Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WALTER SAYLES, Case No.: 26-cv-0174-AJB-JLB CDCR #AL-4784, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 (1) DISMISSING THE EIGHTH vs. 14 AMENDMENT EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 15 SERGEANT AMAYA, SERGEANT AMAYA AND TAYLOR; 16 TAYLOR AND JANE DOE, (2) DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT 17 Defendants. COUNSEL, AND 18 (3) PROVIDING PLAINTIFF WITH THE OPTION OF AMENDING OR 19 PROCEEDING WITH THE EIGHTH 20 AMENDMENT FAILURE TO PROTECT CLAIM AGAINST 21 DEFENDANT AMAYA AND THE 22 EIGHTH AMENDMENT EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM AGAINST 23 DEFENDANT JANE DOE 24 25 26 On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff Walter Sayles, a state prisoner confined at Mule Creek 27 State Prison in Ione, California, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 28 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court for the Eastern District of California, claiming he 1 was subjected to the excessive use of force while housed at the Richard J. Donovan 2 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (Doc. No. 1 at 3–6.) The case was 3 transferred to this Court. (Doc. No. 4.) On February 11, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff 4 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissed the Complaint with leave to 5 amend for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 9.) Plaintiff has now filed a First Amended 6 Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. No. 11.) He has also filed a Motion to appoint counsel and an 7 exhibit to the FAC describing his medical condition. (Doc. Nos. 12; 13.) 8 I. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 9 A. Standard of Review 10 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-Answer 11 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court 12 must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, 13 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 14 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 16 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the targets of frivolous 17 or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 18 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted). 19 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 20 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 21 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 22 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 23 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 24 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 25 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 26 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 27 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Detailed factual 28 allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 1 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 2 B. Allegations in the FAC 3 Plaintiff alleges that on November 15, 2024, he approached the program office and 4 informed Defendant RJD correctional officer Sergeant Taylor that he had safety concerns 5 about being on the yard. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 5.) Taylor said, “do you want candy” and “you 6 don’t have no safety concerns on the yard [but] without looking into the matter of me being 7 harmed by inmates on the yard.” (Id.) When Plaintiff refused to go back to the yard, “Taylor 8 used force on me with the purpose to cause harm by putting me on the ground hard with 9 force,” and never addressed his safety concerns. (Id.) 10 Plaintiff alleges that on June 2, 2025, he went to the program office to speak with 11 Defendant RJD correctional officer Sergeant Amaya “about a issue we had words and he 12 said you can go back to your cell or I will handcuff you and take you there.” (Doc. No. 13 11-1 at 3; Doc. No. 11-2 at 4, 7.) Plaintiff walked away and was on his way to the medicine 14 line to get his meds before going back to his cell, Amaya exited the office and “grabbed 15 hold of my arm without giving me a direct order to cuff up. I hesitated from being grabbed 16 and officer Amaya used force to take me to the ground and punch me twice with a closed 17 fist in the head hard as I was on the ground holding on to one of his legs so that Amaya 18 would not kick me. As I let go of officer Amaya’s leg he hit me with his knee down hard 19 in my back.” (Doc. No. 11-1 at 3; Doc. No. 11-2 at 3, 7.) As he was on the ground in leg 20 and arm restraints and not resisting, Plaintiff “had words with” Defendant correctional 21 officer Jane Doe, the supervisor of C-yard, who “walked in to take over.” (Doc. No. 11-1 22 at 3; Doc. No. 11-2 at 3.) Doe, “with the purpose to cause harm kneeled down put her hand 23 around my throat and started choking me.” (Doc. No. 11-1 at 4; Doc. No. 11-2 at 4.) 24 “Amaya watched and did nothing to stop Jane Doe from choking me in arm and leg 25 restraints,” despite standing right there and having the opportunity to do or say something 26 to stop her. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 4; Doc. No. 11-2 at 4, 7.) 27 Plaintiff alleges he has nerve damage to his spine with lower back problems for 28 which he has to have physical therapy and take pain medication, and that he has suffered 1 emotional and psychological distress. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 3–5; Doc. No. 11-2 at 4–5.) He 2 claims that the use of excessive force and the failure to protect him violated his rights under 3 the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and requests $45,000 in damages. (Doc. No. 11-1 4 at 3–6; Doc. No. 11-2 at 3–5, 7–8.) 5 C. Analysis 6 The Eighth Amendment, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 7 Amendment, forbids prison officials from “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 8 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). It “places restraints on prison officials, who 9 may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 10 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to 11 “‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. (quoting Hudson 12 v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). Prison officials have a duty to intercede when 13 another officer violates the constitutional rights of a prisoner, provided the officer has a 14 “realistic opportunity” to intercede. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289–90 (9th 15 Cir. 2000). 16 Nevertheless, “prison officials are authorized and indeed required to take 17 appropriate measures to maintain prison order and discipline and protect staff and other 18 prisoners.” LeMaire v. Maas, 12 F.3d 1444, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993); Simmons v. G. Arnett, 19 47 F.4th 927, 933 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[P]rison officials should be accorded ‘wide-ranging 20 deference’ when they are exercising their judgment to maintain prison safety,” because 21 “[i]n the specialized context of prison operations, the use of force can be a ‘legitimate 22 means for preventing small disturbances from becoming dangerous to other inmates or the 23 prison personnel.’”) (citations omitted); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321–22 (prison officials are 24 entitled to deference when a prisoner challenges a use of force). 