Juan Omar Ramirez-Rivas v. Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Robert Steven Huie (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a noncitizen seeking a bond hearing, noting that the petitioner had already received a bond hearing where bond was denied due to mandatory detention and flight risk. The court denied the petition and the motion to appoint counsel, finding the detention mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and that no constitutional violation was shown.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied“Accordingly, the Petition is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the mandatory detention statute (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)) which requires detention during the 90-day removal period. The petitioner had a final order of removal and had already received a bond hearing where the immigration judge denied bond based on mandatory detention and flight risk. The court properly noted that the petitioner failed to show that his detention violated the Constitution or federal law, as he was within the mandatory detention period and had not yet reached the stage where Zadvydas v. Davis would apply (post-90-day period). |
Motion to appoint counsel denied“The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 3], as Petitioner has not shown “exceptional circumstances” warranting such an appointment here.” | agree with court The court applied the correct standard from Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009), which requires a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' for appointment of counsel in habeas cases. The order does not elaborate on why the petitioner's circumstances were not exceptional, but the legal standard cited is correct for the Ninth Circuit. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal framework for mandatory detention of noncitizens with final orders of removal. It properly distinguishes between the mandatory 90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and the post-removal period governed by Zadvydas v. Davis. The court correctly notes that the petitioner had already received a bond hearing where bond was denied, and that he is currently subject to mandatory statutory detention. The reasoning is sound and the result follows from the law and the record recited in the order. The order is concise but addresses the key legal issues.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN OMAR RAMIREZ-RIVAS, Case No.: 26-cv-1981-RSH-BJW 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 WARDEN, Imperial Regional Detention [ECF No. 2] Facility, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 On March 27, 2026, petitioner Juan Omar Ramirez-Rivas, proceeding pro se, filed a 19 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 20 1. The same day, he filed a motion to appoint counsel. ECF No. 2. 21 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 22 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 23 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the 24 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 25 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 26 Petitioner asserts that the length of his detention to date establishes that he is entitled 27 to a bond hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to the community. ECF 28 No. 1 ¶¶ 2–5. However, Petitioner fails to mention that: (1) he previously filed, through 1 counsel, a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Case No. 26-cv-994; (2) in the prior case, 2 the Court granted the writ and ordered a bond hearing; (3) on March 9, 2026, Petitioner 3 received a bond hearing before an immigration judge, see ECF No. 5-1, Ex. 2 (immigration 4 judge order); or (4) at that hearing, the immigration judge denied bond, on the ground that 5 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under the Laken-Riley Act, but also on the 6 ground that Petitioner “poses a significant flight risk, as he has been ordered removed from 7 the United States and has waived his right to appeal,” id. Petitioner also does not mention 8 the status of his immigration proceedings; but the immigration judge’s order, as well as 9 records filed in his previous case, reflect that on February 26, 2026, Petitioner was ordered 10 removed to El Salvador by another immigration judge; was denied relief from removal; 11 and waived appeal. See Case No. 26-cv-994-RSH-DDL, Dkt. No. 5-1. 12 Because Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal, his detention at this time is 13 mandatory under by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which provides that the Attorney General “shall 14 detain” a noncitizen during the 90-day removal period. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a), (b). After 15 that removal period, the framework established by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. 16 Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), applies. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court construed 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1231(a)(6), the statutory provision authorizing detention of a noncitizen subject to a final 18 order of removal beyond the 90-day removal period, and concluded that the “statute, read 19 in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a 20 period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” 21 Id. at 689. The Court held that after a six-month “presumptively reasonable period of 22 detention,” “once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant 23 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond 24 with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 701. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 Petitioner is at this time subject to mandatory statutory detention and provides no 2 || basis for this Court to conclude that Petitioner’s detention violates the U.S. Constitution or 3 || federal law. Accordingly, the Petition is DENIED. 4 The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 3], as 5 || Petitioner has not shown “exceptional circumstances” warranting such an appointment 6 ||here. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). 7 The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 || Dated: April 14, 2026 ‘ 10 Jekut Howe 1 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28