William S. Kachele, Jr. v. Joe El-Maasri, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Michelle M. Pettit (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se plaintiff's ex parte motion for expedited discovery seeking 'core credentials' of defense counsel, including bar licenses, oaths, and engagement letters. The court denied the motion, finding the requests procedurally improper, irrelevant, disproportionate, privileged, or premature.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Produce Core Credentials“For the reasons stated above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s discovery Requests 1-5 and 7 are outside the scope of Rule 26(b). Plaintiff’s Request 6 is premature and its subject matter may be raised during initial disclosures. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the procedural prerequisites for discovery (Rule 26(f) conference and meet and confer) and the substantive standards for relevance and proportionality under Rule 26(b)(1). The denial is supported by the record, which shows the information is publicly available, the requests target a non-party, and the motion was filed before discovery was open. |
Prohibition on future filings directed at defense counsel“Plaintiff's requests are improperly directed at defense counsel rather than a Defendant. No other filings seeking core credentials directed to defense counsel will be permitted.” | agree with court Defense counsel is not a party to the action and is not subject to Rule 34 discovery requests in their personal capacity. The court's order to prevent harassment of non-parties is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(1) and general judicial authority to manage the docket. |
The order itself: sound — The order is thorough, addressing both procedural defects (lack of 26(f) conference, failure to meet and confer, targeting a non-party) and substantive merits (relevance, proportionality, public availability, privilege, and prematurity). It correctly applies the 'good cause' standard for early discovery and the proportionality factors of Rule 26(b)(1). The court also appropriately distinguishes the plaintiff's cited authority (Ramirez) and applies Ninth Circuit precedent regarding privilege.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 WILLIAM S. KACHELE, Jr., Case No.: 25-cv-3458-AGS-MMP 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 12 v. PRODUCE CORE CREDENTIALS 13 JOE EL-MAASRI, et al., [ECF No. 26] 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 On February 23, 2026, pro se Plaintiff William S. Kachele, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed an 18 ex parte motion seeking production of “core credentials of authority to appear” for Attorney 19 Michell Dean. ECF No. 26. Plaintiff states the “demand arises from counsel’s appearance 20 filed on behalf of Defendant City of San Marcos.” Id. at 2. Defendant filed an opposition. 21 ECF No. 56. Plaintiff did not file a reply. The Court found the motion suitable for 22 determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 23 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion. 24 Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds it necessary to address the merits 25 of the requests directed at Attorney Dean. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s motion 26 as a motion for discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26. See Erickson 27 v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed.’”) 28 1 (citation omitted). Under this liberal construction, and for efficiency, the Court analyzes 2 the requests themselves under Rule 26(b), despite Plaintiff’s failure to meet and confer 3 prior to filing a discovery-related motion and discovery not yet being open in this case. 4 ECF No. 26 at 12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1); Judge Pettit’s Civil Chambers Rules X.A. 5 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 6 Rule 26(b)(1) establishes the scope of discovery as follows: 7 [A]ny nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues 8 at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access 9 to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed 10 discovery outweighs its likely benefit. 11 12 Discovery is generally not permitted until after the parties have conferred pursuant to Rule 13 26(f), which has not yet occurred in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Courts assess a 14 party’s request for early discovery under the “good cause” standard discussed in Semitool, 15 Inc. v. Tokyo Electrom Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In addition to the 16 relevance and proportionality factors under Rule 26(b)(1), for early discovery requests 17 courts generally consider whether “the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of 18 the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Semitool, 19 208 F.R.D. at 276; see also Am. LegalNet, Inc. v. Davis, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (C.D. 20 Cal. 2009) (citation modified). The Court weighs the following non-exclusive factors in 21 considering whether early discovery is appropriate: “(1) whether a preliminary injunction 22 is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery requests; (3) the purpose for requesting the 23 expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) 24 how far in advance of the typical discovery process the request was made.” Id. at 1067 25 (citation modified). 26 27 1 The Court notes this motion is but one of three seeking the “core credential” information 28 1 V. ANALYSIS 2 Plaintiff seeks the following documents: 3 1. State Bar License and Certificate of Good Standing 4 2. Oath of Attorney 5 3. Proof of Admission to the Bar of the Southern District of California 6 4. Authorization to Represent the City of San Marcos 7 5. Scope of Representation of the City of San Marcos 8 6. Insurance Defense / Risk Pool Disclosure 9 7. Disclosure of Disciplinary History 10 ECF No. 26 at 7–10. 