Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 REYNA MARCIAL GARCIA, Case No. 25-cv-01847-BAS-DEB 14 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 15 v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (ECF No. 36) 16 SIZZLING PLATTER, LLC and SIZZLING WINGS, LLC, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Reyna Marcial Garcia’s motion for 20 reconsideration (ECF No. 36) of the Court’s prior Order (ECF No. 34) denying Plaintiff’s 21 motion to transfer venue (ECF No. 25) and granting Defendant’s motion to stay (ECF No. 22 20). For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 23 (ECF No. 36.) 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed two actions against Defendants in different 26 California state courts citing various California Labor Code violations—including for 27 failure to pay overtime wages. (See ECF No. 20-3.) On July 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed the 28 present action, alleging a single cause of action for failure to pay overtime wages under the 1 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (“FLSA”). (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 55–64.) 2 Defendants filed a motion to stay. (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff opposed the motion to stay. 3 (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff also filed a motion to transfer venue (ECF No. 25), which 4 Defendants opposed (ECF No. 28). Plaintiff replied to Defendants’ opposition. (ECF No. 5 30.) 6 The Court issued an Order on Parties’ motions. (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff moved to 7 reconsider the Court’s Order. (ECF No. 36.) For the reasons below, the Court DENIES 8 Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. (ECF No. 34.) 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Motions for reconsideration are within the discretion of the trial court. Rodgers v. 11 Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc). Under Civil Local Rule 7.1.i, a party 12 may apply for reconsideration when a “motion or any application or petition for an order 13 or other relief has been made to a judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” CivLR 14 7.1.i.1. On a motion to reconsider, relief should be granted only “if the district court (1) is 15 presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or [its] initial decision 16 was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School 17 Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). In 18 order to succeed on a motion to reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly 19 convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. Singleton v. Kernan, 20 No. 16-CV-02462-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 4922849, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2017). A 21 motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and arguments 22 upon which the court has already ruled. Id. 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 Plaintiff moves for the Court to reconsider its prior Order on several grounds. (ECF 25 No. 36.) The Court considers each in turn below. 26 A. Whether the Court Committed Clear Error When Finding Evidence of 27 Forum Shopping 28 1 Plaintiff moves the Court to reconsider whether it committed a clear error when 2 finding evidence of forum shopping and denying Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue. (ECF 3 Nos. 25, 34.) More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiff was not forum stopping but 4 instead, intended to transfer the present action to the United States District Court for the 5 District of Utah given that Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction there and the 6 recent Ninth Circuit decision in Harrington v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. 7 states that a “nationwide” collective can only be maintained in a forum where the defendant 8 is subject general jurisdiction. (ECF No. 36-1 at 4:2–5:14 (citing Harrington v. Cracker 9 Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 142 F.4th 678, 685 (9th Cir. 2025).) 10 The Court finds that Harrington, 142 F.4th 678 does not preclude the Court’s finding 11 that Plaintiff is forum shopping when filing the present action in the Southern District of 12 California. First, Harrington is not an “intervening change in controlling law”—as 13 Harrington was decided on July 1, 2025—prior to Plaintiff filing the present action on July 14 18, 2025, and prior to the Plaintiff filing the motion to transfer venue on December 19, 15 2025. See School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. Second, Harrington does not provide 16 guidance on what does or does not constitute forum shopping—and does not affect the 17 Court’s prior analysis that Plaintiff presents evidence of forum shopping by moving to 18 transfer the present action out of the district in which she resides (see ECF No. 34 at 5:22- 19 6:18.) Thus, the Court did not “commit[] a clear error” and the Court does not find “[its] 20 initial decision was manifestly unjust.” School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. In addition, 21 Plaintiff does not present any “newly discovered evidence” that requires the Court to 22 reconsider its prior Order. (ECF No. 35.) 23 For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider that the 24 Court’s finding of forum shopping was made in clear error. (ECF No. 36.) 25 B. Whether the Court Committed Clear Error When Finding Utah Does 26 Not Have a Greater Local Interest in Controversy Compared to California 27 Plaintiff moves for the Court to reconsider whether it committed a clear error when 28 finding that California has a greater local interest in controversy than Utah, and denying 1 Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue—since Defendants’ headquarters are in Utah. (ECF 2 Nos. 25, 34.) 3 Again, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that the Court committed a “clear error” in 4 finding that California has a greater local interest—given an ongoing related state case in 5 California and Plaintiff’s own allegations revolve around events taking place in California. 6 Further, other courts within this district have also found that the location of defendant’s 7 residence is not necessarily dispositive of the local interest analysis. See e.g., Reynolds v. 8 Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., No. C 06-06216 SI, 2007 WL 484782, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 9 2007) (“While the Court agrees with Defendants regarding a general local interest in having 10 localized controversies decided at home, the Court does not agree that this is such a 11 controversy. Indeed, the relevant occurrences involved in this case are spread across at 12 least three federal districts.”). 