Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ROGER TEDI EDWARDS, Case No.: 25-cv-03825-AJB-DDL CDCR #BZ-1566, 11 ORDER GRANTING MOTION Plaintiff, 12 TO PROCEED IN FORMA v. PAUPERIS AND SCREENING 13 PRO SE § 1983 COMPLAINT CHULA VISTA POLICE DEPARTMENT, 14 et al., (Doc. Nos. 1–2) 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Roger Tedi Edwards is a Kern Valley State Prison prisoner proceeding pro 18 se—without an attorney. Edwards has filed a civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. 19 § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 1–2.) 20 As explained below, the Court GRANTS Edwards’ IFP motion and SCREENS his 21 Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court finds that Edwards 22 adequately alleges an excessive force claim against Defendants Lowell Moreno and 23 Michael Menna in Count One. But the Court finds that he (1) fails to state any plausible 24 claim for relief against the Chula Vista Police Department, and (2) fails to state any 25 plausible claim in Counts Two and Three. The Court, therefore, ORDERS Edwards to 26 either file an Amended Complaint that addresses the pleading deficiencies discussed 27 below, or a Notice of Intent to Proceed with only the excessive force claims alleged in 28 Count One of his current Complaint against Defendants Moreno and Menna. 1 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 2 Generally, anyone initiating a civil action in a U.S. district court must pay a $405 3 filing fee, which includes a $350 statutory fee and a $55 administrative fee (although 4 anyone granted IFP status is excused from paying the administrative fee). See 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 6 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). If a plaintiff fails to prepay the entire fee, the lawsuit will not go 7 forward unless the plaintiff’s IFP motion is granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 8 Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 9 A prisoner filing an IFP motion must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund 10 account statement (or institutional equivalent),” which must cover “the 6-month period 11 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 12 King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 13 Even if the court grants IFP status, the prisoner must pay the statutory filing fee. 14 Payments, however, are determined based on the prisoner’s available resources. The 15 method for determination is as follows. First, courts calculate an initial filing fee payment. 16 This initial fee is twenty percent of the larger of two amounts: either the average monthly 17 deposits in the trust fund account over the past six months, or the average monthly balance 18 in the account for the past six months. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (4); Bruce v. Samuels, 19 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). Nevertheless, if a prisoner plaintiff has insufficient assets, no initial 20 filing fee is required. Second, once the IFP motion is granted and the initial fee is charged, 21 the remaining balance must be paid in installments. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2); Bruce, 22 577 U.S. at 84. 23 Edwards’ IFP motion includes a copy of his California Department of Corrections 24 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Inmate Statement Report and Prison Certificate attested to 25 by a CDCR trust account official. (Doc. No. 2 at 5–7.) His average monthly balance, 26 average monthly deposits, and available balance are all $0.00. (Id.) 27 The Court therefore GRANTS Edwards’ IFP motion. No initial partial fee will be 28 charged since it appears Edwards presently has no means to pay. See 28 U.S.C. 1 § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action” 2 simply because “the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial 3 filing fee.”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 5 solely on “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 6 ordered”). Edwards is nevertheless required to pay the full $350 filing fee in installments 7 as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) calls for.1 8 II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 9 A. Standard of Review 10 Because Edwards is a prisoner proceeding IFP, federal law requires pre-screening 11 of Edwards’ claims before any defendants are required to file an answer. 28 U.S.C. 12 §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b). Pre-screening means that the Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP 13 complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks 14 damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th 15 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 16 (9th Cir. 2010) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 17 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 18 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 20 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Likewise, § 1915A screening “incorporates 21 the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 22 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) 23 (citations omitted). 24 25 1 The Court notes that Edwards was granted IFP status in another civil rights action he filed on 26 October 14, 2025. See Edwards v. Montes-Espinosa, et al., No. 25-cv-02813-TWR-GC, (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2025), Doc. No. 3 (order granting IFP status and dismissing complaint without prejudice). Since 27 Edwards’ October 2025 complaint is against the San Diego Sheriff’s Office and several of its personnel based on an unrelated arrest on December 22, 2023, this present matter, against the CVPD and two of its 28 1 Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 2 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 3 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 4 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific 5 task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 6 sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted). 