Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 BERTHA ESQUEDA MORALES, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01800-RBM-MMP 10 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 11 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 12 WARDEN OF IMPERIAL REGIONAL [Doc. 1] DETENTION FACILITY, 13 Respondent. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Bertha Esqueda Morales’s (“Petitioner”) 17 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) challenging the 18 lawfulness of her detention by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 19 (“ICE”). (Doc. 1.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States at some point before 22 December 15, 2020 without being admitted or paroled. (See Doc. 1-2 at 2.) On December 23 15, 2020, she was issued a Notice to Appear that charged her as inadmissible under 24 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). (Id.) In December 2025, ICE arrested 25 Petitioner and placed her in immigration custody at Imperial Regional Detention Facility, 26 where she has remained since. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Petitioner has not received a bond hearing 27 before an immigration judge on the ground that her detention is mandatory pursuant to 28 Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id. at 3.) 1 On March 23, 2026, Petitioner filed her Petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court set a briefing 2 schedule shortly thereafter. (Doc. 2.) Respondent filed their Response to Petition 3 (“Response”) on March 30, 2026. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner was authorized to file a reply on or 4 before April 6, 2026, but did not file one. 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 7 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 8 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 9 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 10 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 11 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 12 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 13 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 14 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Petitioner argues that she “is being unlawfully detained under the wrong statutory 17 authority and unlawfully denied an Immigration Judge Custody redetermination bond 18 hearing, because DHS is treating [her] as detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)” when she 19 should be subject to § 1226. (Doc. 1 at 2–6.) She seeks a prompt bond hearing or release. 20 (Id. at 4.) Respondent argues that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 21 § 1225(b), but “acknowledges that Courts in this District have repeatedly reached the 22 opposite conclusion,” and that “the facts are not materially distinguishable” here. 23 (Doc. 4 at 2–3.) 24 The Court has granted petitions filed by similarly-situated petitioners. See, e.g., 25 Silvestre-Mendoza v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03206-RBM-DDL, 2025 WL 3512410, at 26 *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025). In that decision, the Court found that “‘a proper 27 understanding of the relevant statutes, in light of their plain text, overall structure, and . . . 28 case law interpreting them, compels the conclusion that § 1225’s provisions for mandatory 1 detention of noncitizens seeking admission [do] not apply to someone like [the petitioner],’ 2 who has been residing in the United States” for several years. Id. at *1 (quoting Lopez 3 Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)). The Court incorporates its 4 reasoning in Silvestre-Mendoza, and makes the same findings, here. 5 There is no dispute that Petitioner was detained in December 2025 in the interior of 6 the United States, after having resided in the United States for years. (Doc. 1-2 at 2; Doc. 7 1 at 4.) Therefore, the discretionary detention procedures of § 1226 govern Petitioner’s 8 detention, and the Petition must be granted. The Court also finds that immediate release, 9 rather than a bond hearing, is the appropriate remedy. See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. 10 Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Although the Government notes that Petitioner 11 may request a bond hearing while detained, such a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve 12 as an adequate procedural safeguard because it is after the fact and cannot prevent an 13 erroneous deprivation of liberty.”); Jorge M.F. v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 14 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“if Petitioner is detained, he will already have suffered the injury he is 15 now seeking to avoid”); Domingo v. Kaiser, Case No. 25-cv-05893 (RFL), 2025 WL 16 1940179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (“Even if Petitioner[] received a prompt post- 17 detention bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and was released at that point, he will 18 have already suffered the harm that is the subject of his motion; that is, his potentially 19 erroneous detention.”). 20 IV. CONCLUSION1 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly: 22 1. Respondent is ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody. 23 2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall 24 receive a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to 25 26 27 1 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining grounds for relief. 28 1 determine whether detention is warranted. Respondent shall bear the burden of 2 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,” that Petitioner poses a danger to the 3 community or a risk of flight.? 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 ||DATE: April 7, 2026 ° 7 ce RUTH cual MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 See Sadegqi v. LaRose, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her 23 continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 25 ||583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake” warranted 26 placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [a noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond’’). 27 ||° This relief has been granted in similar matters. See E.A. T.-B, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1324; 28 Duong v. Kaiser, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1043-44 (N.D. Cal. 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119-20 (E.D. Cal. 2025).