Murrey Life Insurance & Endowment Trust, by and through its Sole Trustee and Sole Beneficiary, Charles D. Murrey III v. Charles Deshields Murrey, III
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court considered a request for a refund of the filing fee and a motion for e-file access in a case that had already been voluntarily dismissed. The court denied both requests as moot, noting that the plaintiff could not proceed pro se on behalf of the trust and that the court lacks authority to refund filing fees upon voluntary dismissal.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Request for Refund of Filing Fee (Doc. 8) and Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents (Doc. 9) are DENIED as moot.“Accordingly, and because this case has already been closed pursuant to the filing of Plaintiff's Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (see Doc. 7), Plaintiff's Request for Refund of Filing Fee (Doc. 8) and Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents (Doc. 9) are DENIED as moot.” | agree with court The court correctly identifies that the case was closed via voluntary dismissal, rendering pending motions moot. Additionally, the court correctly notes that it lacks statutory authority to refund filing fees upon voluntary dismissal, citing consistent district court precedent. |
Plaintiff's argument that he may proceed pro se on behalf of the trust is rejected.“These arguments are incorrect. The Ninth Circuit in CLE. Pope ruled that a trustee may not proceed pro se on behalf of the trust, and that Rule 17(a) “does not warrant the conclusion that a nonlawyer can maintain such a suit” pro se.” | agree with court The court correctly applies the binding Ninth Circuit precedent in CLE. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, which holds that a non-lawyer trustee cannot represent a trust pro se. The court also cites Maisano v. Welcher for the same proposition. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the mootness of the motions due to the prior voluntary dismissal. It also correctly applies binding Ninth Circuit precedent (CLE. Pope) to reject the plaintiff's argument regarding pro se representation of a trust. The alternative holding regarding the lack of authority to refund fees is supported by consistent district court authority and statutory interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1914.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MURREY LIFE INSURANCE & Case No.: 3:25-cv-02580-RBM-JLB ENDOWMENT TRUST, by and through 12 its Sole Trustee and Sole Beneficiary, ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 13 Charles D. Murrey III, REFUND OF FILING FEE AND MOTION FOR E-FILE ACCESS 14 Plaintiff, 15 v. [Docs. 8, 9] 16 CHARLES DESHIELDS MURREY, III, 17 Defendant. 18 19 20 On September 30, 2025, Plaintiff Murrey Life Insurance and Endowment Trust, by 21 and through its Sole Trustee and Sole Beneficiary, Charles D. Murrey III (“Plaintiff”) filed 22 the Complaint against Defendant Charles Deshields Murrey III. (Doc. 1.) As another 23 Court in this District has explained, “Mr. Murrey may not proceed pro se in a legal action 24 on behalf of the trust he represents.” Murrey Life Ins. & Endowment Tr. v. Kohl’s, Inc., 25 Case No.: 3:25-cv-2134-CAB-JLB, 2025 WL 2412159, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) 26 (citing Maisano v. Welcher, 940 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the plaintiffs, 27 who were both trustees and beneficiaries of the trust, could not maintain an action on behalf 28 of the trust as pro se litigants)). 1 Plaintiff argues that he “may prosecute this action pro se, as he is the sole trustee and 2 ||sole beneficiary of the Trust,” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1)(E) and 3 || the holding in CLE. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1987). (Doc. 1 4 1.) These arguments are incorrect. The Ninth Circuit in CLE. Pope ruled that a trustee 5 ||may not proceed pro se on behalf of the trust, and that Rule 17(a) “does not warrant the 6 ||conclusion that a nonlawyer can maintain such a suit” pro se. 818 F.2d at 697-98 7 (emphasis added). Accordingly, and because this case has already been closed pursuant to 8 || the filing of Plaintiff's Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (see Doc. 7), Plaintiff's Request for 9 ||Refund of Filing Fee (Doc. 8) and Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents 10 ||(Doc. 9) are DENIED as moot. 11 Additionally, even if it reached the merits of Plaintiff's Request for Refund of Filing 12 || Fee, the Court would deny the request. The Court lacks the authority to refund a filing fee 13 a voluntary dismissal. See Green v. Bank of Am., No. 2:12-cv-02093-GEB-CKD PS, 14 WL 5032414, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (denying refund of filing fee after pro 15 plaintiff voluntarily dismissed complaint under Rule 41(a)); Lopez v. Doe, Case No. 16 5:23-cv-01924-FWS-AJR, 2024 WL 5422706, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2024) (“Filing fees 17 || for initiating a lawsuit in district court are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and are part of 18 costs of litigation,” and “[nJothing in § 1914 provides for the refund of filing fees.”’); 19 || Reed v. Newsom, Case No.: 3:20-cv-2439-AJB-MDD, 2021 WL 3406283, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 20 || Aug. 4, 2021) (‘to the extent Plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal under [Rule] 41(a), the 21 court nevertheless lacks the authority to refund a filing fee’). 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || DATE: March 31, 2026 et Barely Merle □ 5 ON. RUTH BERM@BDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28