11 At the outset, the Court notes this discovery is procedurally improper for numerous 12 reasons. First, the parties have not held the 26(f) conference. Therefore, in addition to 13 showing showing relevance and proportionality, Plaintiff must also demonstrate good 14 cause for expedited discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1); Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276; 15 Am. LegalNet, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. Second, Plaintiff failed to meet and confer 16 with Defendant prior to filing the discovery requests with the Court, as discussed in detail 17 below, in violation of CivLR 26.1 and the undersigned’s Chambers Rules. Third, the 18 discovery requests are targeted at defense counsel rather than the Defendant itself. As 19 defense counsel is not a party in the action, he is not subject to Rule 34; nor has Plaintiff 20 shown counsel has any obligation to respond to the discovery requests in his personal 21 capacity in this matter. The Court cautions Plaintiff regarding filing and serving papers 22 regarding counsel, rather than Defendants in this action. No other filings directed to counsel 23 seeking “core credentials” will be permitted. Plaintiff is further cautioned of his duty to 24 avoid imposing an undue burden or expense on any non-party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). 25 Even if the Court reaches the merits in spite of the procedural issues of the requests, 26 the result is the same—the discovery is improper under Rule 26(b)(1), and the motion is 27 denied. 28 // 1 A. Discovery Requested in Requests 1–3 and 7 is Publicly Accessible, Not 2 Relevant, and Not Proportional 3 All discovery must be relevant to a party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 4 needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Under Rule 26(b)(1), the parties’ “relative 5 access to relevant information” is a proportionality factor for discovery. Here, in Requests 6 1-3 and 7, Plaintiff requests defense counsel’s state licensure, attorney oath, proof of 7 admission to the Southern District of California, and disclosure of discliplinary history. 8 Plaintiff fails to establish the relevancy or proportionality of this material. The Court 9 DENIES each request. 10 First, Plaintiff fails to establish the relevance of the information sought to his claims 11 or Defendant’s defenses. To the contrary, Plaintiff seeks the same information—State Bar 12 License and Certificate of Good Standing, Oath of Attorney, Proof of Admission to Bar of 13 the Southern District of California, and a Disciplinary History Disclosure—from each 14 attorney of record appearing in the case for Defendants. ECF Nos. 25 at 10–14; 26 at 7– 15 10; 47 at 18–19. These duplicative, generic requests suggest Plaintiff’s purpose is to harass 16 counsel simply for appearing on behalf of a defendant in this action; thus, the requests are 17 harassing rather than seeking information regarding Plaintiff’s claims or Defendant’s 18 defenses. The Court will not tolerate further improper discovery intended to harass rather 19 than for a proper purpose under the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). 20 Second, Plaintiff’s access to publicly available information weighs against his 21 discovery requests. The State Bar of California provides public access to lookup a 22 California Attorney(s) Bar Number, License Status, Disciplinary, and Administrative 23 History on its website.2 As this information is easily accessible to Plaintiff, the Court finds 24 the discovery request is not proportional to the needs of the case and thus improper. 25 Third, Request 2 seeking production of defense counsel’s Oath of Attorney is 26 27 28 2 1 improper for numerous reasons. The Oath of Attorney is mandatory for admission to 2 practice law in California; therefore information about defense counsel’s State Bar License 3 covers the attorney oath request. See State Bar of California, Attorney’s Oath, 4 https://www.calbar.ca.gov/admissions/examinations/california-bar- 5 examination/attorneys-oath (“Taking the attorney’s oath is not just a ritual. It is required 6 for admission to practice law in California pursuant to California Business and Professions 7 Code section 6067.”). As Defendant correctly argues, there is no requirement to provide 8 “oath compliance” statutorily or precedentially. ECF No. 56 at 5–6. Nor is the caselaw 9 Plaintiff cites persuasive. Ramirez v. State Bar, cited by Plaintiff to support his proposition, 10 is factually distinct. 28 Cal.3d 402, 411 (1980). In Ramirez, the Court held false statements 11 made with reckless disregard for truth that are not protected speech can be the basis of 12 attorney discipline. Id. The Court has not made any findings regarding false statements by 13 defense counsel in this matter; nor are there currently any analogous facts at hand before 14 the Court. Simply put, defense counsel is under no obligation to produce any evidence of 15 his attorney oath. 16 Fourth, regarding Request 3, the Southern District of California provides public 17 access to information regarding active attorney bar members on its website.3 Thus, Plaintiff 18 has public access to defense counsel’s Southern District of California Bar Membership. 19 Therefore, the Court finds Requests 1-3 and 7 seek information neither relevant nor 20 proportional to the case, particularly as the information sought is publicly available 21 information. Plaintiff has access to the requested information. Furthermore, Request 2, the 22 Oath of Attorney, is subsumed by Plaintiff’s related requests for Attorney Dean’s Bar 23 Information and is facially improper. The Court DENIES Requests 1-3 and 7 due to 24 relative access by Plaintiff and failure to meet the relevance hurdle in Rule 26(b)(1). 