Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EVGENII KOSHELEV, Case No.: 3:26-cv-1529-JES-MSB 12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING PETITION FOR 14 JOHN DOE, WARDEN OF THE OTAY WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS MESA DETENTION CENTER; 15 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, 16 SECRETARY OF HOMELAND (2) DENYING AS MOOT SECURITY; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 17 PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE), A IMMEDIATE RELEASE 18 COMPONENT OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 19 Respondents. [ECF NOs. 1, 2] 20 21 Before the Court is Petitioner Evgenii Koshelev’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of 22 Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), and Motion for Immediate 23 Release or, alternatively, for a Bond Hearing (“Motion”). ECF Nos. 1, (“Pet.”), 2. Pursuant 24 to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, Respondents (the “Government”) filed the Response, 25 a Notice which expressed their non-opposition to a bond hearing for Petitioner. ECF No. 26 5. 27 // 28 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On March 20, 2026, the Court issued an order in which it: (1) set forth the factual 3 background of this Petition; (2) found that it had jurisdiction over this matter; (3) found 4 that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing; and (4) ordered the parties to provide 5 supplemental briefing regarding which detention statute (i.e., 8 U.S.C. §§ (“Section”) 1225 6 or 1226) governed Petitioner’s detention. See ECF No. 6. The Court made this request to 7 determine which standard would apply in Petitioner’s bond hearing. For the reasons set 8 forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 11 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 12 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 13 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 14 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 15 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 16 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 17 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 18 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 19 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 20 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 21 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 The pro se drafted Petition contains several factual gaps. See generally Pet. For 24 example, the circumstances surrounding where and how he was detained, and whether he 25 had some immigration status prior to his current detention are absent. Id. As a result, the 26 Court construed the Petition liberally and inferred that Petitioner could reasonably be 27 detained under either detention statute. See Evgenii Koshelev, V. Doe, No. 3:26-CV-1529- 28 JES-MSB, 2026 WL 785536, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026). 1 On March 24, 2026, Respondents filed supplemental briefing, stating the following: 2 “Petitioner entered the United States on or about September 13, 2023 and was released on 3 parole on October 28, 2023. It is Respondents’ position that Petitioner is currently detained 4 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” ECF No. 7. The Government’s response makes clear 5 that Petitioner had an immigration status—here, he was granted parole—prior to being 6 detained in October 2025. Petitioner’s prior parole status gives the Court pause in ordering 7 Petitioner’s bond hearing because this remedy would be inferior to that which would be 8 available resulting from an unlawful deprivation of a liberty interest. See Pinchi v. Noem, 9 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (holding that noncitizen’s parole cannot be 10 revoked without first affording them with notice and an opportunity to be heard). 11 The Court finds that this issue has been addressed by the undersigned in a recent 12 decision, Gergawi v. Larose. No. 3:25-CV-3352-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 3719321, at *2-4 13 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025). Therefore, the Court, elects to follow the reasoning it stated in 14 Gergawi and incorporates it by reference. Id. 15 In 2023, Petitioner was released on parole from Respondents’ custody. See ECF No. 16 7. The Court notes that it is unspecified whether he was granted parole under 8 U.S.C. § 17 1182(d)(5)(A) or conditional parole under Id. § 1226(a)(2). However, the Court need not 18 clarify this detail because the procedural safeguards for both are the same. See, e.g., 8 19 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (proscribing the revocation of parole unless a government official 20 gives notice and makes certain findings); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) (proscribing same); 21 Gergawi, 2025 WL 3719321, at *3-4 (finding that conditional parole may only be revoked 22 after first providing noncitizen with notice and an opportunity to be heard). Therefore, the 23 Court finds that Respondents’ conduct—releasing Petitioner on parole—resulted in 24 Petitioner’s acquisition of a liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See 25 Gergawi, 2025 WL 3719321, at *3-4; see also Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1031. 26 Petitioner claims that, to date, he has not received a bond hearing and that “[t]he 27 Government has failed to show any changed circumstances, violation of conditions, or 28 lawful justification warranting continued confinement.” Pet. at 2. Accordingly, the Court 1 || finds that the Respondents failed to provide Petitioner with notice and opportunity to be 2 ||heard prior to revoking his parole, when he was detained in October 2025. In doing so, 3 Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights. C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV- 4 ||01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025); Leiva Flores v. 5 || Albarran, No. 25-cv-09302-AMO, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5; Faizyan v. Casey, No.: 3:25- 6 cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2025). As a result, the 7 || Court will order Petitioner’s immediate release. 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons discussed above: 10 (1) The Court GRANTS Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 11 U.S.C. § 2241; 12 (2) In light of the Court’s ruling on the Petition, it DENIES AS MOOT the 13 Petitioner’s Motion for Immediate Release. 14 (3) Because the Court GRANTS the Petition and concludes that 15 Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner's parole violates procedural due 16 process, Respondents are ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY release 17 Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions of her preexisting 18 conditional parole; 19 (4) The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report on or before 20 March 30, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released; and 21 (5) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: March 26, 2026 24 Soar Str, 25 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. United States District Judge 27 28