25 “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments 26 necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, 27 provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” 28 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). “When 1 prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary 2 standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or not significant injury is evident. 3 Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how 4 diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson, 503 5 U.S. at 9. However, “[n]ot every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal 6 cause of action,” and “[a]n inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no 7 discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.” Wilkins v. 8 Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). The extent of the injury 9 suffered by an inmate is one factor that may determine “whether the use of force could 10 plausibly have been thought necessary” in the situation, “or instead evinced such 11 wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing 12 willingness that it occur.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 13 386, 396 (1989) (“Not every push or shove . . . violates the [federal Constitution].”). 14 With respect to the November 2024 incident, Plaintiff alleges Taylor “used force on 15 me for the purpose to cause harm by putting me on the ground hard with force,” because 16 Plaintiff did not want to return to the yard due to safety concerns. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 5.) He 17 describes the harm he suffered as: “I had back injury.” (Id.) It is unclear whether the injury 18 he suffered in this incident is related to the injury which he describes in detail that he 19 allegedly suffered in the June 2025 incident with Amaya and Jane Doe. Irrespective of the 20 severity of the injury, as with the original Complaint, the allegations against Taylor in the 21 FAC are insufficient to allege that the amount of force Taylor used could not “plausibly 22 have been thought necessary” in the situation. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. Rather, Plaintiff 23 once again fails to describe in detail the actions he took, if any, which led Taylor to 24 “putting” him on the ground, other than refusing to return to the yard, or just how “hard” 25 he was put on the ground and in what manner. As with the original Complaint, the 26 allegations in the FAC once again indicate that Taylor used force in response to Plaintiff’s 27 refusal to obey an order to return to the yard but without any allegations identifying the 28 reasons he had safety concerns on the yard, or their severity or immediacy, which might 1 plausibly indicate Taylor issued the order with a purpose other than a good-faith effort to 2 maintain or restore discipline. Plaintiff has also once again fails to include any factual 3 allegations showing that Taylor’s use of force or the injury it caused was so severe that the 4 amount of force used could plausibly be found to have “evinced such wantonness with 5 respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that 6 it occur.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. Although Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that 7 Taylor used force “with the purpose to cause harm” and that his “purpose was to see harm 8 done to me” (Doc. No. 11-1 at 5), Plaintiff was previously instructed (see Doc. No. 9 at 6), 9 that such conclusory allegations do not plausibly allege Taylor applied force maliciously 10 and sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 11 discipline. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 12 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 13 statements, do not suffice” to meet the plausibility standard and a complaint is subject to 14 dismissal for failure to state a claim if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, 15 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”). 16 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Taylor is 17 dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim. Watison, 18 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. The Court will provide Plaintiff with a final 19 opportunity to amend to attempt to state a claim against this Defendant. 20 With respect to the June 2025 incident, Plaintiff alleges that after Amaya told him 21 “you can go back to your cell or I can handcuff you and take you there,” Plaintiff walked 22 away with the intention of going to the medicine line to get his meds before returning to 23 his cell. (Doc. No. No. 11-1 at 3.) Amaya “grabbed hold of my arm without giving me a 24 direct order to cuff up. I hesitated from being grabbed and officer Amaya used force to take 25 me to the ground and punch me twice with a closed fist in the head hard as I was on the 26 ground holding on to one of his legs so that Amaya would not kick me. As I let go of officer 27 Amaya’s leg he hit me with his knee down hard in my back.” (Id.) 28 These allegations are once again insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment 1 excessive force claim against Amaya, as Plaintiff alleges he “hesitated from being 2 grabbed,” which caused Amaya to take him to the ground. Although Plaintiff alleges 3 Amaya punched him twice and hit him with his knee, he also alleges he was holding on to 4 Amaya’s leg and only let go after being hit. Plaintiff once again fails to plausibly allege 5 there was no need for Amaya to use force, as it could have appeared to Amaya that he 6 disregarded the order to return to this cell by walking toward the medicine line or resisted 7 when he hesitated. Plaintiff also once again fails to plausibly allege that the force used, two 8 punches and a knee in the back to force him to let go of Amaya’s leg, in the context alleged, 9 was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good-faith effort to 10 maintain or restore discipline. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38; McMillian, 503 U.S. at 9; Iqbal, 556 11 U.S. at 678. 12 The Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Amaya is dismissed under 28 13 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; 14 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. The Court will provide Plaintiff with a final opportunity to 15 amend his pleading to attempt to correct the pleading deficiencies as to this claim. 16 With respect to the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Jane Doe and 17 the Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Amaya, Plaintiff alleges that after 18 his encounter with Amaya, as he was on the ground in leg and arm restraints and not 19 resisting, Jane Doe, the supervisor of C-yard, “walked in to take over.” (Doc. No. 11-1 at 20 3; Doc. No. 11-2 at 3.) Jane Doe, “with the purpose to cause harm kneeled down put her 21 hand around my throat and started choking me.” (Doc. No. 11-1 at 4; Doc. No. 11-2 at 4.) 