), test when addressing due process where a petitioner has already been afforded 12 at a least one bond hearing. See, e.g., Sahota v. Allen, No. 20-CV-03180-WHO, 2020 WL 13 2992872, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2020) (using Mathews framework to determine whether 14 bond hearing was appropriate where petitioner’s last bond hearing was two years prior); 15 Rubin v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Field Off. Dir., No. 2:24-CV-00260-TL- 16 TLF, 2024 WL 3431914, at *6 (W.D. Wash. June 28, 2024) (“Because petitioner has 17 already received a bond hearing (at which the Government had the burden), the Court 18 should apply the Mathews test in this case.”); Singh v. United States Immigr. & Customs 19 Enf’t, No. 2:22-CV-00548-BHS-TLF, 2023 WL 4627819, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 20 2023) (“[W]here a petitioner has already had a hearing, courts in this District have applied 21 the Mathews test to determine whether an additional bond hearing is required.”); Espinoza 22 v. Wofford, No. 1:24-CV-01118-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 1556590, at *12 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 23 24 1 Respondents also raise arguments regarding administrative exhaustion and jurisdiction 25 which are substantively identical to those addressed by the undersigned in Chiapot Perez v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 26-CV-2393-JES-AHG, 2026 WL 1333755 26 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2026). The Court adopts its reasoning in that case by reference here, 27 finds that it has jurisdiction to hear this claim, and addresses only arguments cognizable on habeas in this order. See id. 28 1 2025) (“Here, as Petitioner has already received a bond hearing and is seeking a second 2 bond hearing, the Court finds that the three-part test set forth in [Mathews] is applicable.”); 3 Ortuno-Perez v. ICE Field Off. Dir., No. 2:23-CV-344-BHS-DWC, 2023 WL 5807305, at 4 *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2023) (“Where a petitioner has already had a bond hearing, 5 courts in this District have applied the test set forth in [Mathews] to determine whether an 6 additional bond hearing is required.”). 7 Under Mathews, the Court must consider three factors: “(1) the private interest at 8 stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest at stake through the 9 procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 10 (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 11 administrative burdens that any additional procedural requirements would entail. 424 U.S. 12 at 335. 13 As to the first factor, it is indisputable that “the private interest at issue here is 14 ‘fundamental’: freedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the 15 Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 16 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 17 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due 18 Process] Clause protects.”); Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 19 2022) (“We have also held, more generally, that an individual’s private interest in ‘freedom 20 from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably substantial.’”). While courts have considered 21 the relative strength of this interest at different stages of the removal process, they have 22 generally rejected the government’s efforts to meaningfully distinguish between the liberty 23 interests of detainees at various stages and detention under different provisions of the INA. 24 See Rubin, 2024 WL 3431914, at *7. However, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that courts 25 should not “overstate the strength of [Petitioner]’s showing under the first Mathews factor.” 26 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207. “[W]e cannot simply count his months of detention and 27 leave it at that. We must also consider the process he received during this time, the further 28 process that was available to him, and the fact that his detention was prolonged due to his 1 decision to challenge his removal order.” Id. Here, Petitioner’s detention had become 2 prolonged. However, courts have recognized that this interest is “somewhat diminished” 3 where petitioners have had a prior bond hearing. See Alvarez v. Beccerra, No. 1:26-CV- 4 00008 DC SCR, 2026 WL 295552, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2026). Petitioner does not raise 5 any concerns with the validity of the bond hearing in his petition. Thus, the Court finds 6 that this factor weighs slightly in favor of Petitioner. 7 In evaluating the second Mathews factor, “the Ninth Circuit has looked to whether 8 the detainee has a statutory right to procedural protections, such as individualized custody 9 determinations and the right to seek additional bond hearings throughout detention.” 10 Jensen v. Garland, No. 5:21-cv-01195-CAS (AFM), 2023 WL 3246522, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 11 May 3, 2023) (citing Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1209-10). Generally, where a noncitizen 12 has been afforded some process, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest 13 and the value of additional procedures is very low unless he can demonstrate a material 14 change in circumstances since his last bond hearing.” Rubin, 2024 WL 3431914, at *8. In 15 evaluating this factor, courts may take into consideration when Petitioner’s last bond 16 hearing was held and whether Petitioner has articulated any changed circumstances. Here, 17 Petitioner’s last bond hearing was held in February, about three months ago. This falls 18 short of the length of time where courts generally find this factors tips to Petitioner. See, 19 e.g., Alvarez, 2026 WL 295552, at *6 (finding factor weighed against petitioner where 20 previous bond hearing was a year ago); Cruz-Olvera v. Henkey, No. 2:26-CV-00218-CDS- 21 EJY, 2026 WL 658917, at *5 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2026) (finding factor weighed against 22 petitioner where previous bond hearing was six months ago); but see Sahota, 2020 WL 23 2992872, at *6 (finding factor weighed for petitioner where previous bond hearing was one 24 and a half years ago). In addition, Petitioner has not articulated any changed circumstances 25 that may affect the bond determination. Thus, the Court concludes that this factor weighs 26 against Petitioner. 27 As to the third factor, it is similarly indisputable that the government has strong 28 interests in enforcing the INA’s statutory framework for detention of “noncitizens whom 1 ||Congress has deemed pose a flight risk or danger to the community based on their 2 ||offenses.” Rubin, 2024 WL 3431914, at *7. It also has a strong interest in the 3 || “[e]nforcement of [the] immigration laws,” particularly paying attention to the sovereign 4 ||interests at stake in the immigration context. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. However, 5 ||courts have distinguished the strength of this interest depending on whether the noncitizen 6 ||seeks release or another bond hearing. Governmental interests in enforcing immigration 7 || laws in general may be substantial, but in the context of whether to provide Petitioner with 8 ||}another bond hearing or not, this interest may be diminished if another bond hearing is 9 ||sought because “courts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is 10 relatively minimal” and usually, providing another bond hearing would not be “fiscally or 11 ||administratively burdensome.” Eliazar G.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:24-CV-01032-EPG-HC, 12 ||2025 WL 711190, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2025). Here, the government’s interest is 13 || mitigated by the “minimal cost,” but this must be balanced against Petitioner’s lack of any 14 || expressed changed circumstances since his last bond hearing. Thus, the Court finds that 15 || this factor tips in favor of the government. 16 In conclusion, weighing the Mathews factors overall, the Court concludes that due 17 || process does not require ordering another bond hearing for Petitioner at this time. 18 IV. CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 20 || Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 |! Dated: May 26, 2026 23 4am Sin, 24 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. United States District Judge 26 27 28