7 “Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 8 color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 9 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The statute, though “not 10 itself a source of substantive rights, . . . provides a method for vindicating federal rights 11 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (citation and in- 12 ternal quotation marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both 13 (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 14 (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 15 Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011). 16 Complaints filed pro se must be “liberally construed, particularly where civil rights 17 claims are involved.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) 18 (citations omitted). 19 B. Allegations in the Complaint 20 Edwards names three defendants: the Chula Vista Police Department (“CVPD”), 21 CVPD Officer Lowell Moreno, and CVPD Detective Michael Menna. He raises three 22 causes of action, i.e., counts. Counts One and Two allege that Defendants Moreno and 23 Menna violated Edwards’ constitutional rights after the two men arrested Edwards on 24 December 31, 2023. (Doc. No. 1 at 1–2.) Count Three alleges the CVPD and Menna 25 violated his right to a fair and impartial trial and due process. (Id. at 5.) 26 Count One. The allegedly unconstitutional conduct began at 2330 Palomira Court 27 in Chula Vista and continued after Moreno and Menna brought Edwards to the South Bay 28 Detention Center and the San Diego Central Jail. (Id. at 1.) “During arrest on December 1 31, 2023,” Edwards claims Moreno and Menna confined him “in a WRAP device and 2 locked [him] in their vehicle for an excessive amount of time.” (Id. at 3.) 3 A WRAP is a “total body restraint in the style of a cocoon.” Garcia v. Yuba Cnty. 4 Sheriff’s Dep’t, 559 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2021). “Properly applied, it forces 5 a person into a seated position with the legs straight in front and hands restrained behind 6 the back.” Est. of Sanchez v. County of Stanislaus, No. 1:18-cv-00977-ADA-BAM, 2023 7 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203673, at *72 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2023) (cleaned up). 8 Between the three locations, Edwards alleges “[m]ultiple excessive force incidents 9 happened for a total of 9 hours,” during which time the “officers kept playing with buttons 10 tightening and loosening the equipment to intentionally cause discomfort,” “essentially 11 torturing” him. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) 12 As such, Count One asserts that Defendants Moreno and Menna violated Edwards’ 13 right to “freedom from cruel and unusual punishment,” i.e, the Eight Amendment. (Id.) 14 Count Two. Following his arrest, Edwards further alleges that Moreno and Menna 15 violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing “a Random National City Police Officer to 16 scan” Plaintiff’s finger with a “portable scanner at the South Bay Detention Facility.” (Id. 17 at 4.) 18 Count Three. Following arrest and booking by the CVPD, Edwards was later 19 convicted at trial for robbery and burglary of the Enagic Golf Club in Chula Vista. In 20 relation to his conviction, Edwards alleges that Menna, on an unspecified date, “stated 21 false[ly]” in a police report that the golf club “has no cameras.” (Id. at 5.) This, per 22 Edwards, meant that “CVPD interfered with the investigation of his criminal case, 23 “creating an unfair bias[,] withholding exculpatory evidence proving” Edwards’ 24 “innocence.” (Id.) 25 C. Discussion 26 1. Excessive Force (Count One) – Defendants Moreno and Menna 27 In Count One, Edwards alleges Moreno and Menna, both CVPD personnel, violated 28 his Eighth Amendment rights on December 31, 2023, the same day they arrested him. 1 Generally, though, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual 2 punishments” applies only “after conviction and sentence.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 393 & 3 n.6. It appears Edwards was either an arrestee or a pretrial detainee at the time of his 4 asserted injury. The Supreme Court has stated that “excessive force during a[n] . . . arrest 5 is ‘analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.’” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 79 (2025) 6 (quoting Graham, 490 U. S. at 395). Pretrial detainees’ “rights arise under the Due Process 7 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”; they “are accorded no rights under the Eighth 8 Amendment.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations 9 omitted). 10 Whether a pretrial excessive force claim arises under the Fourth2 or Fourteenth3 11 Amendment, a court’s inquiry is the same. Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 594 U.S. 464, 12 466 n.2 (2021) (per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] pretrial 13 detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was 14 objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015). 15 Liberally construed, Edwards’ claim of being confined in a patrol car in a WRAP 16 device for nine hours states a cognizable claim of excessive force. Since a WRAP device 17 is arguably far more restrictive than tightly handcuffing Edwards, a nine-hour period of 18 post-arrest confinement in such a device is sufficient to survive the minimum initial 19 screening threshold. See, e.g., Buckley v. Evans, No. 2:02-cv-01451-JKS, 2007 WL 20 2900173, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) (finding that tight handcuffing was more than de 21 minimis force where prisoner was kept in handcuffs and leg irons for almost five hours and 22 they were not loosened when he constantly complained). 23 24 25 2 The Fourth Amendment, in part, protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . 26 against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

