Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JASON CASILLAS, Case No.: 25-cv-0087-BJC-MMP 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 14 DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY AND MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. FIRE PROTECTION, 24] AND 15 Defendants. 16 (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ADMIT NEWLY 17 DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IN 18 PART [ECF NO. 27] 19 On January 14, 2025, Plaintiff Jason Casillas, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint 20 alleging employment discrimination under federal and state law arising from his 21 termination by Defendant California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (“CAL 22 FIRE”). ECF No. 1. 23 Pending before the Court is CAL FIRE’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or in the 24 Alternative, For a More Definite Statement. ECF No. 24. Plaintiff filed a Response in 25 Opposition and a Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence. ECF Nos. 25, 27. 26 Defendant filed a Reply. ECF No. 26. For the reasons outlined below, the Court grants 27 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and grants Plaintiff’s Motion in part. 28 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 From June 19, 2022, to March 11, 2024, Plaintiff worked as a firefighter for CAL 3 FIRE at the San Mateo/Santa Cruz Unit. On December 2, 2023, Plaintiff requested a 4 transfer due to an ongoing hostile work environment that included comments about 5 Plaintiff’s age and alleged drug use. Fire Captain Ryan McGlynn2 (“McGlynn”) instructed 6 Plaintiff to write a letter requesting the transfer, which McGlynn indicated he would submit 7 to CAL FIRE headquarters. Plaintiff claims he told McGlynn that writing a letter was not 8 the proper CAL FIRE method for requesting a transfer, but he submitted it as he was told. 9 Plaintiff claims that his transfer request was never submitted to CAL FIRE headquarters. 10 Instead, Plaintiff claims he “endured this hostile work environment for close to two years 11 before transferring to the San Diego Unit.” ECF No. 1 at 30. 12 On the morning of December 4, 2023, Fire Captain Sean Davis (“Davis”) told 13 Plaintiff he "would like to do another end of Seasonal Performance Record CAL FIRE 212 14 review" of Plaintiff, but Plaintiff informed Davis that he felt this was a personal attack 15 towards him and his career. Plaintiff told Davis that he "would like to have union 16 representation advice on this matter because [he did] not know the rules or laws regarding 17 CAL FIRE'S code of conduct and policies, and [he] would not like to engage until then per 18 MOU." ECF No. 1 at 25. On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff received a write-up by McGlynn, 19 who told Plaintiff that he was not entitled to union representation and gave Plaintiff a 20 “Letter of Warning (Informal).” McGlynn told Plaintiff to sign the Letter of Warning and 21 became defensive and hostile when Plaintiff questioned why he was being written-up. 22 Plaintiff claims that McGlynn yelled at him, “Be quiet, be quiet, and just sign it!” ECF No. 23 1 at 23. 24 25 26 1 The facts are taken from the Complaint. 27 2 Plaintiff refers to multiple individuals as “Defendant,” but only CAL FIRE is a named 28 1 On December 24, 2023, Deputy Chief Jed Wilson and Captain Tyler Hickey 2 (“Hickey”) served Plaintiff with a “Notice of Letter Warning.” ECF No. 1 at 21. Hickey 3 purportedly told Plaintiff, "I am here as union representation if you would like." Id. 4 Plaintiff claims that Hickey also stated that if Plaintiff did not sign the documents, he had 5 paperwork for Plaintiff’s termination in his vehicle. According to the warning letter, the 6 justification provided by McGlynn and Davis for writing up Plaintiff was that "Plaintiff 7 has been a continuing problem of unprofessional and disrespectful behavior, despite the 8 direction given to improve Plaintiff’s conduct." Id. 9 On August 27, 2024, Plaintiff had an intake appointment with the Equal 10 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). ECF No. 1 at 18. He alleges that Fire 11 Captain Woychak (“Woychak”) knew Plaintiff had the EEOC appointment because 12 Plaintiff conducted the appointment in his vehicle during a lunch break. Plaintiff claims 13 that Woychak engaged in harassment, discrimination, or retaliation against him for filing 14 a charge with the EEOC. 15 Plaintiff claims that on August 31, 2024, he told Fire Captain Haven (“Haven”) that 16 he would not be coming to work on September 1, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 16. On September 17 1, 2024, Plaintiff asserts that he told Woychak that he had given Haven notice that he would 18 not be working that day. Yet, on September 15, 2024, Woychak told Plaintiff that he would 19 be documented as “absent without leave” for the September 1, 2024, shift. ECF No. 1 at 20 15. 21 On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff informed firefighter Vincent Media that he was 22 leaving work because of an emergency involving his spouse. ECF No. 1 at 13. Later that 23 day, Plaintiff claims he spoke to Division Chief Reynolds (“Reynolds”), who told Plaintiff 24 "[n]ext time, please let a supervisor know, and if there is anything that you need, let us 25 know." ECF No. 1 at 14. According to Plaintiff, Reynolds knew that Plaintiff had been on 26 FMLA leave, yet Plaintiff claims that this critical information was never documented in 27 the Notice of Termination with Cause. 