Kenneth Gregory Edwards v. Creekside Meadows Apartments Inc.; San Diego County Superior Court
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Dana M. Sabraw (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se petition for emergency injunctive relief and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted the IFP application and dismissed the petition sua sponte with leave to amend.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting application to proceed in forma pauperis“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s IFP application.” | agree with court The order recites that the petitioner is unemployed, has no monthly income, and holds only $1.60 in assets, which satisfies the statutory requirement for IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). |
Dismissing claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3“For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES Petitioner’s § 2000a-3 claim.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to the IFP screening. The petitioner failed to allege that the apartment complex was a 'place of public accommodation' or that he suffered discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin. Additionally, the court noted the failure to allege compliance with the 30-day notice requirement under § 2000a-3(c). |
Dismissing claim under California Civil Code § 1940.8“Thus, the Court also DISMISSES this claim.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claim because the federal claim was dismissed and the petitioner failed to allege diversity jurisdiction. Furthermore, the petition failed to state a claim on the merits because it did not allege the existence of a pest control contract or a failure to provide the required notice. |
Granting leave to amend“Petitioner may file a First Amended Petition to cure the defects described above no later than twenty one (21) days from the date this Order is entered.” | agree with court The court granted leave to amend, which is a standard procedural remedy when a pro se plaintiff's initial pleading fails to state a claim but has potential merit. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standards for IFP screening and failure to state a claim. It accurately applies these standards to the specific facts alleged by the petitioner, noting the lack of necessary elements for both the federal civil rights claim and the state law claim. The jurisdictional analysis for the state law claim is also correct.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 26-cv-01687-DMS-DDL KENNETH GREGORY EDWARDS, 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 13 v. TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; DISMISSING PETITION 14 CREEKSIDE MEADOWS SUA SPONTE APARTMENTS INC.; SAN DIEGO 15 COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, [ECF Nos. 1–2] 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Kenneth Gregory Edwards, appearing pro se, filed a petition for 19 emergency injunctive relief (“Petition”), (Pet., ECF No. 1), and an application to proceed 20 in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (IFP Appl., ECF No. 2). Petitioner did not file a complaint; 21 thus, the Court treats the Petition as his complaint. For the foregoing reasons, the Court 22 grants Petitioner’s application to proceed IFP and dismisses the Petition sua sponte. 23 I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP 24 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Civil Local Rule 3.2, any action sought to 25 be filed IFP “must be accompanied by an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets 26 which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2. Petitioner 27 indicates that he receives no monthly income and is unemployed. (IFP Appl. 1–2.) He 28 1 reports $1.60 in a checking account and no other assets. (Id. at 2–3.) He estimates $1,951 2 in monthly expenses. (Id. at 3–4.) The Court finds that Petitioner cannot afford to pay the 3 filing fee in this case and is eligible to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a). Accordingly, 4 the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s IFP application. 5 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING OF PETITION 6 A. Legal Standard 7 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), an IFP complaint (or, here, petition) must be screened 8 by the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint 9 that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a 10 defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.; see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 11 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 12 are not limited to prisoners”). 13 The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under 14 § 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure 15 to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) 16 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 17 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 18 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 19 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the 20 Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 21 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not 22 initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 23 1982). 24 B. Discussion 25 Petitioner has been living at Respondent Creekside Meadows Apartment Inc. 26 (“Creekside”). (Pet. 1.) In May 2024, a manager at Creekside returned Petitioner’s rent 27 payment and refused payment for ten months. (Id. at 1–2.) In addition to rent, Petitioner 28 was billed a monthly maintenance fee. (Id. at 2.) A now-former office staff member told 1 Petitioner to ignore the maintenance fee bill because of his Section 8 status. (Id.) However, 2 six months after moving in, Petitioner was told that he was responsible for this fee. (Id.) 3 He was then told that non-payment was not grounds for eviction, and that he would be 4 allowed to pay his debt incrementally. (Id.) 5 In June 2025, Creekside filed an unlawful detainer action in San Diego County 6 Superior Court, alleging Petitioner did not pay rent. (Id.) Petitioner answered the unlawful 7 detainer action on June 16, 2025, stating that the landlord refused to accept his rent 8 payments and that “the amount alleged as rent was in fact maintenance fees.” (Id.) On 9 June 17, 2025, Creekside filed a request for dismissal. (Id.) Despite dismissing the action, 10 Creekside continued to refuse Petitioner’s rent payments for seven months until Petitioner 11 paid his delinquent maintenance fees. (Id. at 2–3.) Petitioner began saving the monthly 12 rent payments and informed his Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing counselor of such. 13 (Id. at 2.) The counselor suggested that Petitioner contact the manager and arrange 14 payment of fees; however, the manager did not respond to Petitioner or his counselor. (Id.) 15 At an ex parte hearing on March 9, 2026, Petitioner told the state court that he could pay 16 rent, but the state court “still ordered the lock-out.” (Id. at 3.) 17 Petitioner “files this action in accordance with and pursuant to 42 USCS § 1940.8 18 and [California Civil] Code §2000a-3.” (Id. at 1.) The Court construes Petitioner’s claims 19 as causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 and California Civil Code § 1940.8. 20 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 21 Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., provides: “All 22 persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 23 privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . 24 without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national 25 origin.” Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC, No. 24-CV-01278-TSH, 2024 WL 26 2971669, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)). “Section 2000a- 27 3 creates a private cause of action to enforce § 2000a,” of which “[o]nly injunctive and 28 declaratory relief (and attorney’s fees) may be awarded.” Evans v. Holiday Inns, 951 F. 1 Supp. 85, 86 (Dist. Md. 1997) (citation omitted). Here, Petitioner fails to establish that 2 Creekside is a place of public accommodation, and he has not alleged that he faced 3 discrimination or segregation based on his race, color, religion, or national origin from 4 either Respondent. Thus, Petitioner does not sufficiently assert a claim under § 2000a-3. 5 Additionally, § 2000a-3(c) requires plaintiffs to “give written notice of the alleged 6 act of discrimination to the appropriate state or local agency if the state has a law 7 prohibiting the alleged conduct,” which California does. Floyd, 2024 WL 2971669, at *8. 8 (citing Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 52). Petitioner may not “file suit under § 2000a until 30 days 9 after he files written notice of the alleged discrimination.” Id. Petitioner does not allege 10 that he followed this jurisdictional requirement, and thus, Petitioner’s claim may be 11 defective. Id. (citation omitted). For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES Petitioner’s § 12 2000a-3 claim. 13 2. California Civil Code § 1940.8 14 The Court does not have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s section 1940.8 claim—a state 15 law claim. Federal question jurisdiction applies only to the federal law claim, which is 16 now dismissed. Plaintiff has the burden to show the Court also has jurisdiction over the 17 section 1940.8 claim, either through supplemental or diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff fails 18 to sufficiently allege either. 19 Further, section 1940.8 provides that “[a] landlord of a residential dwelling unit shall 20 provide each new tenant that occupies the unit with a copy of the notice provided by a 21 registered structural pest control company . . . , if a contract for periodic pest control service 22 has been executed.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1940.8. The Petition does not allege there exists a 23 contract for periodic pest control service or that Creekside failed to provide notice as 24 required by section 1940.8. Thus, the Court also DISMISSES this claim. 25 III. CONCLUSION 26 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s application to proceed IFP 27 and DISMISSES the Petition with leave to amend. Petitioner may file a First Amended 28 1 || Petition to cure the defects described above no later than twenty one (21) days from the 2 || date this Order is entered. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: March 23, 2026 2» ; fr, Yn « LA4\ Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28