27 3 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that the State shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 28 1 To be sure, the excessive force inquiry involves “careful attention to the facts and 2 circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Those circumstances 3 include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force 4 used; the extent of the plaintiff ’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit 5 the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably 6 perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 7 U.S. at 397. While it is true that Edwards does not explain whether he posed any security 8 risk to the officers or was actively resisting, taking his remaining allegations as true at this 9 stage, his Complaint has alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim 10 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal quotation 11 marks omitted). Even absent any allegation that the initial deployment of the WRAP device 12 was unreasonable, the claim as pleaded surpasses §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)’s initial 13 screening threshold when considering Edwards’ additional allegations that defendants kept 14 him in the device for a nine-hour period and “kept playing with buttons tightening and 15 loosening the equipment to intentionally cause [him] discomfort.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) 16 2. Excessive Force – Defendant CVPD 17 In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), the Supreme Court held 18 that municipalities and other local government units qualify as “persons,” and are therefore 19 subject to lawsuits, under § 1983. The Ninth Circuit has held that police and sheriff 20 departments in California can be subject to Monell liability under § 1983 when acting for 21 a county or city. Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 565 (9th Cir. 2001) (Los 22 Angeles County Sheriff’s Department); see also Shaw v. Cal. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage 23 Control, 788 F.2d 600, 604–05 (9th Cir. 1986) (San Jose Police Department). 24 To establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must “prove ‘(1) that [the plaintiff] pos- 25 sessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a 26 policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional 27 right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” 28 Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. 1 Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1997)). A plaintiff can prove the 2 existence of a policy or custom on any of three theories: (1) that the official acted pursuant 3 to expressly adopted official policy; (2) that the official’s conduct was a product of the 4 local entity’s deficient practices or customs, such as failing to train or supervise; or (3) that 5 the official had “final policy-making authority” or “ratified a subordinate’s 6 unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 7 961, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted). 8 However, nothing in Edwards’ Complaint plausibly suggests that Defendants 9 Moreno and Menna, in allegedly using excessive force against him, acted pursuant to a 10 City of Chula Vista or CVPD policy, custom, or practice that caused him injury. Nor has 11 Edwards pointed to the police department’s failure to train or supervise. 12 The Court therefore concludes Edwards fails to allege facts stating a claim against 13 Defendant CVPD and dismisses with respect to the CVPD. 14 3. Counts Two and Three 15 A district court may dismiss a claim and “deny leave to amend when amendment 16 would be futile.” Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). This Court 17 does so with regard to Counts Two and Three. 18 In Count Two, Edwards alleges that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment 19 when they allowed a National City Police Officer to scan” his “finger . . . at the South Bay 20 Detention Facility.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) 21 This allegation, on its face, fails to state a claim. The Fourth Amendment protects 22 “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 23 unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. While it is true that an “arrest 24 without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and gives rise to a claim for 25 damages under § 1983,” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 26 2008), Edwards has not alleged that his arrest and pretrial detention took place in the 27 absence of probable cause. 28 1 Since Edwards does not challenge the legality of the arrest or his initial detention, 2 he cannot make out a plausible claim of Fourth Amendment violation. For it is well- 3 established that “[w]hen officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a 4 serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, . . . 5 fingerprinting [is] . . . a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the 6 Fourth Amendment.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013). As the Supreme Court 7 observed in King, since the advent of fingerprinting, courts “have had no trouble 8 determining that fingerprinting was a natural part of ‘the administrative steps incident to 9 arrest.’” 