Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WEN XUE CHANG, Case No.: 26-CV-2218 JLS (SBC)

12 Petitioners, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of (ECF No. 1) the Department of Homeland Security, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Wue Xue Chang’s Petition for Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court 20 is Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4) and Petitioner’s Traverse 21 (“Traverse,” ECF No. 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s 22 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of China who entered the United States in 2004, 25 and in July of 2008 was ordered removed and released on parole under 8 U.S.C. § 26 1182(d)(5). Pet. at 4; Ret. at 2. In May 2025, Petitioner was detained at an immigration 27 checkpoint in between Los Angeles and Arizona. Pet. at 4. Petitioner never received notice 28 or an individualized determination of his circumstances before his re-detention. Id. 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 3 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 4 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 5 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 6 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 7 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 8 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 9 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 10 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 11 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by, Jennings v. 12 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. 13 Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 14 DISCUSSION 15 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or 16 consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. at 17 3. The Court agrees. 18 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 19 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 20 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 21 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 22 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 23 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 24 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 25 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 26 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 27 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 28 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). 1 Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 2 government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 3 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 4 be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting 5 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial 6 discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that 7 individual is released from custody[,] she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out 8 of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 9 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 10 Respondents state that Petitioner was previously released on parole issued under 8 11 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), that he is now detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), that they do not 12 oppose the petition, and that the proper relief is a bond hearing under § 1226(a). Ret. at 2– 13 3. However, Petitioner is not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, 14 as Petitioner has been in the United States since 2004. Pet. at 4. In 2008 when he was 15 released on parole, he was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk. 16 Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due 17 process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, 18 e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her 19 initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a 20 flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining 21 at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1164 22 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country 23 for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth 24 Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 25 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty 26 interest in his release). 27 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 28 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 1 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient 2 to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. See 3 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be 4 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 5 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 6 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved 7 and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 8 requirement would entail.” Id. 9 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s 10 revocation of Petitioner’s release without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 11 heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has 12 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. “Freedom 13 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 14 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 15 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and providing for his family. See 16 Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully 17 employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 18 attachments of normal life.”). 19 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 20 parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an 21 opportunity to be heard. Pet. at 5–8. Since DHS’s determination that Petitioner should be 22 paroled because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no 23 evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 24 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the 25 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). “Once a noncitizen has 26 been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is 27 subject to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence 28 of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact 1 dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. Respondents, 2 failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response, do not point to any 3 material circumstances that have changed that would warrant reconsideration of his parole. 4 See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody 5 hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the 6 government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid 7 basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 8 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up). 9 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 10 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 11 1130; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the 12 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 13 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail 14 to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice, 15 reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret. 16 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in 17 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v. 18 Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting 19 a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre- 20 deprivation hearing); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, 21 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from 22 custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / l CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 3 || Corpus (ECF No. 1). The Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner 4 || from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. The Court ORDERS that 5 ||Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without following the procedures set out in 8 6 || C.F.R. § 241.13() and other implementing regulations. The Parties are ORDERED to file 7 ||a Joint Status Report by April 24, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. As 8 concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 ||Dated: April 17, 2026 . & .

12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28