13 As such, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider that the Court’s finding 14 that California had a greater local interest in controversy was made in clear error. (ECF 15 No. 36.) 16 C. Whether the Court Committed Clear Error When Finding Convenience 17 of the Witnesses Weighs Against Transfer 18 Plaintiff moves for the Court to reconsider whether it committed a clear error when 19 finding that inconvenience of the witnesses weighs against transfer, given that the majority 20 of Defendant’s officers reside in Utah and Defendant’s headquarters are in Utah. (ECF 21 No. 34 at 6:19–7:21.) 22 The Court declines to revise its prior finding that convenience of the witnesses 23 weighs against transfer—given that the Court already weighed the location of Defendant’s 24 officers’ residence and Defendant’s headquarters when initially deciding on the matter. 25 (ECF No. 34 at 6:19–7:21.) Plaintiff further attempts to argue that requiring Defendant’s 26 officers to travel to the Southern District of California to testify would impose a 27 “significant cost.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 7:1-7 (citing Kiley v. MedFirst Consulting Healthcare 28 Staffing, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-00470-CL, 2017 WL 11434180 (D. Or. Oct. 13, 2017), at *6 1 (quoting Getz v. Boeing Co., 547 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2008)). However, as 2 the Court previously reasoned, Defendant has made clear that it would cover that cost and 3 thus, such travel would not impose a significant financial burden upon Defendant or its 4 employees. (ECF No. 34 at 7:14-15.) 5 Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider that the Court’s finding 6 that the Southern District of California is a convenient location for Plaintiff’s witnesses 7 was made in clear error. (ECF No. 36.) 8 D. Whether the Court Committed Clear Error When Staying the Entire 9 Action 10 Plaintiff also claims that the Court’s prior decision to grant Defendant’s motion to 11 stay (ECF No. 20) and to stay the entire action purportedly based on Plaintiff’s ability to 12 represent remaining states’ potential class members was “clear error”—given that the 13 adequacy of Plaintiff’s representation purportedly does not factor into analyzing whether 14 to stay FLSA collective actions (ECF No. 36-1 at 7:8–8:4) (citing Campbell v. City of Los 15 Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1111 (9th Cir. 2018)). 16 However, the crux of the Court’s analysis in deciding to stay the entire action (rather 17 than partial stay for potential class members in California) is not whether Plaintiff was an 18 inadequate representative of Plaintiff’s proposed class. Rather, the Court reasoned that 19 allowing Plaintiff’s lawsuit to proceed with respect to the other 49 states would lead to 20 piecemeal litigation, which may result in inconsistent outcomes for plaintiffs in California, 21 or even a wholesale dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit depending on the outcome of the related 22 state case. (See e.g., ECF No. 34 at 11:25–13:26.) 23 Plaintiff does not present any caselaw precluding the Court’s authority to stay the 24 entire action on that basis. Thus, Court finds that it exercised proper discretion to stay the 25 entire action. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936) (“[T]he power to 26 stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition 27 of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for 28 litigants.”); see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1111 (9th Cir.2005) ( “[A] 1 trial court may, with propriety, find it efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for 2 the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent 3 proceedings which bear upon the case.”). 4 For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider that the 5 Court’s decision to stay the entire action was made in clear error. (ECF No. 36.) 6 E. Whether the Court Committed Clear Error When Finding Castelan and 7 This Action are Substantially Similar 8 Plaintiff also moves to stay the entire action on the basis that the Court committed a 9 clear error when finding that Plaintiff’s California state court cases and the current action 10 are “substantially similar” (and granting stay) under the Colorado River doctrine—given 11 that Plaintiff may choose to opt out of the settlements in Plaintiff’s state court actions. 12 (ECF No. 36-1 at 8:5-22.) 13 The fact that Plaintiff may choose to opt out of the settlements in Plaintiff’s state 14 court actions does not prevent the Court from finding that Plaintiff’s state court cases and 15 the current action are “substantially similar” such that the Colorado River doctrine may 16 apply. First, Plaintiff (and other potential class members who may be parties in both the 17 state and federal action) have not opted out as a matter of fact. Second, substantially 18 overlapping parties to both actions (as there appears to be here) supports finding 19 “substantial similarity”—as parties between both actions do not need to be the exact same. 20 Cf Del Conte v. San Francisco Police Dep't, No. C 06-05030 JSW, 2007 WL 1119187, at 21 *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2007) (“The only differences between the parties in the actions are 22 that state plaintiff Steven Andrew Nice did not join Del Conte in the Federal Action . . . 23 and that Del Conte added defendant Officer Kerwitz, unnamed police officers and the San 24 Francisco Police Department (the City) to the Federal Action. However, these differences 25 do not preclude application of the Colorado River doctrine because the doctrine requires 26 only a ‘substantial similarity,’ not exact parallelism”.). 27 28 I As such, the Court finds it did not make a “clear error” when finding that □□□□□□□□□□□ 2 ||state and federal action are “substantially similar’—such that reconsideration of its prior 3 || Order is warranted. 4 For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to reconsider that the 5 ||Court’s finding of substantial similarity between Plaintiff's state court actions and the 6 || present action—and thus, application of the Colorado River doctrine—was made in clear 7 error. (ECF No. 36.) 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to reconsider in its 10 || entirety. (ECF No. 36.) 11 IT IS SO ORDERED.

13 || DATED: April 30, 2026 Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge 14 United States District Court 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 □ _