Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AKROMZHON SAIDALIEV, Case No.: 26-CV-2261 JLS (SBC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et 15 (ECF No. 7) al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Akromzhon Saidaliev’s Amended Petition 19 for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 7). Also before 20 the Court are Respondents’ Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Ret.,” ECF 21 No. 9) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, 22 the Court GRANTS IN PART the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 23 No. 7). 24 BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner, a citizen of Uzbekistan, alleges that he has been detained by the United 26 States Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs 27 Enforcement (“ICE”) division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since September 17, 28 1 the United States on September 5, 2023, through the CBP One app. Id. Petitioner was 2 released on parole three months later and placed in removal proceedings. Id. Petitioner 3 was detained in 2025 while attending an ICE check-in appointment. Id. On March 28, 4 2026, an immigration judge granted Petitioner withholding of removal to Russia but denied 5 him withholding of removal to Uzbekistan. Id. Petitioner appealed the decision, and his 6 appeal remains pending. Id. Petitioner now alleges that his detention violates the Due 7 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. See 8 generally id. 9 LEGAL STANDARD 10 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 11 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 12 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 13 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 14 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 15 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 16 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 17 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 18 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 19 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 20 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 21 (citations omitted). 22 DISCUSSION 23 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release without justification or 24 consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. at 25 5–7. The Court agrees. 26 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 27 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 28 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 1 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 2 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 3 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 4 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 5 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 6 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 7 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 8 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). 9 Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 10 government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 11 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 12 be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting 13 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial 14 discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that 15 individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of 16 custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 17 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 18 Petitioner is not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as 19 Petitioner has been in the United States since September 5, 2023. Pet. at 2. Petitioner is 20 not merely an “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due process rights; 21 Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 22 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial 23 apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk 24 nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty 25 unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 26 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present 27 in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the 28 Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. 1 Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected 2 liberty interest in his release). Respondents do “not oppose the [P]etition and defer[] to the 3 Court on the appropriate relief.” Ret. at 2–3. 4 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 5 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 6 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient 7 to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. See 8 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be 9 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 10 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 11 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved 12 and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 13 requirement would entail.” Id. 14 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s 15 revocation of Petitioner’s release without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 16 heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has 17 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his release on 18 conditional parole. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, 19 or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] 20 protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the 21 conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and 22 friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”). 23 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 24 parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or an opportunity to be 25 heard. Pet. ¶¶ 44–47. Since DHS’s determination that Petitioner should be granted parole 26 because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence 27 that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 28 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen 1 is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). “Once a noncitizen has been released, 2 the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to 3 removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of 4 materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact 5 dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. Respondents 6 do not oppose the Petition. See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not 7 received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is 8 high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine 9 whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting 10 Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up). 11 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 12 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 13 1130; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the 14 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 15 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail 16 to point to any burdens on the government if it were to have provided proper notice, 17 reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret. 18 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in 19 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v. 20 Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting 21 a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre- 22 deprivation hearing); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, 23 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from 24 custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). 25 CONCLUSION 26 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Amended 27 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 7). The Court ORDERS Respondents to 28 immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting 1 ||release. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is 2 || entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before a neutral 3 decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear 4 || the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger 5 ||to the community or a risk of flight.!_ The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status 6 Report by June 9, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. As this concludes 7 litigation in this matter, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: May 19, 2026 . tt f Le 10 on. Janis L. Sammartino 1 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || ——____—__- 27 Ih This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1133; Pinchi, 792 28 || F. Supp. 3d at 1038; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez y. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).