Samandar Jumakul Ugli Tulyakov v. Christopher Larose, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; Daniel A. Brightman, Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Barry T. Moskowitz (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a noncitizen detained by ICE after his conditional parole was revoked without notice or a hearing. The court granted the petition on the Fifth Amendment due process claim, ordered the petitioner's immediate release, and dismissed the APA and Fourth Amendment claims as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for writ of habeas corpus granted on the Fifth Amendment due process claim“The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED on the second claim and the writ is ISSUED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine the specific dictates of due process. The petitioner had a protected liberty interest in remaining on parole, the government's failure to provide notice or a hearing created a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government failed to demonstrate that its administrative interests outweighed the petitioner's liberty interest. The order relies on binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland) and consistent district court authority to support the conclusion that the revocation violated due process. |
Immediate release from custody ordered“The Respondents shall immediately release Tulyakov from custody on preexisting conditions.” | agree with court The order for release is the appropriate remedy for a successful habeas petition challenging unlawful detention. The court properly conditioned the release on preexisting conditions, which aligns with the petitioner's prior status. |
Administrative Procedure Act and Fourth Amendment claims dismissed without prejudice as moot“The first and third claims are DISMISSED without prejudice as moot.” | agree with court Because the court granted the petition on the due process claim and ordered the petitioner's release, the remaining claims for relief regarding the same detention are moot. Dismissing them without prejudice is procedurally correct as it preserves the petitioner's ability to raise them in future proceedings if necessary. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standard (Mathews v. Eldridge), applies it to the specific facts of the case (lack of notice, no hearing, no justification for revocation), and relies on binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Rodriguez Diaz) and consistent district court authority to reach a defensible result. The court properly balances the petitioner's liberty interest against the government's administrative burden and finds the government's interest insufficient to justify the deprivation of due process.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAMANDAR JUMAKUL UGLI Case No.: 3:26-cv-01695-BTM-BLM TULYAKOV, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Petitioner, 13 DISMISSING IN PART PETITION v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 15 [ECF NO. 1] CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden, 16 Otay Mesa Detention Center; DANIEL 17 A. BRIGHTMAN, Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, 18 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 19 TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 20 ACTING SECRETARY, Department of 21 Homeland Security; TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Department 22 of Justice; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 23 HOMELAND SECURITY; and U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 24 ENFORCEMENT; 25 Respondents. 26 27 // 28 // 1 Pending before the Court is Samandar Tulyakov’s petition for the writ of habeas 2 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS 3 IN PART and DISMISSES IN PART the petition and orders Tulyakov’s immediate release 4 from custody. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 Tulyakov fled Uzbekistan and arrived at the U.S. border on January 7, 2025. (ECF 7 No. 1, ¶ 1–2.) Immigration officials inspected him and determined that he did not pose a 8 danger to the community or a flight risk. (Id. ¶ 2.) Tulyakov was then granted conditional 9 release on his own recognizance and placed in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings. (Id. 10 ¶ 39–40.) He attended all his scheduled immigration appointments. (Id. ¶ 41.) On January 11 14, 2025, Tulyakov applied for asylum. (Id. ¶ 43.) He later received work authorization 12 from the Respondents. (Id. ¶ 44.) 13 On January 11, 2026, Tulyakov parked his cab in a rest stop. (Id. ¶ 45.) Masked 14 gunmen surrounded his cab, ordered him out, and took him into U.S. Immigration and 15 Customs Enforcement custody. (Id.) Tulyakov was injured during the arrest and taken to 16 the hospital for three days. (Id.) He was transferred first to Batavia Detention Center and 17 later to Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Id.) Tulyakov remains in detention. (Id. ¶ 4.) He 18 filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus on March 17, 2026. (Id. at 19.) 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 The Petitioner makes three claims. First, the Petitioner argues that the Respondents 21 violated the Administrative Procedure Act when they improperly revoked his parole. (Id. 22 ¶ 52–60.) Second, that the Respondents violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 23 Amendment by revoking his parole arbitrarily and without notice and opportunity to be 24 heard. (Id. ¶ 61–65.) Third, that the Respondents violated the Fourth Amendment by 25 arresting him without a valid warrant. (Id. ¶ 66–72.) The Petitioner requests that the Court 26 grant him release on any claim. The Respondents acknowledge that this Court has granted 27 petitions with similar facts and legal issues. (ECF No. 4 (“Return”), at 2.) They “defer[] 28 to the Court on the appropriate relief.” (Id.) 1 The Court finds that relief is warranted on the second claim because the Respondents 2 improperly revoked the Petitioner’s parole. The Court declines to reach the first and third 3 claims. 