28 On September 28, 2024, Battalion Chief Clays (“Clays”) served Plaintiff with two 1 separate adverse action documents. The first was a Notice of Termination with Cause, and 2 the second placed Plaintiff on Administrative Time Off. ECF No. 1 at 10. Plaintiff argues 3 that the documentation violated CAL FIRE’s Progressive Disciplinary Policy and 4 Procedures because he did not receive a development plan to correct any mistakes before 5 he received the Notice of Termination with Cause. Plaintiff claims he asked Clays whether 6 there was any other documentation for the termination and also requested union 7 representation, to which Clays responded that Plaintiff “would be denied union 8 representation.” Id. After Plaintiff turned in his gear, he was escorted off the property in 9 front of other fire crews. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he had no prior write-ups, had 10 received no notice of any issues with performance or conduct while he was with the CAL 11 FIRE San Diego Unit, and had returned from FMLA leave the morning he was terminated. 12 ECF No. 1 at 11. Plaintiff asserts that he was issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter from 13 the EEOC on October 10, 2024. Id. at 5. 14 On January 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed his complaint using a court provided form titled 15 “Complaint for Employment Discrimination,” in which he alleges six causes of action for 16 discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff claims that Defendants wrongfully terminated his 17 employment, failed to promote him, provided unequal terms and conditions of 18 employment, and engaged in retaliation. ECF No. 1 at 4. He checked boxes indicating he 19 asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e- 2000e- 20 17, age discrimination under 29 U.S.C.§ 621 to 634, due process 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 21 various California statutes. ECF No. 1 at 2. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 23 A. Motion to Dismiss 24 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss 25 on the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 27 sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive 28 a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 1 to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 2 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); 3 Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 4 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 5 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible 6 claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and 7 common sense.” Id. at 663-64. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 8 relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If Plaintiff “ha[s] not 9 nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the complaint “must be 10 dismissed.” Id. at 570. 11 The court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and must construe the 12 allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Western Reserve Oil & 13 Gas Co. v. New, 765 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1985). But courts are not “required to 14 accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 15 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 16 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 17 “Rule 12 (b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires not only ‘fair 18 notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.’” Zixiang Li v. 19 Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013)(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n. 3. Rule 8 20 requires a complaint to “contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 21 court’s jurisdiction; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 22 entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Courts may 23 dismiss a complaint that violates Rule 8. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 24 (9th Cir. 1985). 25 Generally, courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally. See Bernhardt 26 v. Los Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 27 520 (1972) (per curiam) (noting that courts hold pro se complaints to “less stringent 28 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). However, “a liberal interpretation 1 of a [pro se] complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 2 pled.” See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 3 B. FRCP 12(e) 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) states: “A party may move for a more definite 5 statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 6 ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion ... must point 7 out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). A motion for 8 a more definite statement “attacks the unintelligibility of the complaint, not simply the 9 mere lack of detail.” Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 10 A plaintiff is required only to “set forth enough details so as to provide the defendant and 11 the court with a fair idea of the basis of the complaint and the legal grounds claimed for 12 recovery.” Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th 13 Cir. 1990). Rule 12(e) motions are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. Id. 