Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SERGEI TOTSKII, Case No.: 26-cv-1053-JES-JLB 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER LaROSE; DANIEL A. BRIGHTMAN; TODD LYONS; [ECF No. 14] 15 MARKWAYNE MULLIN; PAMELA 16 BONDI; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; and U.S. 17 IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 18 ENFORCEMENT, 19 Respondents. 20 Before the Court is Petitioner Sergei Totskii’s Second Amended Petition for Writ of 21 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 14. Pursuant to the Court’s Order 22 to Show Cause (ECF No. 16), Respondents filed a return to the petition and Petitioner filed 23 a traverse. ECF Nos. 18, 19. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the 24 Petition. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 Petitioner is a citizen of Ukraine who fled to the United States from Russia. ECF No. 27 14 ¶ 3. He entered the United States on January 25, 2024, and presented himself at the 28 1 border. Id. At that time, he was granted humanitarian parole, which was set to expire on 2 April 18, 2025. Id. ¶ 4; ECF No. 14-1. After receiving parole, he received work 3 authorization, applied for asylum, and started to integrate himself into the local community. 4 ECF No. 14 ¶ 5. 5 On May 21, 2025, while attending a regularly scheduled check-in, Petitioner was re- 6 detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Id. ¶ 6. He alleges that he 7 was not told why he was being detained, was not told about any changed circumstances, 8 and did not have an opportunity to be heard. Id. He was first sent to a detention facility in 9 Adelanto, California, and later transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Center, where he is 10 currently being held. Id. 11 Based on the foregoing facts, Petitioner brings the following claims for the manner 12 in which he was re-detained: (1) violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); 13 (2) violation of procedural due process in the manner he was re-detained; and (3) violation 14 of due process due to prolonged detention. Id. ¶¶ 47-72. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 17 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 18 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 19 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 20 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 21 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 22 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 23 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 24 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 25 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 26 of a district court’s habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 27 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 28 // 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 In Respondents’ return to the petition, they do not substantively address the claims 3 raised in the petition. ECF No. 18. Instead, they take the position that Petitioner is subject 4 to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), while recognizing the many court cases 5 rejecting this position and submitting that they do not “oppose the petition and defer[] to 6 the Court on the appropriate relief.” Id. In light of this concession, the Court finds that it is 7 appropriate to grant the petition here on procedural due process grounds. 8 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from 9 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of 10 law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause 11 applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is 12 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from 13 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 14 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering 15 a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner 16 and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 17 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 18 Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of 19 parole. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. 20 Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 21 2025). It appears that here, Petitioner was granted humanitarian parole 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1182(d)(5)(A). In the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), courts have held that such 23 parole status entitles the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due 24 process and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. 25 Supp. 3d 1123, 1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under APA); Mata Velasquez v. 26 Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding violation under procedural 27 due process where notice and opportunity to be heard were not given to a petitioner). 28 1 Further, courts have repeatedly held that liberty interests do not expire when parole 2 does. “When he was released from his initial detention on parole, Petitioner took with him 3 a liberty interest which is entitled to the full protections of the due process clause.” Ramirez 4 Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025). The court went on to 5 hold that “this private interest did not expire along with Petitioner’s parole agreement. 6 Once established, Petitioner’s interest in liberty is a constitutional right which may only be 7 revoked through methods that comport with due process.” Id.; see also Rodriguez Cabrera 8 v. Mattos, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1179 (D. Nev. 2025) (“Petitioner has a fundamental 9 interest in freedom from physical confinement, and that liberty interest is particularly 10 strong given his initial release from detention in 2022, and the fact that Respondents did 11 not seek his return to custody upon the expiration of his parole in December 2022, or in the 12 three years since.”); Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 13 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (“[P]etitioner’s liberty interest did not expire 14 along with his parole.”). 15 Here, Petitioner was granted parole after he entered and was processed in this 16 country, creating a liberty interest protected by the Due Process clause. The liberty interest 17 underlying that parole has not expired through any of the stages of his immigration case, 18 including the automatic, time-based end of his parole. See Ramirez Tesara, 800 F. Supp. 19 3d at 1136. The expiration of parole automatically does not extinguish due process claims. 20 See Rodriguez Cabrera, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 1179 (“That the express terms of Petitioner’s 21 parole allowed for discretionary termination or expiration does not somehow obviate the 22 need for the government to provide an individualized hearing prior to re-detaining him 23 given the significance of his liberty interest.”); Omer G. G., 2025 WL 3254999 at *5. 24 Further, these liberty interests are particularly “weighty” where Petitioner relies on the 25 government’s grant of release to take actions to build a life in this country—as Petitioner 26 has done here. Ramirez Tesara, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 1136; Rodriguez Cabrera, 808 F. Supp. 27 3d at 1179 (“His interest in being free from confinement is particularly weighty, given his 28 family and community ties within this country.”). l As this Court explained in Sanchez v. LaRose, due process requires not only notice 2 ||and opportunity to be heard, but also that the notice and opportunity be meaningful. No. 3 || 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). Petitioner 4 |\alleges that he was arrested and re-detained without notice or opportunity to be heard 5 ||regarding the loss of his liberty interest. Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondents 6 || violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they re-detained him on May 21, 2025. 7 IV. CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas 9 corpus. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process ground and concludes 10 Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s parole violates procedural due process, 11 ||Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to 12 ||any conditions of his preexisting parole that existed at the time he was re-detained. The 13 || Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by April 7, 2026, confirming that 14 || Petitioner has been released. 15 The Court DENIES AS MOOT the remainder of Petitioner’s claims. The Clerk of 16 Court is directed to close this case. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || Dated: April 2, 2026 19 Ny Shonmee 20 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 1 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 «