Faith Lynn Brashear v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Robert Steven Huie (author)
Analysis
The court considered an ex parte motion by a pro se plaintiff for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction regarding alleged disability accommodation failures and unemployment benefits. The court denied both requests without prejudice because the plaintiff failed to provide notice to the defendants and did not justify why ex parte relief was necessary.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of ex parte motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) without prejudice“For these reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not satisfied the threshold requirement for ex parte relief and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her request for a TRO.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1), which mandates that a TRO issued without notice must be supported by specific facts showing immediate and irreparable injury and a certification of efforts to give notice. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that notice was impossible or that it would render the action fruitless, which are the narrow exceptions recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Reno Air Racing. The denial without prejudice is appropriate as it allows the plaintiff to refile with proper notice. |
Denial of motion for preliminary injunction without prejudice“Because Plaintiff has not shown that she provided adequate notice to Defendants, the Court also DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her request for a preliminary injunction.” | agree with court Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1) explicitly states that a preliminary injunction may only be issued on notice to the adverse party. Since the plaintiff failed to provide notice, the court was required to deny the motion. The denial without prejudice is consistent with the procedural posture. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the threshold requirement of notice under Rule 65 and applies the Ninth Circuit's narrow standard for ex parte relief from Reno Air Racing. The court properly notes that the plaintiff's allegations of financial harm, while relevant to irreparable harm, do not justify bypassing the notice requirement when the defendants are known and locatable. The denial without prejudice is the correct procedural outcome.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FAITH LYNN BRASHEAR, Case No.: 26-cv-1726-RSH-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON EX PARTE MOTION 13 v. FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 14 CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INJUNCTION INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, et al., 15 Defendants. [ECF No. 11] 16 17 18 19 Before the Court is an ex parte motion for temporary restraining order and 20 preliminary injunction filed by plaintiff Faith Lynn Brashear. ECF No. 11. Pursuant to 21 Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the motion presented appropriate for 22 resolution without oral argument. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s 23 motion. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 The instant action arises from alleged failures by Defendants to provide Plaintiff 26 with disability-related accommodations. 27 On March 18, 2026, plaintiff Faith Lynn Brashear, proceeding pro se, initiated this 28 action against the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (“CUIAB”), the 1 Employment Development Department (“EDD”), the California Division of Workers’ 2 Compensation (“DWC”), Nancy Faulkner, in her official capacity as the Chair of the 3 CUIAB, Nancy Farias, in her official capacity as the Director of the EDD, George 4 Parisotto, in his official capacity as the Administrative Director of the DWC, and 5 Apartment Management Consultants LLC. ECF No. 1. 6 Plaintiff alleges that, while employed by Apartment Management Consultants, she 7 experienced a workplace incident that led her to develop severe anxiety whenever she is 8 required to participate in telephone-based communication. Id. ¶¶ 35–38. According to 9 Plaintiff, Apartment Management Consultants failed to engage with her written request 10 for accomodation. Id. ¶¶ 39–42. Plaintiff alleges that she later pursued “administrative 11 proceedings” involving “workers’ compensation adjudication,” “unemployment 12 insurance appeals,” and “federal employment discrimination processes.” Id. ¶ 54. 13 Although she purportedly provided documented notice of her disability and requested 14 accommodations in those proceedings, Plaintiff alleges the responsible entities failed to 15 rule on her requests to ensure that she could participate. Id. ¶¶ 57–62. 16 Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims for: violations of the Americans with 17 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq. (Claims 1 and 2); 18 violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim 3); a claim over the interpretation 19 of 26 U.S.C. § 131 during “unemployment appeals proceedings” (Claim 4); and ADA 20 retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Claim 5). Id. ¶¶ 127–164. 21 On April 9, 2026, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice in light of 22 Plaintiff’s failure either to pay the $405 civil filing and administrative fee required by 28 23 U.S.C. § 1914(a) or to move to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 24 1915(a). ECF No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff subsequently paid the filing fee on April 28, 2026. ECF 25 No. 8. On May 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant ex parte motion for a temporary 26 restraining order and preliminary injunction. ECF No. 11 at 2. 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 3 right.” Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary 4 injunction must establish: (1) that she “is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) that she “is 5 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; and (3) “that the 6 balance of equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. 7 at 20. The standard governing the issuance of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is 8 substantially identical to the standard governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 9 See Harris v. Santos, No. 25-CV-284 JLS (DDL), 2025 WL 1594465, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 10 May 9, 2025). 11 “When a plaintiff has not provided notice of their TRO application to the 12 defendant, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) imposes additional requirements.” 13 Willard Marine, Inc. v. Shanghai Breeze Tech. Co., Ltd., No. 25-CV-2907 JLS (BLM), 14 2025 WL 3063320, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025). Under Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure 65(b)(1): 16 The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or 17 oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:
