John Kong Diu v. Cybersecurity
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Benjamin J. Cheeks (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) filed by John Kong Diu against a defendant identified only as 'Cybersecurity.' The court denied the IFP motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Denied“As submitted, it appears Plaintiff is able to pay the one-time filing fee. As such, the motion to proceed IFP is DENIED.” | agree with court The court applied the statutory standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which requires a showing of inability to pay. The plaintiff reported monthly income of approximately $3,458 ($1,226 disability + $2,232 public assistance) and minimal expenses. This income level is significantly above the threshold for indigency, making the denial of IFP status consistent with the law and the facts recited. |
Complaint Dismissed Without Prejudice“Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES the complaint without prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1)) and DENIES Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP.” | agree with court The court found the complaint failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it did not clearly identify the defendant or state a claim. The defendant was listed as 'N/A' in the required field and described only as 'unknown cybersecurity.' The allegations were incoherent and lacked essential elements. Dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate remedy for a pro se plaintiff who fails to state a claim due to pleading deficiencies, allowing for amendment. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the statutory standard for IFP status based on the plaintiff's reported income. It correctly identifies that the complaint fails to meet the pleading standards of Rule 8 because the defendant is not properly identified and the claims are unintelligible. The court appropriately cites the duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally but correctly notes that this duty does not extend to supplying essential missing elements. The dismissal without prejudice is the standard and appropriate remedy for such pleading deficiencies.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN KONG DIU, Case No.: 25-cv-2331-BJC-MSB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND 13 v. DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED 14 CYBERSECURITY, IN FORMA PAUPERIS 15 Defendant. [ECF Nos. 1, 2] 16 17 18 19 INTRODUCTION 20 On September 8, 2025, John Kong Diu, proceeding pro se, filed the instant 21 complaint. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 22 (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 2. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 23 motion to proceed IFP and dismisses the complaint without prejudice. 24 DISCUSSION 25 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 26 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 27 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 28 $402. See U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5. A court may authorize the commencement of a 1 suit without prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement 2 of all his or her assets, showing that he or she is unable to pay the fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 3 1915(a). 4 Plaintiff contends he receives monthly payments of $1,226 in disability payments 5 and $2,232 in public assistance. ECF No. 2 at 2. He reports no employment history for 6 the last two years, no bank accounts, and no assets. Id. at 2-3. He lists $83 per month for 7 utilities as his sole expense. As submitted, it appears Plaintiff is able to pay the one-time 8 filing fee. As such, the motion to proceed IFP is DENIED. 9 II. Screening of the Complaint 10 A complaint filed by any person proceeding in formal pauperis pursuant to 28 § 11 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review, and dismissal by the court to the 12 extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 13 seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). A court may also dismiss an action 16 sua sponte, at any time, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); 17 Harmon v. Superior Ct. of State of Cal. In & For Los Angeles Cnty., 307 F.2d 796, 797 18 (9th Cir. 1962). 19 In his complaint, Plaintiff names “Cybersecurity” as the defendant in the caption but 20 includes “N/A” in the portion of the complaint in which he is required to list the defendants. 21 ECF No. 1 at 2. He asserts federal question jurisdiction and jurisdiction based upon a 22 federal defendant. Id. at 3. However, he includes no information on the defendant he refers 23 to as “Cybersecuity” beyond describing it as “unknown cybersecurity” and stating 24 “Cybersecurity cut off social security reel payment” to support jurisdiction. Id. at 3, 4. In 25 support of his claims for relief, Plaintiff refers to “Cybersecurity” taking action to “cut off 26 [his] social security wire industry,” and he refers to a 6.2% increase in “social security reel 27 income” and records that are separated onto two networks. Id. at 5-6. 28 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to “contain: (1) 1 short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a short and plain 2 ||statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for 3 relief sought.” FED. R. CIv. P. 8. Plaintiffs allegations fail to clearly identify the 4 ||alleged federal defendant “Cybersecurity” and the legal theories upon which he seeks 5 ||relief. The complaint vaguely refers to the defendant as “Cybersecurity” and “unknown 6 cybersecurity.” Additionally, the complaint lists two claims and references the Fourth 7 || Amendment in the second claim, but lacks any intelligible facts regarding an unreasonable 8 search or seizure. Generally, courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally. See 9 || Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). However, “a liberal 10 || interpretation of a [pro se] complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that 11 || were not initially pled.” /vey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). As 12 alleged, Plaintiff fails to comply with Rule 8. 13 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 14 Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES the complaint without prejudice 15 || pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1)) and DENIES Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP. Plaintiff 16 || may file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies noted above no later than May 17 2026. To proceed with an amended complaint, Plaintiff must pay the filing fee no later 18 May 15, 2026. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: April 14, 2026 21 23 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28