Girmay Negasi v. Jeremy Casey, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
The court considered a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion for appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus action challenging immigration detention. The court granted both motions, finding the petitioner indigent and that the complexity of immigration law combined with the petitioner's lack of English proficiency warranted the appointment of counsel.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Granted“Since it is clear petitioner cannot afford the filing fee, his IFP request is granted.” | agree with court The order recites that the petitioner has $0.00 in wages and no savings, which satisfies the statutory requirement for IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The decision follows directly from the facts stated in the order. |
Motion for Appointment of Counsel Granted“inability “to speak nor write the English language” convinces the Court that counsel is warranted.” | agree with court The court applied the Ninth Circuit standard from Bashor v. Risley and Wilborn v. Escalderon, weighing the likelihood of success and the ability to articulate claims. While the likelihood of success was deemed difficult to judge, the court relied on the petitioner's inability to speak or write English and the complexity of immigration law to find that the interests of justice require counsel. This is a defensible application of the discretionary standard. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standards for IFP status and appointment of counsel. It applies the Wilborn factors, acknowledging the difficulty in assessing merit but relying on the petitioner's language barrier and the complexity of the law to justify appointment. The reasoning is sufficient for a preliminary order granting these procedural motions.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Girmay NEGASI, Case No.: 26-cv-1858-AGS-BJW 4 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Petitioner, 5 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. (ECF 3) AND MOTION FOR 6 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 7 (ECF 2) Jeremy CASEY, et al. 8 9 Respondents 10 11 Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his 12 immigration detention. In support of that request, he seeks to proceed without paying the 13 filing fee, known as proceeding in forma pauperis, and requests appointment of counsel. 14 Both of those requests are granted. 15 Typically, parties seeking a writ of habeas corpus in a United States district court 16 must pay a $5 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed without payment 17 of fees only if the court grants the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See Hymas 18 v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that when an “IFP 19 application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] 20 [a]re paid”). Although the filing fee is only $5, petitioner claims to have “0.00” in wages 21 and “no savings.” (ECF 3, at 1–2.) Since it is clear petitioner cannot afford the filing fee, 22 his IFP request is granted. 23 As to the request for counsel, courts may appoint an attorney for an “impoverished 24 habeas petitioner” when “the interests of justice so require.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 25 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) (cleaned up); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In this 26 assessment, courts weigh an indigent petitioner’s (a) “likelihood of success on the merits” 27 and (b) “ability . . . to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal 28 issues involved.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Given the 1 of detail in his petition, it’s difficult to judge petitioner’s likelihood of success. But 2 inability “to speak nor write the English language” convinces the Court that counsel is 3 || warranted. (ECF 2, at 1); see United States v. Ahumada Aguilar, 295 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 4 2002) (noting that immigration law is “second only to the Internal Revenue Code in 5 ||complexity” (quotation marks omitted)); Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2020) 6 ||(“Divining [the immigration laws’] meaning 1s ordinarily not for the faint of heart.”). The 7 ||Court provisionally appoints Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., to initially determine 8 ||if petitioner qualifies for representation by that organization. The Clerk is directed to 9 || forward a copy of this order to Federal Defenders. 10 By April 3, 2026, Federal Defenders must submit a notice to the Court concerning 11 || whether it can and will accept the appointment. By that same date, Federal Defenders must 12 state whether, under Chief Judge Order 134, it “requests to file supplemental briefing.” 13 || Once that notice is received, the Court will set a return date and a hearing. 14 || Dated: March 26, 2026 16 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28