569 U.S. at 458 (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58 10 (1991)). Indeed, by 1932, it had already been observed that “routine fingerprinting did not 11 violate the Fourth Amendment precisely because it fit within the accepted means of 12 processing an arrestee into custody.” Id. 13 Therefore, Edwards fails to state a plausible Fourth Amendment violation simply by 14 pointing to the scanning of his fingerprint by a National City Police Department officer at 15 the South Bay Detention Facility. The Court notes that Edwards seems to imply the scan 16 was done to further some unrelated investigative motive, (Doc. No. 1 at 4) (stating the 17 fingerprint-scanning officer was able to “obtain Edwards’ personal information”), yet the 18 Supreme Court in King pointed out that the routine making of comparisons between an 19 “arrestee’s fingerprints against electronic databases of known criminals and unsolved 20 crimes” raises no Fourth Amendment implications. Id. at 451. Given the breadth of 21 permissible general uses of fingerprint data taken during arrest or booking, and Edwards’ 22 failure to allege any discernible expectation of privacy with respect to his fingerprint scan 23 by a law enforcement agent from an adjacent city’s police department, Count Two is 24 dismissed. 25 Finally, in Count Three, Edwards’ claim of interference with his rights at trial is 26 barred by the rule established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483–87 (1994). Heck 27 states that, “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 28 imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 1 conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence 2 has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a 3 state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal 4 court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 5 (footnote omitted). As such, whenever any “claim for damages bearing that relationship to 6 a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” 7 Id. at 487. Heck, therefore, instructs courts to “consider whether a judgment in favor of the 8 plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, 9 the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 10 sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. 11 Edwards’ claim directly implicates the validity of his conviction as he alleges that 12 Menna’s conduct interfered with an investigation that would have unearthed “evidence 13 proving [his] innocence.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) Not only does Edwards not plead facts 14 indicating a “favorable termination” of a challenge to his conviction for underlying 15 robbery, Edwards’ habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is pending in this District. See 16 Edwards v. CDCR, et al., No. 26-cv-01245-BJC-VET (S.D. Cal. filed Feb. 17, 2026). 17 Thus, Edwards does not allege and cannot show the conviction which forms the basis 18 of his Count Three claim has already been invalidated, the Court finds this claim fails to 19 state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 and warrants sua sponte dismissal without 20 leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. 21 Accordingly, Counts Two and Three are DISMISSED without leave to amend, since 22 it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies” with respect to these claims therein “could not 23 be cured by amendment.” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal 24 quote marks omitted). 25 III. Conclusion and Orders 26 For the reasons explained, the Court: 27 1. GRANTS Edwards Motion to Proceed IFP. (Doc. No. 2.) 28 1 2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect the $350 2 filing fee owed in this case and forward monthly payments from Edwards’ account to the 3 Clerk of the Court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 4 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order by U.S. Mail 5 on Jeff Macomber, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 6 P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001. 7 4. DISMISSES all claims against Defendant Chula Vista Police Department 8 based on Edwards’ failure to state a plausible claim for relief against the department 9 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). 10 5. GRANTS Edwards forty-five (45) days’ leave from the date of this Order in 11 which to either: (A) file a Notice of Intent to Proceed with his excessive force claims 12 against Moreno and Menna only; or (B) file an Amended Complaint that corrects the 13 deficiencies of pleading identified in this Order. If Plaintiff files a Notice of Intent to 14 proceed against Moreno and Menna only, he may include a request that the U.S. Marshal 15 effect service of summons and his original Complaint on Moreno and Menna pursuant to 16 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Federal Rule Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). 17 If Edwards instead chooses to amend, his new pleading must be clearly titled as his 18 Amended Complaint, contain S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 25-cv-3825-AJB-DDL in its 19 caption, and be complete in itself without reference to his original Complaint. Defendants 20 not named and any claim not realleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, including the 21 currently sufficient excessive force claim alleged against Moreno and Menna in his 22 original Complaint, will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach 23 Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 24 amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 25 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not realleged 26 in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”). 27 If Edwards fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 28 will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Edwards ’s failure to state 1 claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and 2 || 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 3 ||amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 4 ||not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 5 || dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: May 7, 2026 © g 8 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12