Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 SCOTT SCHUTZA, Case No.: 26-cv-00861-AJB-BJW 13 Plaintiff, ORDER 14 v. 15 LESLIE’S POOLMART, INC., et al., (Doc. Nos. 10; 12) 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff Scott Schutza (“Schutza”) initiated this action on February 11, 2026. (Doc. 19 No. 1.) After being served, Defendants Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc. (“Leslie’s”), and Mission 20 Gorge Square, LLC (“Mission Gorge”), (collectively, “Defendants”) failed to timely 21 respond to Schutza’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1). (Doc. No. 5.) The Court consequently 22 directed the Clerk of Court to enter default against Defendants and ordered Schutza to 23 move for default judgment within 30 days of April 3, 2026. (Id.) Schutza failed to timely 24 file such a motion. (Doc. No. 9.) The Court therefore ordered Schutza to show cause by 25 May 12, 2026, why the Court should not dismiss the complaint. (Id.) 26 Schutza and Defendants now jointly move to set aside the Court’s entry of default 27 (Doc. No. 10.) The parties additionally ask the Court to deem an attached unsigned answer 28 as filed so that the parties can “move the case onto the merits track.” (Id. at 9–10.) Schutza 1 additionally asks the Court to discharge the order to show cause and vacate the 2 corresponding hearing. (Doc. No. 12.) 3 I. Motion to Set Aside Default 4 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), “[t]he court may set aside an entry 5 of default for good cause.” The Court must “consider three factors: (1) whether the party 6 seeking to set aside the default engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; 7 (2)whether it had no meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment 8 would prejudice” the other party. United States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of 9 Yubran S. Mesle (“Mesle”), 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). A “finding 10 that any one of these factors is true is sufficient reason for the district court to refuse to set 11 aside the default.” Id. However, “judgment by default is a drastic step appropriate only in 12 extreme circumstances; a case should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits.” Falk 13 v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984). 14 A. Defendants’ conduct is not culpable. 15 “[A] defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice 16 of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1092 17 (quoting TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 2001)). 18 Defendants indicate that they were not culpable because they “believed the[ir] 19 response deadline[s] had been extended by agreement.” (Doc. No. 10-1 at 6.) Additionally, 20 three days after the Court entered default, the parties “filed a stipulation to set aside the 21 default and extend the response deadline.” (Id. (citing Doc. No. 7).) Although the Court 22 denied the stipulation on April 7, 2026 (Doc. No. 8), Defendants’ counsel did not learn of 23 the order until April 21, 2026, because of an “inadvertent ECF notice-routing issue” that 24 caused notice to be sent to “legacy email addresses rather than counsel’s current firm email 25 address.” (Doc. No. 10-1 at 7.) Defendants concede that “[t]his record shows mistake, not 26 bad faith.” (Id.) 27 The Court agrees that the record does not show that Defendants “intentionally failed 28 to answer.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1092. Rather, Defendants’ mistakes appear to be due to 1 negligence at best. For instance, although the parties agreed to extend Defendants’ deadline 2 to respond to the Complaint, they failed to move the Court to approve their stipulation as 3 required by Civil Local Rule 7.2. Additionally, attorneys who have registered for electronic 4 service through the Case Management/Electronic Case Files system “must update the[ir 5 contact] information through the PACER website and file a timely notification of [contact 6 information] changes.” Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures 7 Manual § 1.f, United States District Court for the Southern District of California, 8 https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/_assets/pdf/cmecf/Electronic%20Case%20Filing%20Proc 9 edures%20Manual.pdf. Defendants’ counsel apparently failed to comply with this 10 obligation. (Doc. Nos. 10-1 at 7; 10-2 ¶ 8.) 11 B. Defendants present a potentially meritorious defense. 12 “A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment must present specific facts that 13 would constitute a defense. But the burden on a party seeking to vacate a default judgment 14 is not extraordinarily heavy.