Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JIANFENG LI, Case No.: 26cv1756-LL-BJW 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 AND 14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. DENYING AS MOOT EX PARTE Department of Homeland Security, et al., 15 APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY Respondents. RESTRAINING ORDER 16 17 [ECF Nos. 1, 2] 18 19 20 Before the Court are Petitioner Jianfeng Li’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”)] and Ex Parte Application for Temporary 22 Restraining Order [ECF No. 2]. Respondents filed a Response [ECF No. 7], and Petitioner 23 filed a Reply [ECF No. 8]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition 24 and DENIES AS MOOT the Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 Petitioner is a citizen of China who came to the United States in 2023 seeking 27 asylum. Pet. at 9. Petitioner was released “on conditional parole issued under 8 U.S.C. 28 § 1226(a).” ECF No. 7 at 2. Petitioner filed an asylum application, which remains pending. 1 Pet. at 9. On February 22, 2026, Petitioner was taken into custody by Immigration and 2 Customs Enforcement and placed in immigration detention. Id. Petitioner remains detained 3 and has not received a bond hearing or other individualized custody review. Id. 4 On March 19, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition followed by the Ex Parte 5 Application two days later, alleging that his re-detention violates federal law and the Fifth 6 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. ECF Nos. 1, 2. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner “is in custody 9 in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2241(c); Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241 11 expressly permits the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those 12 aliens are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 13 States.’”). In federal habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case 14 by a preponderance of evidence. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 15 (9th Cir. 2004); Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 A. Detention Statute 18 The Court finds Petitioner is wrongfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). As a 19 noncitizen who, at the time of his detention, had been present in the United States for more 20 than two years, Petitioner was and is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which states that a 21 noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] 22 is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). By contrast, 8 U.S.C 23 § 1225(b) applies to noncitizens arriving at the border or who very recently entered the 24 United States. See Beltran v. Noem, No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *4–7 25 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). As the Supreme Court explained, the government may “detain 26 certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” while 27 § 1226(a) allows the government to “detain certain aliens already in the county pending 28 the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) 1 (emphasis added). The Court adopts its reasoning stated in Beltran v. Noem on this issue. 2 Id. at *4–7. 3 B. Due Process Clause 4 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, 5 or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that 6 the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 7 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 8 (1993)). “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding 9 which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 10 to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 11 to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 12 (1950) (citations omitted). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a 13 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 14 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 15 be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 16 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 17 The Court finds that having been previously released on conditional parole, 18 Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention. “Even 19 individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the 20 government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi 21 v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the 22 initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the government’s 23 discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an 24 implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked 25 only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. 26 Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original). 27 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 28 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 1 334–35. To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the Due 2 Process Clause, the Court considers the following factors: (1) “the private interest that will 3 be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 4 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 5 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function 6 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 7 procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. 8 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the government’s 9 revocation of Petitioner’s conditional parole without an opportunity to be heard denied 10 Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a significant 11 liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his conditional parole. See Pinchi, 12 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release 13 a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody 14 she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” (citations omitted)). 15 Freedom from detention is a fundamental part of due process protection. See Hernandez v. 16 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core 17 of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 18 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))). 19 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 20 release was revoked without giving him an opportunity to be heard. Since he was released 21 on conditional parole, there is no indication that Petitioner has failed to abide by the 22 conditions of his parole or that circumstances have changed. “Once a noncitizen has been 23 released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject 24 to removal proceedings.” Id. “Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence 25 of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact 26 dangerous or has become a flight risk . . . .” Id. The risk of erroneous deprivation of 27 Petitioner’s liberty is high because neither the government nor Petitioner has had an 28 opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for his detention. Pinchi, 792 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citation omitted). It follows that the probable value of additional 2 procedural safeguards, such as notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, is also high. 3 Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without a hearing is low. See 4 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“[T]he government has articulated no legitimate interest 5 that would support arresting [petitioner] without a pre-detention hearing.”); Alvarenga 6 Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 7 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the government wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] 8 at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so 9 without a hearing is low.”). There is also no indication that providing a pre-deprivation 10 hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome on the government. See Pinchi, 11 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose 12 a minimal cost.” (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1048 (E.D. Cal. 2025))). 13 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release without 14 a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. 15 See, e.g., Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (S.D. 16 Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding the petitioner’s parole was revoked without notice and a 17 hearing and without a showing of a change of circumstances, thus violating her due process 18 rights and rendering her detention unlawful). The proper remedy for the unlawful detention 19 is Petitioner’s immediate release subject only to the conditions of his preexisting 20 conditional parole. See Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2025) 21 (finding DHS violated the petitioner’s due process rights by revoking his parole without 22 notice or a hearing and ordering his immediate release); Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 23 (same); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (ordering immediate release after the petitioner was 24 detained while out on bond without notice or pre-deprivation hearing). 25 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 1 26 27 1 In the Petition’s prayer for relief [Pet. at 14], Petitioner requests attorney’s fees and costs 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons above, the Court ORDERS: 3 1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. 4 2. Petitioner’s Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order is 5 DENIED AS MOOT. 6 3. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody subject only 7 to the conditions of his preexisting conditional parole. 8 4. Prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, he is entitled to notice of the reasons 9 for revocation of his parole and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral immigration 10 judge to determine whether detention is warranted. At such a hearing, the government shall 11 bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a 12 danger to the community or a risk of flight. See Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, 13 No. 1:25-CV-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025) 14 (finding that the petitioner’s initial release “reflected a determination by the government 15 that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk” and so if the 16 government initiates re-detention, “it follows that the government should be required to 17 bear the burden of providing a justification for the re-detention”); Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d 18 at 1038 (ordering that before the petitioner can be re-detained, she must be provided with 19 a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge and that she may not be 20 detained “unless the government demonstrates at such a bond hearing, by clear and 21 convincing evidence, that she is a flight risk or a danger to the community and that no 22 conditions other than her detention would be sufficient to prevent such harms”). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / l 5. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this 2 || case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: April 13, 2026 MO 5 Je J 6 Honorable Linda Lopez 5 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28