Vladimir Dugarov v. Sixto Marrero
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a habeas petition filed by a Russian citizen who was paroled into the United States in 2023 and subsequently detained by ICE in 2026 without notice or a hearing. The court granted the petition, finding that the re-detention violated due process because there was no evidence of materially changed circumstances, and ordered the petitioner's release on the original terms.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the release of the Petitioner on the same terms and conditions as his initial release.“Accordingly, the Court issues the following writ: The Court ORDERS that Vladimir Dugarov (A# 246-837-644) be released on the same terms and conditions as he was ordered released in June 2023.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the due process principles established in Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli to the context of immigration parole. The order recites that the petitioner was released based on a finding of no danger or flight risk, has complied with conditions, and was re-detained without notice, a hearing, or evidence of changed circumstances. Under the Fifth Amendment, a person released from custody has a liberty interest that cannot be revoked without due process. The court's reliance on Saravia v. Sessions and Pinchi v. Noem to support the requirement for notice and a hearing upon re-detention is consistent with Ninth Circuit and district court precedent regarding the revocation of immigration parole. The factual findings in the order support the legal conclusion that the detention was arbitrary. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standard for habeas corpus relief and applies the due process requirements for revoking liberty interests to the specific facts of the case. The court properly distinguishes the petitioner from the class in Maldonado Bautista, ensuring the ruling is based on individual due process rights rather than a potentially inapplicable class certification. The reliance on Morrissey, Gagnon, and Saravia provides a robust foundation for the conclusion that re-detention without notice, a hearing, or changed circumstances is unconstitutional. The factual findings are clear and support the legal conclusion.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 VLADIMIR DUGAROV, Case No. 26-cv-01841-BAS-SBC 13 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 14 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) 15 SIXTO MARRERO, 16 Respondent. 17 18 19 Petitioner Vladimir Dugarov filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 20 claiming he was improperly detained after he was paroled into the United States. (ECF 21 No. 1.) The Government responds. (ECF No. 4.) For the reasons stated below, the Court 22 GRANTS the Petition and orders Petitioner released on the same terms and conditions as 23 he was previously released. 24 I. LEGAL STANDARD 25 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 26 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the 27 writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 28 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or 1 she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It 2 applies to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 3 687 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody and since he is seeking release from custody, he 4 has standing to pursue this Petition. 5 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 Petitioner, a citizen of Russia, entered the United States on June 5, 2023, seeking 7 asylum. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–2.) The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) paroled 8 Petitioner into the United States, evidently finding he was not a danger to the community 9 or a risk of flight. (Id. ¶1.) Petitioner has been in full compliance with all the conditions of 10 his parole. (Id. ¶ 8.) Nonetheless, on June 13, 2026, the West Virginia Highway Patrol 11 detained Petitioner and turned him over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 12 (Id. ¶ 3.) Petitioner has since been held in ICE custody without notice or an opportunity 13 to be heard and without any changed circumstances with respect to his flight risk or danger 14 to the community. (Id.) Petitioner seeks immediate release. 15 III. ANALYSIS 16 Although the Government seems to agree that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, 17 it bases its concession on its belief that Petitioner is part of the class certified in Maldonado 18 Bautista v. Santacruz, __ F. Supp. 3d___, 2025 WL 3713982 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 19 (ECF No. 4.) However, the Maldonado Bautista class applied only to individuals who 20 entered without inspection and were not apprehended upon arrival. Id. Petitioner was 21 apprehended at the border upon arrival, so he does not appear to be part of the Maldonado 22 Bautista class.1 23 Nonetheless, this Court finds Petitioner’s re-detention without notice or an 24 opportunity to be heard and without noticeably changed circumstances violates Petitioner’s 25 due process rights. 26 27 1 The Court notes additionally that the Maldonado Bautista class has been limited to the Central District of California and stayed with respect to all other potential class members. Maldonado Bautista v. 28 1 Individuals released from custody, even where such release is conditional, have a 2 liberty interest in continued liberty. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 3 (1972) (parolees); Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 150 (1997) (pre-parolees); Gagnon v. 4 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probationers). Thus, this Court agrees with those 5 courts that have held: 6 [O]nce a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, 7 the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed 8 circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk, or is now subject to a final order of removal. And if 9 the noncitizen disputes the notion that changed circumstances justify his 10 rearrest, he is entitled to a prompt hearing before an Immigration Judge. 11 Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176–77 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Kamalpreet 12 v. Singh, No. 26-cv-1211-LL-JLB, 2026 WL 622687, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) 13 (“Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 14 government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 15 creates an implicit promise, upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty will be 16 revoked only if they fail to live up to the conditions of release.” (citation modified) (quoting 17 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025))). 18 Because DHS released Petitioner, finding he was not a flight risk or a danger to the 19 community in June 2023, and because there is no evidence those circumstances have 20 changed, Petitioner is entitled to remain released on the same conditions as he was initially 21 released. If DHS believes circumstances have changed, it must provide notice of these 22 changed circumstances to Petitioner and provide Petitioner an opportunity to be heard 23 promptly before an Immigration Judge. Hence, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, the Court issues the following writ: 3 The Court ORDERS that Vladimir Dugarov (A# 246-837-644) be released on the 4 same terms and conditions as he was ordered released in June 2023. 5 The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. . (yatta Bahar g || DATED: April 2, 2026 9 Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A.