Sharipov Khursand v. Christopher J. Larose
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court considered a habeas petition filed by an immigration detainee seeking a new bond hearing after an immigration judge denied bond, and a motion to appoint counsel. The court dismissed the petition without prejudice and denied the motion to appoint counsel.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Dismissal of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus“The Court therefore DISMISSES the petition without prejudice” | agree with court The court correctly identified that the petitioner was attempting to use a § 2241 habeas petition to challenge a bond denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ) before exhausting administrative remedies with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Under Ninth Circuit precedent, specifically Leonardo v. Crawford, such a petition is premature and improper because the proper avenue for challenging an IJ's bond decision is an appeal to the BIA, followed by a petition for review in the Court of Appeals. Dismissing without prejudice is the appropriate procedural mechanism to allow the petitioner to pursue the correct administrative and appellate channels. |
Denial of Motion to Appoint Counsel“and DENIES the motion to appoint counsel” | agree with court The order does not provide specific reasoning for denying the motion to appoint counsel other than the dismissal of the underlying petition. In habeas proceedings, appointment of counsel is discretionary and often denied when the petition is dismissed on procedural grounds or when the petitioner has not demonstrated a meritorious claim that requires legal assistance to present. Given the dismissal of the petition as premature, the denial of counsel is a logical procedural consequence, though the order lacks explicit analysis of the motion's merits. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise and relies on a specific, binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Leonardo v. Crawford) to support the dismissal of the habeas petition as premature. The reasoning directly addresses the petitioner's attempt to bypass the BIA appeal process. While the order does not elaborate on the motion to appoint counsel, the dismissal of the underlying petition makes the denial of counsel a standard procedural outcome. The legal basis for the primary ruling is sound and correctly applied.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHARIPOV KHURSAND, Case No.: 3:26-cv-845-CAB-JLB 12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING MOTION TO 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, APPOINT COUNSEL 15 Respondent. [Doc. Nos. 8–9] 16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner Sharipov Khursand’s amended petition for writ of 18 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, [Doc. No. 8], and motion to appoint counsel, 19 [Doc. No. 9]. The Court previously ordered the government to provide Petitioner a bond 20 hearing. [Doc. No. 5.] Petitioner received a bond hearing on March 11, 2026; the 21 immigration judge denied bond finding Petitioner was a flight risk. [Doc. No. 6.] 22 Petitioner disagrees with the hearing’s outcome and says that the immigration judge denied 23 bond based on a “very weak DHS argument of flight risk.” [Doc. No. 8 at 6.] Petitioner 24 seeks another bond hearing in front of a different, neutral judge. [Id. at 8.] 25 The Ninth Circuit has held that it is “improper” for a habeas petitioner to ask the 26 federal district court to review the immigration judge’s decision before appealing to the 27 Board of Immigration Appeals. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 28 1 }}2011). The Court therefore DISMISSES the petition without prejudice and DENIES the 2 || motion to appoint counsel. 3 It is SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: May 14, 2026 (GB 5 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28