Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 26cv1451 DMS DDL VIKAS VIKAS, 12 O R D E R G R A N T I N G P E T I TION; 13 Petitioner, DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT v. COUNSEL 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Pet., 18 ECF No. 1.) Respondents responded to the Petition. (Resp., ECF No. 4.) Petitioner did 19 not file a Traverse, but submitted a letter wherein he requests counsel. (ECF No. 5.) 20 Having considered the parties’ briefs, the relevant legal authority, and the record, the Court 21 grants the Petition and denies Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel. 22 Petitioner is a citizen and national of India. (Ex., Resp., ECF No. 4-1, at 2.) He 23 entered the country without inspection on or around April 26, 2023. (Id.) He was then 24 processed, served with a Notice to Appear, and released on his own recognizance. (Id. at 25 3.) Petitioner has been detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since April 9, 2025. 26 (Pet. 1, 4, 6.) Neither Petitioner nor Respondents explain why or under what circumstances 27 Petitioner was re-detained. 28 1 Petitioner argues that his detention is unlawfully prolonged in violation of due 2 process. (Id. at 6.) Respondents contend that “the legal issues presented concern the 3 statutory authority” for the Government’s detention of Petitioner under either 8 U.S.C. §§ 4 1225(b)(2)(A) (which requires mandatory detention) or 1226(a) (which entitles Petitioner 5 to a bond hearing). (Return 3.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory 6 detention under § 1225(b)(2) but concedes that courts in this District have generally found 7 noncitizens residing in the interior do not fall under § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention 8 scheme. (Id.) However, Petitioner does not argue that he should be detained under § 9 1226(a). Rather, Petitioner argues that because his detention is prolonged, the Government 10 cannot detain him further without release or an adequate bond hearing. (Pet. 2.) The Court 11 conducts its analysis assuming Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) and finds 12 that continuing to detain Petitioner without a bond hearing violates his due process rights. 13 The facts, claims, and arguments presented in this case are similar to those in Amado 14 v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 25cv2687, 2025 WL 3079052 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (finding 15 petitioner’s detention of thirteen months unreasonable and violative of due process when 16 applying the six-factor test articulated in Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 17 1116–17 (W.D. Wash. 2019)). The Court finds the reasoning of that case persuasive and 18 adopts and applies it wholesale to this case. First, Petitioner has been detained for over a 19 year. “Courts have found detention over seven months without a bond hearing weighs 20 toward a finding that it is unreasonable.” Amado, 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (collecting 21 cases). Second, while the exact status of Petitioner’s removal proceedings is unclear, it 22 appears Petitioner has not yet received a final order of removal. Further, Respondents 23 contend Petitioner’s mandatory detention is lawful. Thus, the Court finds Petitioner faces 24 detention for the foreseeable future. Third, like Amado, Petitioner has spent more than a 25 year at the Otay Mesa Detention “which courts have found is indistinguishable from penal 26 confinement.” Id. at *6 (citation modified) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he fourth 27 factor weighs in favor of Petitioner because the record does not indicate that he has caused 28 any undue delays,” and “[t]he fifth factor weighs in Respondents’ favor because there is 1 no indication that the [G]overnment is responsible for undue delay in the removal 2 proceedings.” Id. On the present record, the Court is unable to meaningfully assess the 3 last factor—the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of 4 removal. Therefore, this factor is neutral. Considering the above Banda factors, the Court 5 finds Petitioner’s mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) has become unreasonable and 6 violates due process. 7 “The Court notes that even under the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the factors support 8 granting Petitioner a bond hearing.” Id. at *7; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 9 When determining whether Petitioner’s procedural due process rights have been violated, 10 the Court must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; 11 (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 12 the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the 13 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 14 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 15 424 U.S. at 335. First, “the private interest affected by the official action is the most 16 significant liberty interest there is – the interest in being free from imprisonment.” Black 17 v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 151 (2nd Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Petitioner has been in 18 detention for over one year and counting, “so any incursion on his liberty interest is 19 serious.” Amado, 2025 WL 3079052, at *7. Next, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides no 20 “procedural safeguards” in place to determine whether Petitioner’s detention has become 21 unreasonable. Id. “Accordingly, an individualized bond hearing at which an IJ can 22 consider the non-citizen’s dangerousness and risk of flight would add value.” Id. “Finally, 23 the ‘Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 24 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 25 entail’ also weigh in favor of Petitioner.” Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). “[A] bond 26 hearing does not impact the Government’s ability to assure Petitioner’s presence if he is 27 ultimately removed, and the Government can raise any concerns regarding Petitioner’s 28 danger to the community or his flight risk at the bond hearing before the IJ.” Id. 1 Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner’s mandatory detention under § 2 || 1225(b)(2)(A) violates due process, and grants the Petition.! Respondents are directed to 3 || arrange an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner before the Immigration Court within 4 ||fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order. At the bond hearing, “Respondents must 5 || justify [Petitioner’s] continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence 6 || that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.” Sadeqi v. 7 || LaRose. 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025). Respondents are further ordered to 8 a Status Report within twenty-one (21) days of this Order’s entry, confirming 9 || Petitioner received a bond hearing and the outcome of that hearing. 10 Because the Petition is granted, appointing Petitioner counsel is unnecessary at this 11 |/juncture. Thus, the Court denies Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 || Dated: April 22, 2026 2» 4 Jorn Yn - L4\ Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 In light of this determination, the Court declines to analyze Petitioner’s other claims.