Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TAMERA RAYNELL RICHARDSON, Case No.: 3:26-cv-888-CAB-JLB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING IFP APPLICATION; 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 15 Defendant. (2) GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT; 16 17 (3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT; and 18 (4) DENYING VARIOUS MOTIONS. 19 [Doc. Nos. 2–6, 10] 20 21 Plaintiff Tamera Raynell Richardson, proceeding pro se, brings suit against 22 Defendant United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for 23 alleged injuries she suffered from negligent medical care provided by “federally funded 24 and federally deemed healthcare providers acting within the scope of federal employment.” 25 [Doc. No. 11 (“Second Amended Complaint”) at 1.] 26 Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the 27 time of filing; instead, she filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 5.] Plaintiff also filed five other motions: for a writ of 2 mandamus, for leave to electronically file documents, for expedited consideration, to 3 amend the original complaint, and for service by U.S. marshals. [Doc Nos. 2–4, 6, 10.] 4 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion to proceed IFP, GRANTS 5 the motion to amend the complaint, DENIES the motion for leave to electronically file 6 documents, DISMISSES the Second Amended Complaint, and DENIES AS MOOT the 7 remaining motions. 8 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 9 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See 10 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). But under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the court may authorize 11 any suit’s commencement, prosecution, or defense without payment of fees if the plaintiff 12 submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing he or she is 13 unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 14 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of 15 life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A] plaintiff seeking 16 IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Granting or denying leave to proceed IFP in civil cases 18 is within the district court’s sound discretion. Venable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 20 Richardson states her income is $509 per month in public assistance benefits with 21 $761 in monthly expenses. [See generally Doc. No. 5.] Richardson sufficiently alleges 22 that she cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of life. The Court GRANTS 23 her motion to proceed IFP. [Doc. No. 5.] 24 II. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 25 Richardson filed her initial complaint on February 12, 2026. [Doc. No. 1.] She then 26 filed a motion to amend the complaint on February 26, 2026. [Doc. No. 6.] Before the 27 Court ruled on the motion, she filed an amended complaint on the same day, [Doc. No. 7], 28 and then a second amended complaint on April 28, 2026, [Doc. No. 11]. 1 Courts are to allow amendments to pleadings with extreme liberality, particularly 2 where the party seeking leave to amend is appearing pro se. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 3 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). As such, the Court GRANTS the motion to amend, [Doc. 4 No. 6], and treats Richardson’s Second Amended Complaint as the operative complaint. 5 III. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ELECTRONICALLY FILE DOCUMENTS 6 Richardson seeks permission to electronically file documents with the Court. [Doc. 7 No. 3.] District rules require a motion for leave to electronically file to comply with the 8 Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual, which includes the 9 applicant confirming they possess the necessary hardware and software. Richardson does 10 not confirm within her motion whether she has “regular access to the technical 11 requirements necessary to e-file successfully[.]” [Doc. No. 3.] Indeed, she left every box 12 on the standard form unchecked. [Id.] Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion for 13 leave to electronically file documents. 14 IV. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT 15 A. Legal Standard 16 A plaintiff proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte 17 dismissal if the complaint is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief 18 may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 19 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 20 (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. 21 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits 22 but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 23 claim.”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and court 24 costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing 25 frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) 26 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 27 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 28 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 1 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 2 1108, 112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual 3 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court construes 5 pro se pleadings liberally. See Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2008). 6 B. Discussion 7 Richardson alleges that on December 17, 1993, she received a Depo-Provera 8 injection after giving birth to her child without being “adequately informed of material 9 risks associated with prolonged use of Depo-Provera.” [Doc. No. 11 at 3.] The medical 10 providers were allegedly “associated with federally supported healthcare services.” [Id.] 11 Richardson alleges she continued to receive Depo-Provera injections at multiple, federally 12 funded healthcare facilities and “experienced progressive medical complications consistent 13 with prolonged exposure to Depo-Provera.” [Id.] She alleges the medical providers who 14 treated her were negligent. 15 Richardson’s negligence claim fails for various reasons. To begin, the complaint 16 lacks “sufficient factual matter.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Richardson does not allege 17 who the relevant medical providers were, what healthcare facilities she received treatment 18 at, or what exact injuries she sustained. Moreover, “the extent of the United States’ liability 19 under the FTCA is generally determined by reference to state law.” Molzof v. United 20 States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992). The Court cannot determine what state’s substantive law 21 applies given that Richardson does not specify when or where the alleged events occurred 22 or which medical personnel were involved. See Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 23 1289 (9th Cir. 2026) (“It is not the job of the district courts to make sense of the pleading, 24 to supply facts to support the claim, or to imagine the claims that might fit the facts.”). 25 Furthermore, Richardson fails to sufficiently allege that she exhausted her 26 administrative remedies. The FTCA bars any tort claim against the federal government 27 unless the claim is filed with “the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such 28 claim accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). “In a medical malpractice case under the FTCA, a 1 |}claim accrues when then plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence 2 ||should have discovered, the injury and its cause.” Tunac v. United States, 897 F.3d 1197, 3 || 1206 (9th Cir. 2018). 4 Richardson alleges she filed her administrative tort claim with the U.S. Department 5 || of Health & Human Services on June 24, 2025. [Doc. No. 9 at 3; Doc. No. 11 at 2.] Thus, 6 || to not have her claim barred, she must have learned of the existence and cause of her injury 7 ||no earlier than June 24, 2023. Richardson alleges no facts concerning what her injury is 8 when she discovered it. She provides one date in 1993 for the initial Depo-Provera 9 injection, but not a single date after even though she alleges other injections at different 10 || facilities over “an extended period[.]’” [Doc. No. 11 at 3.] 11 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Richardson’s complaint with leave to amend. 12 ||[Doc. No. 11.] Richardson must file any amended complaint by June 26, 2026. The 13 |}amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded 14 ||pleading. See CivLR 15.1(a). Richardson must also include a version of the newly 15 |}amended complaint that shows through redlining how it differs from this dismissed 16 |}complaint. See CivLR 15.1(c). 17 V. REMAINING MOTIONS 18 With the complaint dismissed, the Court DENIES AS MOOT the motions for writ 19 ||of mandamus, for expedited consideration and immediate judgment, and for service by 20 marshals. [Doc. Nos. 2, 4, and 10.] 21 It is SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: May 26, 2026 € Ee 23 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28