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 1. Motion to Dismiss or For a More Definite Statement 16 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s “shotgun” pleading must be dismissed because it 17 fails to provide a short and plain statement of Plaintiff’s claims, and it fails to state a 18 plausible claim for relief. ECF No. 24 at 4. Defendant further claims that the Complaint is 19 barred under the Eleventh Amendment because CAL FIRE is an agency within the State 20 of California. Id. at 1. Defendant contends that it is impossible to determine which actions 21 are attributable to each individual, in part, because Plaintiff refers to multiple individuals 22 as “defendant,” but the only named Defendant is CAL FIRE. Id. In the alternative, 23 Defendant seeks a more definite statement because the Complaint is so vague and 24 ambiguous, Defendant cannot adequately respond. Id. Defendant contends that the 25 “statutory authorities, common law references, and extraneous case citations are unduly 26 confusing and fail to clarify Plaintiff’s causes of action or provide any framework for his 27 claims.” Id. at 6. 28 Plaintiff responds that the Complaint sufficiently outlines the factual and legal bases 1 for the causes of action he asserts. Oppo. ECF No. 25 at 6. Plaintiff further argues that the 2 Eleventh Amendment does not provide immunity to Defendant for his claims under 42 3 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. 4 Construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, and in the light most favorable to him, 5 the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown how the asserted facts are tied to the numerous 6 statutes, laws, and other authority he cites. In addition, there are contradictory assertions 7 about key facts. For instance, he claims that “[s]ince 2005, Plaintiff Casillas has shown 8 unwavering dedication and expertise as a firefighter with CAL FIRE.” However, on the 9 next page, he states, “In 2015, Plaintiff accepted a position as a firefighter with the 10 Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE).” ECF No. 1 at 10. 11 Despite being advised in the Complaint for Employment Discrimination to “write a 12 short and plain statement of the claim” in which he should “state how each defendant was 13 involved and what each defendant did” that violated his rights, Plaintiff’s claims do not 14 meet this standard. In the first claim alone, Plaintiff lists 39 separate laws or common law 15 rights he claims have been violated, including the Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights 16 Act, California Evidence Code § 210, Violation of Weingarten Rights, among numerous 17 others. ECF No. 1 at 2. He then lists Defendant CAL FIRE and Battalion Chief J. Clays as 18 the defendants who purportedly violated his rights, but he does not connect the conduct of 19 CAL FIRE or Clays to the asserted legal protections in the statement of facts. As a result, 20 Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a cause of action against either of them. Claims two 21 through six fare no better. While the Court is required to liberally construe Plaintiff’s 22 claims, it cannot provide the elements of a cause of action for him in the Complaint. See 23 Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a 24 plausible claim for relief and grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice.3 In 25 26 27 3 On May 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Petition Regarding Exhaustion of Remedies, Continuing Hardship, and Request for Settlement Conference,” in which he 28 1 ||re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d at 1055. 2 2. Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence 3 In Plaintiff's Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence, he seeks permission to 4 ||admit the “Statement of Decision issued by the Santa Cruz Superior Court in Case No. 5 |}25CV01791 (Casillas v. Brower), dated November 6, 2025, along with related factual 6 || circumstances.” ECF No. 27 at 3. The Court construes Plaintiff's Motion as a request for 7 judicial notice of the referenced document. 8 “Although, as a general rule, a district court may not consider materials not originally 9 included in the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12 motion, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d), it ‘may take 10 judicial notice of matters of public record’ and consider them without converting a Rule 12 11 |}motion into one for summary judgment.” U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 547 F.3d 943, 955 12 Cir. 2008). The Court grants the request, finding that the court document satisfies 13 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 because it is a “matter[] of public record.” /d. However, 14 || Plaintiff's request for the Court to consider additional factual support for the claims 1s 15 || denied. Plaintiff may only add additional facts if he amends his Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 || 15; see also Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) 17 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Complaint 19 dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. Plaintiff's Motion to Admit 20 || Newly Discovered Evidence is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff may file an amended 21 ||complaint no later than June 30, 2026. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: May 22, 2026 5 Myon Ob afeL 24 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks 25 United States District Judge 26 |} 27 28 conference. ECF No. 29. In light of the Court’s dismissal of the Complaint, any additional requests are considered moot.