Sean M. Berry and Patricia Berry v. Zachary Petri, et. al
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
Plaintiffs Sean M. Berry and Patricia Berry filed an ex parte emergency application and a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking injunctive relief based on a Fourth Amendment claim. The Court denied both motions, finding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and that the motion was premature because no defendants had been served.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Emergency Application (ECF No. 11)“Thus, for the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for emergency relief. (ECF Nos. 11, 13.)” | agree with court The court correctly applied the four-factor test for injunctive relief from Winter v. NRDC. It found the plaintiffs failed to meet the 'likelihood of success on the merits' prong, distinguishing the lower screening standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A from the higher TRO standard. It also correctly noted the motion was premature due to lack of service, citing Zepeda v. INS regarding personal jurisdiction and the inability to determine rights of persons not before the court. The decision follows from the law and the record recited. |
Denial of Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 13)“Thus, for the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for emergency relief. (ECF Nos. 11, 13.)” | agree with court The court consolidated the motions and applied the TRO standard. The denial is supported by the failure to show likelihood of success on the merits and the procedural deficiency of lack of service. The reasoning is sound and consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent regarding TROs and jurisdiction. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standard for a TRO and applies it to the facts. It properly distinguishes the screening stage from the merits stage for injunctive relief. It also correctly identifies the procedural defect of lack of service as a basis for denial, citing appropriate Ninth Circuit authority regarding jurisdiction. The reasoning is complete and answers the motion with the right authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 14 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 15 16 SEAN M. BERRY and PATRICIA Case No. 25-cv-02367-BAS-DEB BERRY, 17 ORDER: Plaintiffs, 18 (1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EX v. PARTE EMERGENCY 19 APPLICATION (ECF No. 11); ZACHARY PETRI, et. al, 20 AND Defendants. 21 (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR 22 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 23 ORDER (ECF No. 13)
24 Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Sean M. Berry and Patricia Berry motions for 25 emergency relief, including: (1) an “ex parte emergency application” (ECF No. 11); and 26 (2) a motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 13). Given that both motions 27 28 1 request emergency injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 11, 13), the Court considers them together 2 as a request for a temporary restraining order. 3 In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff “must establish that he is 4 likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 5 of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 6 in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations 7 omitted); see also Jones v. H.S.B.C. (USA), 844 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2012) 8 (standard for granting a temporary restraining order is similar to standard for granting a 9 preliminary injunction). 10 Here, Plaintiffs move for emergency relief on various grounds—the most viable of 11 which is Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 12 (ECF No. 11 at 1.) Although Plaintiffs allege that Officer Angel Manzano seized their 13 motorhome without a warrant (id.) and that allegation was sufficient at the screening stage 14 (ECF No. 8), they fail to demonstrate that they meet the stringent standard of being likely 15 to succeed on the merits as required for a temporary restraining order. See Springfield v. 16 Valencia, No. 219CV00965KJMCKDP, 2019 WL 6179543, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 17 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 219CV0965KJMCKDP, 2019 WL 18 6170744 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)) (“[T]he screening 19 standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is far lower than that needed to demonstrate a likelihood 20 of success on the merits . . . a claim need only be ‘cognizable’ in order to avoid dismissal 21 at the screening stage). 22 In addition, Plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary restraining order is premature. No 23 defendants have been served at this time and thus they have not been provided an 24 opportunity to respond to plaintiff's allegations. See Zepeda v. United States Immigration 25 & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue an 26 27 1 Plaintiffs do not explicitly link any factual support to the other stated causes of action. (ECF 28 I |}injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction 2 || over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”). 3 Thus, for the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for emergency 4 ||relief. (ECF Nos. 11, 13.) 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 ~ 7 || DATED: May 1, 2026 (yi. Duhark H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Qe
Cites, in this corpus
- Jones v. H.S.B.C. (USA) Case No. 11-cv-2939-MMA (NLS) · 2012-01-04