4 A. Due Process Parole Rights 5 The Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens1 “to due process of law in deportation 6 proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Once a noncitizen “passe[s] 7 through our gates,” he may be removed “only after proceedings conforming to traditional 8 standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States 9 ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). Due Process also “protects noncitizens from 10 unlawful detention during their removal proceedings.” Esquivel Pacheco v. LaRose, No. 11 25-cv-2421, 2026 WL 242300, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 12 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). Here, the Petitioner challenges his current detention as contrary 13 to the Due Process Clause. 14 To determine the “specific dictates of due process” in this situation, the Court must 15 consider three factors: 16 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 17 used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 18 safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 19 substitute procedural requirement would entail. 20 21 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Court adopts and applies the 22 reasoning of the decisions Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146 (S.D. Cal. 2025), and 23 Esquivel Pacheco, 2026 WL 242300. 24 First the Petitioner acquired a protected interest in being free from imprisonment 25 once he was paroled into the country. The Respondents granted the Petitioner conditional 26 parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Return, 1.) By exercising their discretion to do so, the 27 1 This order uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” 8 U.S.C. 28 1 Respondents made “at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if [the 2 Petitioner] fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 3 482 (1972). The Petitioner relied on that promise and complied with his reporting 4 conditions for the year he lived in the country. This created a “protectable expectation of 5 his due process rights in his removal proceedings and the fair procedures this country 6 guarantees.” Noori, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1165. That expectation of due process extends to 7 his parole revocation. 8 Second, the Respondents’ process of revoking the Petitioner’s parole created a 9 substantial risk that the Petitioner’s liberty interest would be erroneously deprived. The 10 Petitioner was given no prior notice that he would be placed under arrest. He was provided 11 no paperwork or explanation for the arrest. Instead, he was surrounded, ordered out of his 12 cab, and taken into custody. The record contains no indication that the Respondents 13 arrested the Petitioner because he failed to report as ordered or had become a danger or 14 flight risk that needed to be detained. Rather, it appears the Respondents “breached the 15 ‘implicit promise’ made to Petitioner that he would enjoy this liberty as long as he did 16 nothing to forfeit it.” Esquivel Pacheco, 2026 WL 242300, at *6. 17 Third, the Respondents have not shown that their interest in immigration 18 enforcement justifies the process used to detain the Petitioner. The Court acknowledges 19 that holding a predeprivation hearing or providing notice “poses some degree of ‘fiscal and 20 administrative burden.”’ Esquivel Pacheco, 2026 WL 242300, at *6 (quoting Rodriguez 21 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1209 (9th Cir. 2022)). But the Respondents have not 22 argued that the burden would be significant. Also, that burden must be balanced against 23 the Petitioner’s liberty interest and the procedural protections afforded that interest. Taken 24 together, the Petitioner’s interest outweighs the Respondents’. 25 The Petitioner entered the country on parole and was ordered to adhere to the 26 conditions of that parole. In turn, “it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn 27 square corners when it deals with” him. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021). 28 The Respondents violated the Petitioner’s due process rights by “detaining [him] without 1 justification.” Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. 2025). The 2 Respondents do not contend that any changed circumstances warranted Petitioner’s re- 3 ||detention. The Respondents also do not contend that the Petitioner is a danger to the 4 ||community or a flight risk. Thus, the writ must issue to release him from custody. The 5 || petition is granted on the second claim. 6 B. Other Claims 7 Because the Court grants the petition on other grounds, the Court declines to reach 8 merits of the Petitioner’s Administrative Procedure Act and Fourth Amendment claims. 9 || Counts One and Three of the petition are dismissed without prejudice as moot. 10 Ht. CONCLUSION 11 The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED on the second claim and the 12 || writ is ISSUED. The Respondents shall immediately release Tulyakov from custody on 13 preexisting conditions. The Respondents also shall return any papers taken from 14 || Tulyakov when he was detained. The first and third claims are DISMISSED without 15 || prejudice as moot. The parties shall file a statement as to the satisfaction of the writ by 16 April 14, 2026, at 5 p.m. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the writ. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 13, 2026 ny Fil Ysehuc Honorable Barry Ted Mosko 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 □ □□