Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SUSAN V. KLAT, Case No.: 26-CV-1293 TWR (DEB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 13 v. LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a Municipal Corporation; COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 15 (ECF No. 1) a Governmental Entity; COUNTY OF 16 SAN DIEGO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, a Public 17 Entity/Legislative Governing Body for the 18 County of San Diego; TERRA LAWSON- REMER, an individual; JIM DESMOND, 19 an individual; JOEL ANDERSON, an 20 individual; NORA VARGAS, an individual; MONICA MONTGOMERY- 21 STEPPE, an individual; HEATHER 22 FERBERT, an individual; SUMMER STEPHAN, an individual; ANGELA D. 23 CAESAR, an individual; AMIR H. ALI, 24 an individual; JAMES E. BOASBERG, an individual, and DOES 1-100, Inclusive, 25 Defendants. 26 27 Presently before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Susan V. Klat’s Complaint (“Compl.” 28 ECF No. 1), which alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and 1 Plaintiff’s Response (“Resp.,” ECF No. 10) to this Court’s Order to Show Cause Why 2 Action Should Not be Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (“OSC,” ECF No. 3 5). Plaintiff sues the following entities: the City of San Diego, the County of San Diego, 4 the San Diego Board of Supervisors (as an entity and the individuals on the board), San 5 Diego City Attorney Heather Ferbert, San Diego County District Attorney Summer 6 Stephan, United States District Court of the District of Columbia (“District of D.C.”) Judge 7 Amir H. Ali, District of D.C. Chief Judge James E. Boasberg, and District of D.C. Clerk 8 of Court Angela D. Caesar. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff alleges she has suffered 9 “discrimination and injustice” as a pro se plaintiff based on “recent media reports of 10 county-sanctioned ‘settlements’ made with attorney partnerships . . . highlighting 11 discrimination against pro se parties when accessing the courts.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff 12 specifically alleges that Defendants conspired to obstruct and impede her as a pro se party, 13 discriminated against her as a pro se party, obstructed her access to due process and the 14 equal protection of law, and were negligent in failing to prevent interference with her right 15 to access judicial review in federal court.1 (See generally id.) Plaintiff seeks $25 million 16 in damages as well as punitive damages. (See id. at 16.) 17 18 1 As explained in the Court’s Order to Show Cause, the instant action trails six other lawsuits Plaintiff has filed related to the death of her grandson. (See ECF No. 3 (“Plaintiff’s Notice of Related 19 Cases”).) Four of the cases were filed and dismissed in this District and two of the cases were filed and dismissed in the District of Columbia. (See id.; see also Compl. ¶¶ 17–24.) Plaintiff’s most recent case, 20 filed in the District of Columbia on January 21, 2026, was dismissed sua sponte by District Judge Amir 21 H. Ali for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on February 10, 2026, because—among other reasons—the complaint did not provide any plausible theory for a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 22 Docket in Klat v. Caesar et al., No. 1:26-cv-00192-AHA (D.D.C. filed Jan. 21, 2026). Plaintiff’s other case filed in the District of Columbia was also dismissed sua sponte by District Judge Amir H. Ali for lack 23 of subject-matter jurisdiction because the judges, prosecutors, and clerks of the court named as defendants were entitled to immunity from suit and Plaintiff had failed to provide any plausible theory for violation 24 of her constitutional rights. See MEMORANDUM OPINION, Klat v. Bondi et al., No. 1:25-cv-04509- 25 AHA (D.D.C. filed Jan. 16, 2026), ECF No. 6.

26 As for Plaintiff’s cases in the Southern District of California, most recently Plaintiff’s wrongful death suit was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on October 29, 2025. See Order Of 27 Dismissal Without Prejudice, Klat v. City of San Diego et al., No. 3:25-cv-01161-RSH-VET (S.D. Cal. filed May 7, 2025), ECF No. 32. Plaintiff appears to believe this order was made “using clerk-generated 28 1 As the Court previously explained in its Order to Show Cause, (see OSC at 3–4), 2 “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. It is to be presumed that a cause lies 3 outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the 4 party asserting jurisdiction.” Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 5 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 6 (1994)). “[T]his court has an independent obligation to address sua sponte whether [it] 7 ha[s] subject matter jurisdiction.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 358 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th 8 Cir. 2004) (citing Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999)). And “[i]f 9 the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 10 dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 11 “A patently insubstantial complaint may be dismissed . . . for want of subject-matter 12 jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 13 319, 327 (1989). This is because, under the substantiality doctrine, “the district court lacks 14 subject matter jurisdiction when the question presented is too insubstantial to consider.” 15 Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985). A case is too 16 insubstantial to consider when it is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior 17 decisions of this Court or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal 18 controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate 19 resolution of the federal issues on the merits.” Id. (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of 20 Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court 21 22 Plaintiff filed the following three suits: (1) a suit seeking public records (the “Public Records Case”), 23 which was dismissed sua sponte for lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, see ORDER: 1. Sua Sponte Dismissing the case for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Without Prejudice, and 2. Denying Defendants 24 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(B)(6), Klat v. Wahl et al., No. 3:24-cv-01474-BAS-AHG (S.D. 25 Cal. filed Aug. 20, 2024), ECF No. 8; (2) a suit challenging the dismissal in Klat v. Wahl et al., which was dismissed for failure to state a claim and failure to respond to the Court’s order, see ORDER Granting 26 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and ORDER DISMISSING CASE, Klat v. Morrill et al., No. 3:25-cv-00241-WQH-BJW (S.