25 // 26 27 28 3 1 B. Requests 4–5 Seek Privileged Information 2 Discovery is limited to “nonprivileged” matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiff 3 requests the scope of defense counsel’s law firm’s representation of Defendant City of San 4 Marcos, including the “engagement letter.” ECF No. 26 at 8–9. 5 The scope of defense counsel’s representation of Defendant City of San Marcos is 6 not at issue before the Court.4 Furthermore, engagement letters and the scope of attorney- 7 client representation can be privileged and therefore undiscoverable. See In re Grand Jury 8 Witness, 695 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982) (Client motive for litigation or attorney 9 retention is privileged); Clarke v. American Commerce Nat. Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th 10 Cir. 1992) (“[C]orrespondence, bills, ledgers, statements, and time records which also 11 reveal the motive of the client in seeking representation, litigation strategy, or the specific 12 nature of the services provided, such as researching particular areas of law, fall within the 13 privilege.”) (citation omitted)). Plaintiff requests the scope of representation in part to 14 identify “whether the representation extends to this federal civil rights action” and “the 15 related state court unlawful detainer action.” ECF No. 26 at 9. This request (a) goes beyond 16 the relevant scope of this federal action and (b) seeks client motive and strategy as to the 17 two proceedings. Neither is permissible as both breach attorney-client privilege. 18 Finally, even if attorney-client privilege was not a barrier to Plaintiff’s request, the 19 Court would still deny the requests because Plaintiff fails to show how the engagement 20 letter is relevant to the ongoing proceedings. Nor do the requests seek information 21 proportional to the needs of the case. The requests do not meet the Rule 26(b)(1) hurdle. 22 C. Request 6 is Premature 23 Plaintiff requests the “(a) the identity of the insurer or risk pool; (b) the policy or 24 coverage agreement under which counsel was retained; (c) any reservation of rights letter; 25 and (d) any coverage dispute or declination.” Id. Plaintiff cites Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) for the 26 27 4 Attorney Dean filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of the City of San Marcos, 28 1 proposition “mandatory initial disclosures include insurance agreements.” Id. However, 2 Rule 26 does not help Plaintiff’s argument at this juncture. 3 Rather, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires “any insurance agreement under which an 4 insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action 5 or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.” Rule 26 initial 6 disclosures have temporal restrictions: 7 A party must make the initial disclosures at or within 14 days after the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference unless a different time is set by stipulation or court 8 order, or unless a party objects during the conference that initial disclosures 9 are not appropriate in this action and states the objection in the proposed discovery plan. 10 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C). 12 Here, the Rule 26(f) conference has not yet occured. Therefore, Defendant is not 13 obligated to produce any initial disclosures information at this time. Plaintiff also cites 14 CivLR 26.1 which covers Deposition and Discovery. CivLR 26.1(a) specifies the Court 15 “will entertain no motion pursuant to Rules 26 through 37, Fed. R. Civ. P., unless counsel 16 will have previously met and conferred concerning all disputed issues.” CivLR 26.1(a). 17 Despite citing to the CivLR 26.1(a), Plaintiff did not heed its requirements, as Plaintiff 18 failed to present evidence of a meet and confer with Defendant prior to the filing of his 19 motion. No other portion of CivLR 26.1 is relevant to Plaintiff’s request for insurance- 20 related discovery. 21 Nor has Plaintiff met the “good cause” standard required for early discovery on 22 Request 6 nor any other Request. Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276. In sum, the information 23 requested is premature given the procedural posture of the case. 24 VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 25 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s discovery Requests 1-5 and 26 7 are outside the scope of Rule 26(b). Plaintiff’s Request 6 is premature and its subject 27 matter may be raised during initial disclosures. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the 28 motion. l IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: 2 1. Plaintiff's requests are improperly directed at defense counsel rather than a 3 || Defendant. No other filings seeking core credentials directed to defense counsel will be 4 || permitted. 5 2. Unless the Court orders otherwise, requests for admission, “interrogatories, 6 requests for production and the answers thereto need not be filed unless and until they are 7 || used in the proceedings.” CivLR 33.1, 36.1. Absent specific leave of court, no further 8 || discovery requests shall be filed on the docket. 9 3. The Court reminds the parties that discovery is generally not available until 10 || after the Rule 26(f) conference and any early discovery requires leave of court. 11 4. The Court highlights Plaintiffs requirement to comply with Rule 11 regarding 12 putting forward “a pleading, written motion, or other paper” which is presented “for 13 ||any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase 14 || the cost of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: April 10, 2026 Wy bol MM. ser 17 HON. MICHELLE M. PETTIT ig United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Cites, in this corpus
- Ramirez v. State Bar S.F. 24117 · 1980-11-10