22 “Amaya watched and did nothing to stop Jane Doe from choking me in arm and leg 23 restraints,” despite standing right there and having the opportunity to do or say something 24 to stop her. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 4; Doc. No. 11-2 at 4, 7.) 25 The allegations that Jane Doe choked Plaintiff and possibly kneeled on his back 26 injuring his spine for no reason while he was in arm and leg restraints and not resisting, 27 plausibly alleges that the force used was intended to cause harm rather than restore order. 28 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. Plaintiff claims Amaya failed to intervene to stop Jane Doe from 1 injuring him because Amaya simply watched as Jane Doe allegedly used unnecessary and 2 excessive force while he was in arm and leg restraints and did nothing to stop her. Plaintiff 3 has plausibly alleged Amaya had a realistic opportunity to intercede to prevent a 4 constitutional violation and failed to take reasonable measures to guarantee his safety. 5 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289–90. The allegations are sufficient 6 to survive the “low threshold” of passing screening for an excessive force claim against 7 Jane Doe and a failure to protect claim against Amaya. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112. 8 Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim against 9 Defendant Amaya and his excessive force claim against Defendant Jane Doe survive the 10 sua sponte screening process, he is entitled to have the United States Marshal effect service 11 of the summons and FAC as to Amaya, but not as to Jane Doe.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) 12 (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] 13 cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United 14 States marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed [IFP].”). 15 D. Plaintiff’s Options 16 Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against 17 Defendant Jane Doe and his failure to protect claim against Defendant Amaya survive the 18 sua sponte screening process but the remaining claims do not, Plaintiff is given the 19 opportunity to (1) notify the Court of his intent to proceed only with the Eighth Amendment 20 excessive force claim against Jane Doe and the Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim 21 22 23 1 Plaintiff must identify Jane Doe by her true name and substitute that person before the United States Marshal will be able to execute service upon her. See Walker v. Sumner, 24 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to properly effect service under Rule 4 in an 25 IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish the information necessary to identify the defendant”). Where the identity of an alleged party is not known prior to filing of an action, 26 Ninth Circuit authority permits a plaintiff the opportunity to pursue appropriate discovery 27 to identify an unknown Doe, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their identity or the complaint should be dismissed for other reasons. See Wakefield v. 28 1 against Amaya; or (2) file a Second Amended Complaint that attempts to correct any or all 2 of the deficiencies of pleading identified in this Order. Plaintiff must choose one of those 3 options within forty-five (45) days from the date this Order is filed. If Plaintiff notifies 4 the Court that he wishes to proceed only with his claims against Defendants Amaya and 5 Doe, the Court will issue an Order directing the Clerk to issue the summons and direct the 6 U.S. Marshal to effect service of the summons and FAC on Defendant Amaya, and all 7 remaining claims and Defendants, except the excessive force claim against Jane Doe, will 8 remain dismissed from this action. 9 II. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 10 Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel on the basis that he is unable to afford an 11 attorney and anticipates an inability to litigate this case due being to a mental health inmate 12 with post-traumatic stress disorder and a learning disability. (Doc. No. 12 at 1.) There is 13 no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case, and the decision to appoint counsel under 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is within “the sound discretion of the trial court and is granted only 15 in exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 16 (9th Cir. 2004); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that only 17 “exceptional circumstances” support such a discretionary appointment). Such exceptional 18 circumstances exist where there is cumulative showing of both a likelihood of success on 19 the merits and an inability of the pro se litigant to articulate his claims in light of their legal 20 complexity. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). 21 Plaintiff’s original Complaint and FAC demonstrates that while not formally trained 22 in law, he is fully capable of articulating the facts and circumstances relevant to his claims, 23 which are not exceptionally legally complex. Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103. Accordingly, the 24 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice to its 25 renewal at a later stage of these proceedings when and if there is a showing of exceptional 26 circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. 27 /// 28 /// 1 || UL. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court: 3 1. DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to appoint counsel without prejudice. (Doc. 4 || No. 12.) 5 2. DISMISSES the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against 6 || Defendants Taylor and Amaya in the First Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim 7 ||upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 8 3. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 9 || which to either: (1) file a Notice of Intent to Proceed only with the Eighth Amendment 10 || excessive force claim against Jane Doe and the Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim 11 |j/against Amaya; or (2) file a Second Amended Complaint correcting any or all of the 12 deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court in this Order. The Second Amended 13 || Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. Defendants 14 ||not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Second Amended Complaint will be 15 || considered waived. See CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 16 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”’); 17 || Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims not re-alleged in an 18 ||amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”’). 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: April 20, 2026 © 21 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 ne □□□ □□□ owt,