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1094 (quoting TCI, 244 F.3d at 700). To 15 satisfy the meritorious defense requirement, a defendant merely needs to “allege sufficient 16 facts that, if true, would constitute a defense.” Id. 17 Defendants contend that they have already remediated the threshold lip that was 18 allegedly non-compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Doc. No. 10- 19 1 at 7.) They add that this remediation provides a meritorious defense against Schutza’s 20 “claim for ongoing ADA injunctive relief.” (Id.) Defendants indicate that they intend to 21 assert additional defenses if the litigation moves forward.” (Id. at 7–8.) 22 This contention “allege[s] sufficient facts that, if true, would constitute a defense” 23 and carries Defendants’ “minimal” burden for setting aside default. Mesle, 615 F.3d at 24 1094. 25 C. It does not appear that Schutza will be prejudiced. 26 For the reopening of a default judgment to be prejudicial, “the delay [in litigation] 27 must result in tangible harm such as loss of evidence, increased difficulties or discovery, 28 1 or greater opportunity for fraud or collusion.” Thompson v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 95 2 F.3d 429, 433–34 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Defendants claim that Schutza will not be prejudiced because this Action is still in 4 its early stages. (Doc. No. 10-1 at 8.) Defendants additionally point to the fact that Schutza 5 has joined in the present motion, which “confirms the absence of prejudice.”) (Id.) 6 Given Schutza’s consent, the Court concurs that setting aside the entry of default 7 will not prejudice Schutza. See Thompson, 95 F.3d at 433–34. 8 Under these circumstances, the Court FINDS that good cause exists to set aside the 9 entry of default against Defendants. Accordingly, the joint motion is GRANTED IN 10 PART and the Court SETS ASIDE the entry of default. 11 II. Deadline to File an Answer 12 As a part of their joint motion, Defendants attach an unsigned “proposed responsive 13 pleading.” (Doc. Nos. 10-1 at 10; 10-3.) The parties ask the Court to “[e]xtend Defendant’s 14 time to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint under Rule 6(b)(1)(B)” and “[d]eem Defendant’s 15 attached responsive pleading filed as of the date of the Court’s order.” (Doc. No. 10-1 at 16 10.) 17 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B), “the court may, for good 18 cause, extend [a deadline] on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to 19 act because of excusable neglect.” To determine whether “excusable neglect” exists, courts 20 consider “(1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and 21 its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the 22 movant acted in good faith.” Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th 23 Cir. 2010) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 24 395 (1993)). 25 These factors weigh in favor of extending Defendants’ deadline. First, as previously 26 discussed, it does not appear that Schutza will be prejudiced. Second, the delay caused by 27 Defendants’ failures is not significant. Defendants’ responsive filings were due by the end 28 of March 2026. (Doc. No. 5.) Approximately 50 days have passed since these deadlines. 1 || The parties jointly indicate that this “delay has had limited impact on the proceedings.” 2 ||(Doc. No. 10-1 at 9.) Third, again, the delay appears to have been caused by Defendants’ 3 || counsel’s negligence instead of any bad faith on Defendants’ part. Fourth, in turn, it appears 4 || that the parties make this motion in good faith. 5 Although the Court is inclined to extend Defendants’ deadline to file a responsive 6 || pleading, it cannot deem the proposed responsive filing as filed on the date of this order. 7 || Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a), “[e]very pleading ... must be signed by 8 least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name.” Defendants’ proposed responsive 9 || filing, however, does not bear any signature. (See generally Doc. No. 10-3.) 10 Accordingly, the Joint Motion is GRANTED IN PART. The Court CONTINUES 11 || Defendants’ deadline to submit a responsive filing to May 15, 2026. The parties’ request 12 deem the proposed responsive pleading as filed on the date of this Order is DENIED. 13 ||. Order to Show Cause 14 In light of the foregoing, the Court DISCHARGES the May 5, 2026 Order to Show 15 ||Cause and VACATES the corresponding May 21, 2026 hearing. (Doc. No. 9; see also 16 || Doc. No. 12.) 17 * * * 18 For the foregoing reasons, the joint motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 19 PART. (Doc. No. 10.) The Court SETS ASIDE the Entry of Default. (Doc. No. 6.) 20 || Defendants must submit a responsive filing on or before May 15, 2026. The Order to Show 21 Cause is DISCHARGED and the corresponding hearing is VACATED. (Doc. No. 9.) 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: May 14, 2026 25 United States District Judge 26 27 28