Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALIREZA SALEMI, Case No.: 25cv2934-AGS (MSB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED 13 v. MOTION FOR PRESERVATION ORDER [ECF NO. 53] 14 CITY OF CARLSBAD, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff Alireza Salemi (“Plaintiff”)’s Renewed Motion for 19 Preservation Order. (See ECF No. 53 (“Renewed Motion”).) The Court construes the 20 Renewed Motion as, in substance, a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s March 5, 21 2026, Order. (See ECF No. 45.) For the reasons set forth below, the Renewed Motion is 22 DENIED. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the City of Carlsbad, the 25 Carlsbad Police Department, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office, Encinitas 26 Union School District, the United States Department of Homeland Security, the 27 Homeland Security San Diego Field Office, the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination 2 defendants John Doe 1 through 10. (See generally Dkt.) 3 On February 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preservation Order Regarding 4 Records of San Dieguito Union High School District and All Defendants. (ECF No. 26.) On 5 February 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion for Preservation Order. (ECF No. 34.) 6 On March 5, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Preservation Motions. (ECF No. 45.) On 7 March 31, 2026, Plaintiff filed the Renewed Motion. (ECF No. 53.) 8 II. APPLICABLE LAW 9 “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 10 circumstances . . . .” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 11 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 12 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Also, a motion for reconsideration “may not be 13 used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time” that could reasonably 14 have been raised earlier. Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th 15 Cir. 2000). The party seeking reconsideration must show (1) newly discovered evidence, 16 (2) clear error or manifest injustice in the prior decision, or (3) an intervening change in 17 controlling law. Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 18 Local rules may impose further limitations on motions for reconsideration. For 19 example, pursuant to the Local Civil Rules of Practice for the United States District Court 20 for the Southern District of California: 21 Whenever any motion . . . has been made to any judge and has been refused in 22 whole or in part, or has been granted conditionally or on terms, and a subsequent motion . . . is made for the same relief in whole or in part upon the same or any 23 alleged different state of facts, it will be the continuing duty of each party and 24 attorney seeking such relief to present to the judge to whom any subsequent application is made an affidavit of a party or witness or certified statement of an 25 attorney setting forth the material facts and circumstances surrounding each 26 prior [motion], including inter alia: (1) when and to what judge the [motion] was made, (2) what ruling or decision or order was made thereon, and (3) what new 27 or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or 2 Bearing this legal standard in mind, the Court must determine whether 3 reconsideration of the prior denial of Plaintiff’s Preservation Motions is warranted. 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 A. No Newly Discovered Evidence 6 Plaintiff asserts that recent responses to public records requests (e.g., statements 7 that no responsive documents were located, requests for extensions due to voluminous 8 records, and ongoing processing) justify reconsideration of the Court’s prior Order. (See 9 ECF No. 53 at 1.) However, such responses do not constitute newly discovered evidence 10 demonstrating a risk of spoliation. At most, such responses reflect routine responses to 11 public records requests, including denial of record existence, ongoing searches, or 12 exemption from the California Public Records Act. Plaintiff’s Exhibits Z.4–Z.6 do not 13 support a reasonable inference that “there is significant risk that relevant evidence will 14 be lost or destroyed.” See Pueblo of Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 138 15 (2004). Nor do Plaintiff’s references to various programs, funding sources, or 16 generalized allegations regarding recordkeeping practices establish that specific, 17 relevant evidence is in danger of loss or destruction. 18 B. No Clear Error or Manifest Injustice 19 Plaintiff has not identified any clear error or manifest injustice in the Court’s prior 20 Order. (See generally ECF No. 53.) The Court previously determined that Plaintiff failed 21 to make a particularized showing of a significant risk of loss or destruction of evidence. 22 (See ECF No. 45 at 5.) The Renewed Motion largely reiterates the same speculative 23 concerns previously raised, namely, that the electronic records sought may be subject to 24 “routine purge cycles.” (See ECF No. 53 at 1.) Despite the additional detail provided, 25 Plaintiff still does not identify specific actors likely to destroy such evidence or concrete 26 facts showing imminent or intentional spoliation. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis 27 to conclude that its prior Order was clearly erroneous or resulted in manifest injustice. 2 Plaintiff does not argue, and the Court does not find, that there has been any 3 intervening change in controlling law. (See generally ECF No. 53.) 4 D. Continued Failure to Meet the Preservation Order Standard 5 Even if the Court were to consider the Renewed Motion on its merits, denial 6 would still be appropriate. As noted in the Court’s prior Order [ECF No. 45 at 3–4], 7 preservation orders are not issued as a matter of course and require a particularized 8 showing that relevant evidence is at significant risk of loss or destruction absent judicial 9 intervention. See Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 3:19-cv-01301-CAB-BGS, 2020 10 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70534, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2020); see also Pueblo of Laguna, 60 11 Fed. Cl. at 138. Plaintiff continues to seek preservation of broad categories of records 12 across multiple entities, including non-parties. Plaintiff still has not established a 13 concrete legal basis for the Court to issue an ex parte preservation order directed at 14 entities that are not parties to this action. As previously explained, preservation orders 15 are an extraordinary remedy requiring restraint and discretion. (See ECF No. 45 at 3.) 16 Plaintiff’s request for a preservation order remains overbroad and unsupported. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 A motion for reconsideration is a remedy that is applied sparingly to preserve the 19 finality of judgments and conserve judicial resources. See Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 20 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff is hereby advised that such a motion is not a vehicle 21 for reasserting arguments previously raised or for presenting speculative concerns 22 unsupported by evidence. The Court has now twice considered and rejected Plaintiff’s 23 requests for a preservation order based on substantially similar assertions. Absent a 24 meaningful showing of newly discovered evidence, clear error or manifest injustice, or 25 an intervening change in controlling law, further motions seeking the same or similar 26 relief will be deemed improper. Plaintiff is further advised that the filing of repetitive, 27 unsupported motions may result in the imposition of appropriate sanctions or other 1 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for 2 || Preservation Order [ECF No. 53]. To reiterate, nothing in this Order should be construed 3 || to relieve any party of its obligations under applicable law to preserve evidence that is 4 ||relevant to the claims and defenses in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: April 3, 2026 — _ 2 FZ 93 Honorable Michael S. Berg United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28