Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEIVIS DAVID TERAN HURTADO, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00977-BTM-DDL 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DISMISSING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 15 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Senior [ECF NO. 3] Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; 16 PATRICK DIVVER, Field Office 17 Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, Immigration and Customs 18 Enforcement; TODD M. LYONS, Acting 19 Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and MARKWAYNE 20 MULLIN, Secretary, Department of 21 Homeland Security, 22 Respondents. 23 24 25 Pending before the Court is Deivis David Teran Hurtado’s petition for the writ of 26 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated below, the Court 27 GRANTS IN PART and DISMISSES IN PART the petition and orders Teran Hurtado’s 28 immediate release from custody. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Teran Hurtado arrived at the United States border on November 19, 2021. (ECF No. 3 3-1 (“Am. Pet.”), ¶ 47.) Immigration officials inspected him and released him on his own 4 recognizance on November 22, 2021. (ECF No. 3-2 (“Release Order”), at 2.) The 5 Respondents acknowledge that he was conditionally paroled into the country under 8 6 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (ECF No. 7 (“Return”), at 2.) The release order required Teran Hurtado 7 to attend an immigration court hearing on January 25, 2022. (Release Order, at 2.) He 8 mailed a letter to the immigration court to request a new date but did not receive a response. 9 (Am. Pet., ¶ 47.) In 2024, he was approved for Temporary Protective Status as a national 10 of Venezuela. (Id.) This was allegedly cancelled by the Government. (Id.) 11 On January 15, 2026, Teran Hurtado was detained by the Respondents without an 12 opportunity to rebut the redetention. (Id. ¶ 8.) He was then placed into Section 1229a 13 removal proceedings. (Id. ¶ 48.) On January 26, 2026, he was moved to the Otay Mesa 14 Detention Center. (Id. ¶ 29.) On March 16, 2026, he applied for asylum. (Id. ¶ 50.) 15 Teran Hurtado is currently detained at Otay Mesa. (Id. ¶ 20.) He filed a petition for 16 the writ of habeas corpus on February 17, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) After the Court dismissed 17 his petition without prejudice and granted him leave to amend, he filed an amended petition 18 on April 2, 2026. (ECF No. 2; Am. Pet.) 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 The Petitioner makes five claims. First, the Petitioner argues that the Respondents 21 violated his liberty interest under the Due Process Clause by detaining him without 22 identifying changed circumstances that warrant redetention. (Am Pet., ¶ 51–59.) Second, 23 that the Respondents violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by detaining him 24 without adequate regulatory authority. (Id. ¶ 60–65.) Third, that the Respondents violated 25 the APA by detaining him without notice as required under the Immigration and 26 Nationality Act. (Id. ¶ 67–77.) Fourth, that the Respondents violated the Fourth 27 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by detaining him without probable cause. (Id. ¶ 78– 28 84.) Fifth, that the Respondents violated the Due Process Clause by detaining him without 1 notice or an opportunity to be heard. (Id. ¶ 85–89.) The Petitioner requests that the Court 2 grant him release on any claim. The Respondents acknowledge that this Court has granted 3 petitions with similar facts and legal issues. (Return, 2.) They “defer[] to the Court on the 4 appropriate relief.” (Id. at 3.) 5 The Court finds that relief is warranted on the first claim and declines to reach the 6 other claims. 7 A. Due Process Rights for Parolees 8 The Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens1 “to due process of law in deportation 9 proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Due Process also “protects 10 noncitizens from unlawful detention during their removal proceedings.” Esquivel Pacheco 11 v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2421, 2026 WL 242300, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026) (citing 12 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). Here, the Petitioner challenges his current 13 detention as contrary to the Due Process Clause. 14 The Court recently analyzed the same issue in Tulyakov v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-01695, 15 2026 WL 981218 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026). There, the Court considered the Mathews v. 16 Eldridge factors2 and found that the Respondents violated the Petitioner’s due process 17 rights. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Tulyakov, 2026 WL 981218, at *2. The Court adopts its 18 previous decision and finds that a similar violation has occurred here. First, the Petitioner 19 acquired a protected interest in being free from imprisonment once the Respondents 20 exercised their discretion and paroled the Petitioner into the country. Second, the 21 22 1 This order uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” 8 U.S.C. 23 § 1101(a)(3); see Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 226 n.2 (2020).

24 2 To determine whether “the administrative procedures provided . . . are constitutionally 25 sufficient,” the Court must consider three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 26 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 27 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 28 1 Respondents’ process of revoking the Petitioner’s parole—arresting him without an 2 opportunity to be heard—created a substantial risk that the Petitioner’s liberty interest 3 would be erroneously deprived. Third, the Respondents have not argued that their interest 4 in immigration enforcement justifies the process used to detain the Petitioner. Taken 5 together, the Petitioner’s liberty interest and the procedural protections afforded that 6 interest outweigh the Respondents’ enforcement interest. 7 The Respondents violated the Petitioner’s due process rights by “detaining [him] 8 without justification.” Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. 9 2025); cf. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) (“If men must turn square 10 corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the 11 government to turn square corners when it deals with them.”). Moreover, the Respondents 12 do not contend that any changed circumstances warranted Petitioner’s redetention or that 13 the Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk. Thus, the writ must issue to 14 release him from custody. The petition is granted on the first claim. 15 B. Other Claims 16 Because the Court grants the petition on other grounds, the Court declines to reach 17 the merits of the Petitioner’s other claims. Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five of the 18 petition are dismissed without prejudice as moot. 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // I Hl. CONCLUSION 2 The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED on the first claim and the writ 3 |}is ISSUED. The Respondents shall immediately release Teran Hurtado from custody on 4 ||any preexisting conditions, updated for reporting and appearances. The second, third, 5 || fourth, and fifth claims are DISMISSED without prejudice as moot. The parties shall file 6 ||a joint statement as to the satisfaction of the writ by May 8, 2026, at 5 p.m. The Court 7 || retains jurisdiction to enforce the writ. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 || Dated: May 7, 2026 Til ‘ 10 Honoris Barry Ted haat 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 □