Sharmake Siyad v. Christopher Larose; Patrick Divver; Todd Lyons; Markwayne Mullin; Acting Attorney General of the United States; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- other — While reserving their righ
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- James E. Simmons (author)
Analysis
The court considered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an asylum seeker who was redetained after being previously released on conditional parole. The court granted the petition and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, finding that the revocation of his liberty interest without notice or procedure violated due process.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Grant of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus“Thus, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus.” | agree with court The court relied on a series of recent, unpublished district court opinions from the same district to establish that a prior grant of release creates a liberty interest protected by procedural due process. While the legal principle that prior release triggers due process protections is well-established in the Ninth Circuit (e.g., *Zadvydas v. Davis*, *Jennings v. Rodriguez*), the court's reliance on a string of unpublished, non-precedential district court orders rather than binding circuit or Supreme Court authority is procedurally weak, though the result is consistent with the law. The order notes that respondents did not oppose the petition, which supports the grant. |
Order for Immediate Release“Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions of his prior that existed at the time he was re-detained.” | agree with court The relief ordered is appropriate given the finding of a due process violation. Conditioning the release on the terms of the prior parole is a standard and reasonable limitation to ensure the petitioner remains subject to immigration oversight. |
The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is 'sound with gaps.' The result is legally defensible and consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent regarding due process rights for previously released aliens. However, the court's reasoning relies entirely on a string of five unpublished, non-precedential district court orders from the same district, rather than citing the binding Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authorities (such as *Zadvydas* or *Jennings*) that establish the underlying due process principles. While the lack of opposition from respondents mitigates the need for a full legal analysis, the omission of binding authority is a significant gap in the legal reasoning.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incomplete record incompleteOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHARMAKE SIYAD, Case No.: 3:26-cv-3011-JES-MSB 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE; PATRICK DIVVER; TODD LYONS; [ECF No. 1] 15 MARKWAYNE MULLIN; ACTING 16 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; U.S. IMMIGRATION 17 AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; and 18 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 19 Respondents. 20 21 Before the Court is Petitioner Sharmake Siyad’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of 22 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court’s Order to 23 Show Cause (ECF No. 2), Respondents filed a return to the petition. ECF No. 4. 24 Petitioner is a native of Somalia who came to the United States in order to seek 25 asylum. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 37-38. On February 15, 2024, Petitioner was granted conditional 26 parole and released on his own recognizance. Id. ¶ 39; see also ECF No. 1-2. Petitioner 27 was redetained when he appeared at a local office for an ICE check-in. ECF No.1 ¶ 45. 28 Petitioner alleges that he was never given any reasons or notice at that time. Id. ¶ 46. 1 In their return, Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner had previously been 2 released on parole, and courts have routinely held that such petitioners are not mandatorily 3 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). ECF No. 4 at 2. While reserving their rights, they state 4 that they “do no oppose the petition and defers to the Court on the appropriate relief.” Id. 5 at 3. 6 In light of Respondents’ non-opposition, the Court will decline to engage in a full 7 analysis of the claims as well. Petitioner states, and Respondents do not refute, that he was 8 previously released on conditional parole by the government when he first entered in 2024. 9 Many courts, including this one, have repeatedly held that a prior grant of release raises a 10 liberty interest for the petitioner and entitles the petitioner to due process rights under 11 procedural due process. See, e.g., Rivera v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-375- 12 JES-AHG, 2026 WL 310193, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026); Besalti v. LaRose, No. 26- 13 CV-270-JES-JLB, 2026 WL 242042, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026); Singh v. LaRose, 14 No. 26-CV-0556-JES-VET, 2026 WL 353355, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026); Ramales 15 v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-501-JES-DEB, 2026 WL 280216, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026); 16 Minhas v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-492-JES-BLM, 2026 WL 280220, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 17 2026). Accordingly, the Court adopts its reasoning and finds that due process requires 18 release of Petitioner here, where the liberty interest was revoked without any notice or 19 procedure. 20 Thus, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. Respondents are 21 ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions of 22 his prior that existed at the time he was re-detained. The Parties are ORDERED to file a 23 Joint Status Report by May 22, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // l The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 || Dated: May 18, 2026 5 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28