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2025), ECF Nos. 16, 17, respectively; and (3) a 27 suit challenging double charging pro se plaintiffs in San Diego Superior Court, which was dismissed for failure to file a first amended complaint, see ORDER DISMISSING CASE, Klat v. Roddy et al., No. 3:25- 28 1 construes her pleading liberally and affords her the benefit of any doubt. See United States 2 v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2020). But even “[u]nder the liberal rules 3 applicable to pro se complaints, an action is frivolous if the plaintiff cannot make a rational 4 argument on the law and facts in support of their claim.” Murray v. Gomez, No. CV 24- 5 03333 PHX CDB, 2024 WL 5395647, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2024) (citing Lopez v. Dep’t 6 of Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 882 (9th Cir. 1991)), report and recommendation adopted, 7 2025 WL 416881 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2025). 8 In her Response, Plaintiff argues that her Complaint is well-pleaded and “includes 9 key, time-stamped receipts documenting unchecked abuse of authority used to wrongly 10 justify a judicial decision to treat the plaintiff differently from a licensed attorney.” (Resp. 11 at 2.) She also notes that the “well-pleaded complaint rule [is] identified throughout the 12 pleading.[]” (Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff’s Response references evidence 13 including “officer body camera footage,” “[m]ortuary records,” a “death certificate,” and 14 the deceased’s “civil rights lawsuit.” (Id.) Further, addressing her previous Public Records 15 Case, Plaintiff explains that post-dismissal, the San Diego County District Attorney’s 16 Office forwarded “roughly 240 pages of largely redacted material” in response to 17 Plaintiff’s records request. (Id.) Plaintiff also, for the first time, argues that she is bringing 18 a Bivens action, seeking damages “related to the concealment, targeting, and killing of the 19 plaintiff’s 25-year-old grandson, who unknowingly became a victim in an unresolved 20 retaliatory vendetta stemming from a lawsuit filed in 1996 involving the Chief Justice of 21 the U.S. Supreme Court.” (Id. at 5.) 22 Ultimately, Plaintiff’s Response fails to establish that the Court has subject-matter 23 jurisdiction. First, Plaintiff fails to address why the Court has jurisdiction over any of the 24 Defendants with immunity from suit in her Response. (See generally Resp.; see also OSC 25 at 4–5.) Further, Plaintiff does not address the Court’s concern that Plaintiffs claims are 26 implausible. (See id.; see also OSC at 5–6.) Instead, Plaintiff continues to conclusorily 27 allege an expansive conspiracy theory without providing any specific facts rendering her 28 claims plausible. While Plaintiff’s Response points to facts relating to her grandson’s 1 death, (see Resp. at 3), these facts in no way support Plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy 2 between Defendants to discriminate against her as a pro se party. Further, Plaintiff’s 3 allegation that her grandson’s death was based on a “vendetta stemming from a lawsuit 4 filed in 1996 involving the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,” (Resp. at 5), is not 5 mentioned in her Complaint and is similarly implausible and lacking any factual basis for 6 a supposed vendetta. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is implausible, the Court lacks subject- 7 matter jurisdiction over it. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006) 8 (“[A] claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . may be 9 dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is . . . ‘wholly 10 insubstantial and frivolous.’” (citations omitted)); Knight v. Brnovich, No. CV-25-00565- 11 PHX-JCH, 2025 WL 798663, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2025) (dismissing the plaintiff’s case 12 sua sponte when the plaintiff’s allegations predicated on a wide-ranging conspiracy were 13 frivolous and wholly unsupported by plausible facts); Frost v. Off. of Att’y Gen., No. C 17- 14 04983 JSW, 2018 WL 6704137, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2018) (dismissing case and 15 finding that, even when construed liberally, the pro se plaintiff’s allegations “indicate more 16 fantastical thinking than a legitimate basis for legal relief”); Tr. v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 17 No. 2:16-CV-1237-ODW-SS, 2016 WL 756461, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) 18 (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff failed to 19 allege any facts in support of his argument that the defendants had violated the Federal 20 Debt Collection Practices Act). 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Accordingly, for the reasons explained in the Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF 2 || No. 5) and this Order, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE but WITHOUT 3 || LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiffs action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 4 || Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).” 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: April 3, 2026 —=— (2 [ 7 [as \— bre g Honorable Todd W. Robinson 9 United States District Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 Plaintiff states she “wi// continue to file lawsuits in this Courthouse against the same individuals, 18 public entities, and officials—both personally and in their official capacities—until clarity and accountability are achieved.” (Resp. at 3 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 5 (“[T]he complaints will 19 persist until accountability is recognized, bad decisions are reversed, or the bad seeds making these 20 prejudicial decisions are replaced.” (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 6 (“[T]he history documented in the six dismissed complaints should send authorities the message that the plaintiff will continue filing 2] complaints until this matter is acknowledged by the judiciary or the current, not-so-ethical decision- making process is revised or replaced.”). 22 Because Plaintiff states she will continue filing duplicative lawsuits, the Court cautions Plaintiff 23 || about the potential sanctions that could result from such filings. Sanctions are appropriate under Rule 11 24 where a party files a pleading, motion, or other paper “presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” Rule 11 sanctions for filing 25 || harassing complaints can be applied to pro se litigants. See, e.g., McMahon v. Pier 39 Ltd. P’ship, No. C03-00251 CRB, 2003 WL 22939233, *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2003); Portnoy v. Veolia Transp. Servs., 26 || Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00043-MCE-EF, 2014 WL 3689366, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2014). “[D]uplicative filings against the same defendants on similar issues . . . constitute harassment under Rule 11.” McMahon, 27 WL 22939233 at *6. While the Court does not find that Rule 11 sanctions are proper at this time, 28 the Court explicitly warns Plaintiff that if she continues to file duplicative lawsuits against the same individuals, public entities, and officials, she could subject herself to Rule 11 sanctions in the future. □□