gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-01539 · 2026-05-12 · Unknown

Walter Sayles v. Amaya and Jane Doe

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:31Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se prisoner's civil rights complaint alleging excessive force by correctional officers. The court dismissed the action for failure to pay the filing fee and as duplicative of a pending case involving the same claims and defendants.

What the court decidedThe model
Dismissal of the civil action for failure to pay the filing fee or move to proceed in forma pauperis.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this civil action is DISMISSED based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay the civil filing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), his failure to move to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)...”
agree with court
The order recites that the plaintiff did not pay the $405 fee or file an IFP motion. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), a civil action under § 1983 cannot be filed without the fee unless IFP status is granted. The dismissal is procedurally correct based on the stated facts.
Dismissal of the civil action as duplicative under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
“Because Plaintiff is currently litigating the same claims presented in this action against the same defendants in Sayles I, the Court will dismiss this duplicative and subsequently filed civil case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).”
agree with court
The court applied the rule against maintaining two separate actions involving the same subject matter, parties, and causes of action simultaneously. The order details that the current complaint and the pending case (Sayles I) involve the same defendants (Amaya and Doe), the same incident (June 2025 excessive force at RJD), and the same constitutional claim (Eighth Amendment). Dismissing the later-filed case as duplicative is a standard and correct application of federal claim-preclusion principles in the context of prisoner litigation.
Denial of leave to amend the complaint.
“Since the duplicity of Plaintiff’s pleading is a defect that cannot be cured, the dismissal is without further leave to amend.”
agree with court
The court cited Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that futility is a proper basis for denying leave to amend. Because the claims are already pending in another case, amending this complaint would not cure the duplicity. The decision is consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the procedural defect (failure to pay fee/IFP) and the substantive defect (duplicity). It applies the correct statutory framework (PLRA) and cites binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Adams, Mendoza, Schmier) to support the dismissal and the denial of leave to amend. The factual comparison between the two cases is sufficient to establish duplicity.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WALTER SAYLES, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01539-BAS-VET CDCR #AL4784, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILING TO v. SATISFY FILING FEE 14 REQUIREMENT UNDER 28 U.S.C.

15 § 1914(A) AND AS FRIVOLOUS AMAYA and JANE DOE, UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Plaintiff Walter Sayles, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights 20 action on March 9, 2026, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claims that he 21 was subjected to the excessive use of force while housed at the Richard J. Donovan 22 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (ECF No. 1 at 2-6.) For the 23 reasons discussed below, this action must be dismissed. 24 I. FAILURE TO SATISFY FILING FEE REQUIREMENT 25 This action must be dismissed because Plaintiff did not pay the $405 civil filing fee 26 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) or move to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 27 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Therefore, his case is subject to dismissal for failure to satisfy the 28 filing fee requirement. 1 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 2 Despite this case being subject to dismissal for failure to satisfy the filing fee 3 requirement, the Court must also screen Plaintiff’s complaint under the Prison Litigation 4 Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires courts to review complaints filed by anyone 5 “incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 6 delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, 7 pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing” and 8 regardless of whether the prisoner prepays filing fees or moves to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915A(a), (c). Specifically, the Court is required to review prisoner complaints which 10 “seek[] redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a government entity,” 11 and to dismiss those, or any portion of those, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to 12 state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or which “seek monetary relief from a 13 defendant who is immune.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 14 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). 15 Plaintiff’s Complaint in this action is subject to sua sponte dismissal because it is 16 duplicative of another ongoing civil action he recently filed in this Court. See Sayles v. 17 Amaya, et al., No. 3:26-cv-0174-AJB-JLB (S.D. Cal.) (“Sayles I”). (ECF No. 1 18 [Complaint], ECF No. 11 [Amended Complaint]). 19 Plaintiffs “generally have ‘no right to maintain two separate actions involving the 20 same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.’” 21 Adams v. California Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation 22 omitted). In assessing whether two matters are duplicative, courts apply “federal claim- 23 preclusion principles,” which examine whether the “second suit involves (1) the same 24 causes of action as the first; and (2) the same parties.” Mendoza v. Amalgamated Transit 25 Union Int’l, 30 F.4th 879, 886 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). 26 The Complaint docketed here (“Sayles II”) alleges RJD personnel, including 27 Defendants Amaya and Jane Doe, “mistreated and target[ed]” Plaintiff in “June 2025.” 28 (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff accuses “Officer Amaya” and “Seargeant Jane Doe” of, inter 1 alia, punching and choking him while he was on the ground in restraints after he had come 2 in from a recreation yard “to the unit of 15 Block.” (ECF No. 1 at 3). He asserts that both 3 Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at 5-6.) 4 Similarly, in Sayles I, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and motion to proceed IFP on 5 January 2, 2026. (See Sayles I, ECF Nos. 1-2.) On February 11, 2026, the Court granted 6 him leave to proceed IFP, screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 7 1915A(b), and dismissed with leave to amend. (See Sayles I, ECF No. 9]. 8 On February 23, 2026, in Sayles I, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Sayles I, 9 ECF No. 11-1 at 3-4.) In it, Plaintiff alleges excessive force by Defendants Amaya and 10 Doe at RJD on June 2, 2025. (See Sayles I, ECF 11-1 at 3-4.). He alleges that Amaya took 11 Plaintiff “to the ground” and punched him “twice with a closed fi[st].” (Id. at 3.) He further 12 claims that, once Amaya had Plaintiff on the ground and placed him in restraints, Doe 13 kneeled down and choked him. (Id. at 4.) As in the instant matter, Plaintiff alleges that 14 Amaya and Doe used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 3-4.) 15 Thus, Plaintiff is bringing the same claims against the same defendants in both cases. 16 Mendoza, 30 F.4th at 886. 17 On May 1, 2026, the Court in Sayles I directed issuance of summons and service on 18 Defendant Amaya (See Sayles I, ECF No. 16). 19 Because Plaintiff is currently litigating the same claims presented in this action 20 against the same defendants in Sayles I, the Court will dismiss this duplicative and 21 subsequently filed civil case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Since the duplicity of 22 Plaintiff’s pleading is a defect that cannot be cured, the dismissal is without further leave 23 to amend. See Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 24 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing futility of amendment as a proper basis for dismissal without 25 leave to amend). 26 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 27 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this civil action is DISMISSED based on 28 Plaintiff’s failure to pay the civil filing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), his failure to move 1 ||to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and as duplicative pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2 1915A(b)(1). 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the dismissal of this case will operate without 4 || prejudice to Plaintiff's pursuit of his claims as alleged in Sayles v. Amaya, et al., S.D. Cal. 5 || Civil Case No. 24-cv-0174-AJB-JLB. Plaintiffis advised that any further filings he wishes 6 submit for Judge Battaglia’s consideration in Sayles J, must clearly include reference to 7 || Civil Case No. 26-cv-0174-AJB-JLB. The Clerk of Court will TERMINATE Civil Case 8 || No. 26-cv-01539-BAS-VET and close the file. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 ~ 11 || DATED: May 12, 2026 (yatta Bahar H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4