Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 CRISTIAN GOMEZ-DOMINGUEZ, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01560-RBM-MMP 13 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 14 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE 15 WARDEN OF IMPERIAL REGIONAL [Doc. 1] DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 19 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Cristian Gomez-Dominguez’s (“Petitioner”) 20 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) 21 For the reasons below, the Court DENIES without prejudice the Petition. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was admitted into the United States “on a 24 nonimmigrant visa” in 2003. (Doc. 5 at 2.) On April 22, 2013, Petitioner “filed 25 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (“DACA”). (Doc. 5-1 at 3.) On 26 May 10, 2015, Petitioner’s DACA status expired, and he did not re-apply for DACA. (Id.) 27 On May 15, 2018, Petitioner was convicted in Salt Lake County, Utah, for the offenses of 28 possession of drug paraphernalia and possession or use of a controlled substance. (Id.) On 1 May 30, 2025, Petitioner was convicted in Salt Lake County, Utah for the offense of 2 aggravated assault. (Id.) Petitioner was detained by Immigration and Customs 3 Enforcement (“ICE”) on August 12, 2025, during a probation check-in regarding his 4 convictions. (Doc. 5 at 2.) Petitioner was then issued a Notice to Appear, which initiated 5 removal proceedings against him under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Id.) 6 Petitioner was transferred to Imperial Regional Detention Center, where he remains 7 to this day. (Id.) On September 26, 2025, Petitioner, through immigration counsel, had a 8 bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id. at 3.) “The 9 immigration judge denied Petitioner bond on the merits of his request,” and Petitioner “has 10 not appealed the immigration judge’s bond order to the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 11 (Id.) 12 Petitioner, then proceeding pro se, filed the Petition on March 9, 2026. (Doc. 1.) 13 The Court set a briefing schedule shortly thereafter. (Doc. 3.) Respondents filed their 14 Return to Petition on March 20, 2026. (Doc. 5.) Petitioner then filed a Motion to Appoint 15 Counsel (Doc. 6), which the Court granted (Doc. 7). Petitioner, now represented, filed his 16 Traverse on May 10, 2026, indicating that counsel “concluded that the briefing before this 17 Court adequately presents the evidence and issues relevant to [Petitioner’s] claims,” and 18 “has no evidence or argument to add.” (Doc. 16 at 1.) 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 21 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 22 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 23 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 24 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 25 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 26 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 27 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 28 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Petitioner argues that his detention has become unreasonably prolonged in violation 3 of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and seeks a prompt bond hearing. (Doc. 1 4 at 6–14 and Prayer for Relief.) Respondents argue that (1) Petitioner is lawfully detained 5 under § 1226(a) because the immigration judge already held a bond hearing and denied 6 relief and (2) Petitioner should not be excused from exhausting administrative remedies. 7 (Doc. 5 at 2–6.) The Court agrees with Respondents. 8 Habeas claims are accompanied by a prudential exhaustion requirement. Hernandez 9 v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court may require exhaustion where: 10 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; 11 12 (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 13 14 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 15 16 Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). 17 “If a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies, then 18 ‘a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the 19 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies.’” Hernandez, 872 20 F.3d at 988 (quoting Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)). But a 21 district court may waive the exhaustion requirement if “administrative remedies are 22 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, 23 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Laing v. 24 Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Petitioner bears the 25 burden of showing that an excuse for requiring exhaustion applies. See Leonardo, 646 26 F.3d at 1161. He has not done so here. 27 But even if he had, Petitioner still could not succeed on the merits of his claim. 28 Petitioner appears to bring an as-applied challenge to the length of his detention under 1 || § 1226 and seeks a prompt bond hearing. But Petitioner already received a bond hearing 2 ||on September 26, 2025 (Doc. 5 at 3), and the Court does not find it appropriate to order 3 || another one. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED without prejudice. 6 || Petitioner may file an amended petition after he exhausts administrative remedies. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 ||DATE: May 13, 2026 ep Bearnidlr, Moatttrygs D 10 ON. RUTH BERMU@DEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28