Ines Perez Solis v. Christopher Larose, Warden at Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court considered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a Mexican national detained by ICE after residing in the United States for over 20 years. The court granted the petition, ordering the petitioner's immediate release and requiring a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) prior to any re-detention.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus“For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED.” | agree with court The court relies on the statutory interpretation that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (mandatory detention) does not apply to noncitizens who have resided in the U.S. for a significant period, instead applying 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (discretionary detention). This interpretation is supported by the cited district court cases (Lopez Benitez, Silvestre-Mendoza) and the government's concession in the Return. The application of the law to the facts (20+ years residence) is consistent with the cited authorities. |
Ordering immediate release of Petitioner“Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody.” | agree with court The court determines that immediate release is the appropriate remedy because a post-deprivation bond hearing is not an adequate procedural safeguard to prevent the injury of erroneous detention. This aligns with the cited case law (E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, Jorge M.F. v. Jennings, Domingo v. Kaiser). |
Ordering a bond hearing prior to re-detention“The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall receive a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to determine whether detention is warranted.” | agree with court The court imposes a procedural requirement for future detention, consistent with the statutory framework of § 1226(a) and the due process concerns raised in the cited cases. |
Setting the burden of proof for re-detention“Respondents shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” | agree with court The court applies the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard for the government to justify continued detention under § 1226(a). This standard is derived from Singh v. Holder, as cited in the order, although the order notes Singh was abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez. The specific burden of proof for § 1226(a) bond hearings remains a point of contention in some circuits, but the court's reliance on Singh (for this specific proposition) and Sadeqi v. LaRose is internally consistent within the district's recent jurisprudence. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound and applies the correct legal standard for § 2241 habeas petitions. It correctly identifies the statutory distinction between § 1225(b) and § 1226(a) and applies the district's recent precedent (Silvestre-Mendoza, Lopez Benitez) to the facts. The remedy of immediate release is supported by the cited case law regarding the inadequacy of post-deprivation hearings. The burden of proof standard is consistent with the cited authorities. The order is concise but sufficiently reasoned for a district court ruling on a habeas petition where the government conceded the legal point.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 INES PEREZ SOLIS, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01532-RBM-AHG 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at Otay [Doc. 1] Mesa Detention Center, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ines Perez Solis’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for 19 Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the 20 lawfulness of her detention by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 21 (“ICE”). (Doc. 1.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a Mexican national who entered the United States in 2003 without being 24 admitted or paroled. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1.) On March 7, 2026, Petitioner was the passenger in a 25 vehicle that ICE pulled over. (Id. ¶ 2.) The driver of the vehicle told ICE officers that he 26 did not have immigration status and was arrested. (Id.) Petitioner was questioned by ICE 27 officers and, after she declined to answer, was also arrested. (Id.) Petitioner was 28 determined to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and placed in removal 1 proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Id. ¶ 9.) The immigration judge found they 2 did not have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s bond hearing, citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 3 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (See id. ¶ 15; Doc. 5 ¶ 4.) 4 On March 11, 2026, Petitioner filed her Petition. (Doc. 1.) That same day, the Court 5 set a briefing schedule. (Doc. 2.) On March 19, 2026, Respondents filed their Return to 6 Petition. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed her Traverse on March 26, 2026. (Doc. 5.) 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 9 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 10 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 11 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 12 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 13 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 14 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 15 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 16 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Petitioner argues that her detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act; 19 the court’s orders in Bautista v. Santacruz;1 the Administrative Procedure Act; the Fifth 20 Amendment’s Due Process Clause; and the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 49–71.) 21 Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), but 22 “acknowledge[ ] that Courts in this District have repeatedly reached the opposite 23 conclusion,” and that “the facts are not materially distinguishable” here. (Doc. 4 at 2–3.) 24 25 26 1 See Bautista v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 27 2025). As the Court noted in its Order to Show Cause, the Ninth Circuit has stayed the judgment of Bautista insofar as it extends beyond the Central District of California. (Doc. 28 1 The Court has granted petitions filed by similarly-situated petitioners. See, e.g., 2 Silvestre-Mendoza v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03206-RBM-DDL, 2025 WL 3512410, at 3 *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025). In that decision, the Court found that “‘a proper 4 understanding of the relevant statutes, in light of their plain text, overall structure, and . . . 5 case law interpreting them, compels the conclusion that § 1225’s provisions for mandatory 6 detention of noncitizens seeking admission [do] not apply to someone like [the petitioner],’ 7 who has been residing in the United States” for many years. Id. at *1 (quoting Lopez 8 Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)). The Court incorporates its 9 reasoning in Silvestre-Mendoza, and makes the same findings, here. 10 There is no dispute that Petitioner was detained on March 7, 2026, after having 11 resided in the United States for over 20 years. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1–2.) Therefore, the discretionary 12 detention procedures of § 1226 govern Petitioner’s detention, and the Petition must be 13 granted. The Court also finds that immediate release, rather than a bond hearing, is the 14 appropriate remedy. See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 15 2025) (“Although the Government notes that Petitioner may request a bond hearing while 16 detained, such a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard 17 because it is after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”); Jorge 18 M.F. v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“if Petitioner is detained, 19 he will already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid”); Domingo v. Kaiser, 20 Case No. 25-cv-05893 (RFL), 2025 WL 1940179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (“Even 21 if Petitioner[] received a prompt post-detention bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 22 was released at that point, he will have already suffered the harm that is the subject of his 23 motion; that is, his potentially erroneous detention.”). 24 IV. CONCLUSION2 25 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly: 26 27 2 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining 28 l 1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody. 2 2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall 3 receive a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to 4 determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents shall bear the burden of 5 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,? that Petitioner poses a danger to the 6 community or a risk of flight.* 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || DATE: March 26, 2026 ep Berrnidlr, □□ oitttrygs D 10 ON. RUTH BERMGDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 3 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her 23 continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 25 ||583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake” warranted 26 placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [a noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond’’). 27 ||* This relief has been granted in similar matters. See E.A. T.-B, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1324; 28 Duong v. Kaiser, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1043-44 (N.D. Cal. 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119-20 (E.D. Cal. 2025).