18 (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly 19 show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard 20 in opposition; and 21 (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made 22 to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). “The stringent restrictions imposed by . . . Rule 65, on the 24 availability of ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the fact that our entire 25 jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice 26 and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose 27 Foods v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974). 28 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Before reaching the merits of Plaintiff’s request, the Court must first determine 3 whether Plaintiff has satisfied the notice requirements governing injunctive relief. 4 The docket does not reflect that Plaintiff served Defendants with—or otherwise 5 provided Defendants notice of—her application for a TRO and preliminary injunction. 6 See Docket. The Court therefore “declines to assume any alleged notice was offered, let 7 alone adequate.” Willard Marine, 2025 WL 3063320, at *3 (internal quotation marks 8 omitted); see Globalization Partners, Inc. v. Layton, No. 19-CV-01990-BAS-LL, 2019 9 WL 5268657, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2019) (“Because there is no proof of service or 10 other documentation reflecting that service was completed, it is unclear whether 11 Defendant received notice of this proceeding. Hence, for purposes of this Order, the 12 Court assumes Defendant was not provided notice of the instant application and construes 13 Plaintiff’s application as a request to issue the TRO without providing notice to 14 Defendant.”). 15 The “threshold question,” then, is whether Plaintiff has provided “an adequate 16 justification” for proceeding without notice to the opposing party. Willard Marine, 2025 17 WL 3063320, at *2. As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, “courts have recognized very 18 few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO. For example, an ex parte 19 TRO may be appropriate where notice to the adverse party is impossible either because 20 the identity of the adverse party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located 21 in time for a hearing.” Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 22 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In cases where notice could have been given 23 to the adverse party, courts have recognized a very narrow band of cases in which ex 24 parte orders are proper because notice to the defendant would render fruitless the further 25 prosecution of the action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 Here, Plaintiff has not established that this case falls within the “very narrow band” 27 of cases in which an ex parte TRO is proper. In her application for a TRO, Plaintiff 28 challenges the CUIAB’s administrative rulings concerning her unemployment benefits. 1 See ECF No. 11. Specifically, Plaintiff contests the CUIAB’s determination that she is 2 liable for overpaid benefits. Id. at 3–7; see ECF No. 11-3. Plaintiff contends that 3 enforcement proceedings, including funds being taken from her bank account, are 4 ongoing. ECF No. 11 at 6. For these reasons, absent emergency relief, Plaintiff argues 5 she will face “immediate and ongoing harm,” including “[a]ctive levy and seizure of 6 funds from her bank account,” “[l]oss of essential living funds derived from wages,” 7 “[a]dditional financial penalties and banking fees,” and an “[i]nability to correct or 8 supplement the administrative record.” Id. at 9. 9 While the alleged urgency of Plaintiff’s financial harm bears on irreparable harm, 10 it is not enough, by itself, to justify the issuance of an ex parte TRO. Defendants are 11 identified in the Complaint and TRO application and Plaintiff has not submitted any 12 evidence that Defendants cannot be located in time for a hearing. Plaintiff has also not 13 explained why providing notice to Defendants “would render fruitless the further 14 prosecution of the action.” Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1131; see Willard Marine, 2025 15 WL 3063320, at *3 (“But to secure a TRO without notice, Plaintiffs’ general argument of 16 irreparable harm alone is not enough.”); see also Modular Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Adamo 17 Constr., Inc., No. 25-CV-01419-BAS-SBC, 2025 WL 2799678, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 18 2025) (denying TRO motion where plaintiff failed to demonstrate case qualified as 19 “extraordinary circumstance” in which ex parte TRO may be granted); Corrales L. PC v. 20 Equal Access Just. Fund LP, No. 25-CV-1834 JLS (MMP), 2025 WL 2309019, at *3 21 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2025) (denying TRO motion where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the 22 case fell “into the ‘very narrow’ category of cases where ex parte orders are proper.”). 23 For these reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not satisfied the threshold 24 requirement for ex parte relief and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her request for a 25 TRO. Because Plaintiff has not shown that she provided adequate notice to Defendants, 26 the Court also DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her request for a preliminary 27 injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1)(“The court may issue a preliminary injunction 28 only on notice to the adverse party.”); Modular, 2025 WL 2799678, at *2 (“When the 1 ||moving party fails to show that it has provided adequate notice to its adversary, courts 2 || will generally deny the request for a preliminary injunction.”). 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 19, 2026 Jekut C / ‘ 6 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28