Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NOUNAGNON THOMAS AYIDEDJI, Case No.: 3:26-cv-1624-CAB-MMP 12 Petitioner, ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner Nounagnon Thomas Ayidedji’s petition for a writ of 18 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] Petitioner claims 19 he is being detained by immigration authorities in violation of the Fifth Amendment. [Id. 20 at 4–7.] He seeks immediate release or, at minimum, a bond hearing before a neutral 21 decisionmaker. [Doc. No. 1-2 at 1.] For the reasons stated below, the Court PARTIALLY 22 GRANTS the request for a writ of habeas corpus and ORDERS that Petitioner receive an 23 individualized bond hearing. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner is non-citizen who has been in Immigration and Customs Enforcement 26 (“ICE”) custody for at least 15 months. [Petition at 4; Doc. No. 6 at 1.] He has remained 27 in custody since then. Petitioner and Respondents have given the Court very few details 28 about Petitioner’s circumstances or background. [See generally Petition; Doc. No. 6.] 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks 3 to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may 4 grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the 5 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” The petitioner bears the burden of 6 demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-BJC- 7 BJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 A. Jurisdiction 10 Respondents challenge this Court’s jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). [Doc. 11 No. 6-1 at 5–6.] This Court and innumerable others have repeatedly rejected the same 12 jurisdictional argument under similar factual scenarios. Because Petitioner challenges the 13 legality of his detention and not the decision to commence proceedings, the adjudication 14 of his removal case, or any action to execute a removal order, the Court rejects 15 Respondent’s jurisdictional arguments by adopting and incorporating by reference the 16 same reasoning expressed in Chavez v. Noem, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138–39 (S.D. Cal. 17 2025). 18 B. Due Process Claim 19 Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing—over fifteen 20 months—violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. [Petition at 4–7.] 21 Respondents counter that the relevant statutory language of § 1225(b)(1) and Supreme 22 Court precedent require Petitioner’s detention until his removal proceedings are resolved. 23 [Doc. No. 6-1 at 6–7]. Respondents cite to Department of Homeland Security v. 24 Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138–40 (2020) to argue that Petitioner has no due process 25 rights beyond those afforded by statute. [Id. at 8–9.] The Court has previously discussed 26 that while Supreme Court precedent does establish that the statutory language of § 1225(b) 27 mandates detention, the Supreme Court did not decide the constitutional question of 28 1 whether indefinite detention is permitted. See L.R.G. v. LaRose, 3:25-CV-3490-CAB- 2 MSB, Doc. No. 13 at 5–6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026). 3 As to the constitutional question, this Court recently held in L.R.G. that a due process 4 violation may occur when § 1225(b) results in practically indefinite civil detention. 3:25- 5 CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13, at *6; see Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 6 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding 7 that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an 8 individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). Respondents’ position has also been 9 questioned by the Ninth Circuit: 10 We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our 11 democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation 12 of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our American government. “[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial 13 or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Civil detention violates 14 due process outside of “certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances.” 15 16 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted) 17 (alteration in original). 18 Though there is no brightline test for a violation, this Court and many others have 19 used the Banda test which considers the following six factors to determine when detention 20 under § 1225(b) violates due process: (1) the total length of detention to date, which is the 21 most important factor; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of 22 detention; (4) delays in removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in removal 23 proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings 24 will result in a final order of removal. Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 25 (W.D. Wash. 2019). 26 The first factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor given that he has been detained for over 27 a year. See Sibomana v. LaRose, No. 22-CV-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D. 28 Cal. Apr. 20, 2023) (finding that courts are typically wary of continued custody without a 1 bond hearing when detention extends beyond one year). Regarding the second factor, 2 which consists of the “anticipated duration of all removal proceedings—including 3 administrative and judicial appeals[,]” Petitioner has a pending appeal with the Board of 4 Immigration Appeals and does not currently have a timeline for adjudication. [See Doc. 5 No. 6 at 1.] Accordingly, the second factor favors Petitioner. As to the third Banda factor, 6 Petitioner’s confinement is similar to penal confinement because, as the Court explained 7 with respect to the petitioner in L.R.G., Petitioner is detained “in a secure facility, guarded 8 by armed personnel, and has restricted access to outdoor space, activities, and 9 communication.” No. 3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 10 16, 2026). Thus, the third factor favors Petitioner. 11 The fourth factor also weighs in his favor as there is no evidence in the record that 12 Petitioner caused any delays. With regard to the fifth factor, there are no allegations of the 13 government delaying any proceedings; thus, this factor weighs against Petitioner. Finally, 14 the Court finds the sixth factor neutral as the outcome of Petitioner’s removal proceedings 15 is uncertain. 16 In sum, factors one (the most important), two, three, and four weigh for Petitioner, 17 while factor five weighs against him and factor six is neutral. The Court thus concludes 18 that Petitioner’s continued mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) without a bond hearing 19 violates his right to due process. Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond 20 hearing before an immigration judge. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s prolonged detention without 23 a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court 24 therefore PARTIALLY GRANTS the writ of habeas corpus and ORDERS Respondents 25 to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing by April 22, 2026. 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 || The Clerk of the Court shall close the case on April 24, 2026 unless the Court is notified 2 || that the bond hearing did not occur. 3 Itis SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: April 8, 2026 5 Gb Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28