Penny Ross and Rodney Ross v. FCA US, LLC, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Anthony J. Battaglia (author)
Analysis
The court considered a motion by plaintiffs' counsel to withdraw from representation due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and the plaintiffs' failure to communicate. The court granted the motion, ordered counsel to withdraw, and gave the plaintiffs 21 days to retain new counsel or proceed pro se.
| What the court decided | Standard it applied | The model |
|---|---|---|
Motion to Withdraw Granted“The Motion to Withdraw (Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED. SLP and attorneys Rabiya F. Tirmizi, Tionna Carvalho, and Elizabeth A. LaRocque are withdrawn as counsel of record in this action.” | abuse of discretion | agree with court The court correctly applied the four-factor test for withdrawal of counsel. The record establishes that the attorney-client relationship had broken down due to the plaintiffs' unresponsiveness (15 calls, 17 emails), which constitutes 'good cause' under ABA Model Rule 1.16(b). The court properly noted that the defendant did not oppose the motion, the case was in its early stages (no scheduling order), and the plaintiffs had been given ample notice and opportunity to respond, thereby minimizing prejudice and harm to the administration of justice. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally and substantively sound. It correctly identifies the standard of review (abuse of discretion) and the applicable ethical framework (ABA Model Rules via federal inherent power). The court explicitly applies the four-factor test for withdrawal, addressing each factor with specific facts from the record (unresponsiveness, lack of opposition, early stage of litigation, and notice provided). The reliance on district court precedent within the same district is appropriate for this procedural matter.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PENNY ROSS AND RODNEY ROSS, Case No.: 25-cv-3242-AJB-BLM 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiffs, WITHDRAW 13 v. 14 (Doc. No. 13) FCA US, LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Before the Court is a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs Penny Ross and 18 Rodney Ross (“Plaintiffs”) filed by Plaintiffs’ counsel Attorney Rabiya Tirmizi and the 19 law firm Strategic Legal Practices, APC (“SLP”).1 (Doc. No. 13.) Defendant FCA US, 20 LLC (“FCA”) does not oppose the motion to withdraw. (Doc. No. 19.) The Court finds the 21 matter suitable for decision on the papers and without oral argument, pursuant to Local 22 Civil Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons stated herein, the motion to withdraw is GRANTED. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendant Haddad Dodge Ram (“Dodge”) and 25 Defendant FCA on March 5, 2025, in San Diego Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1-2.) Plaintiffs 26 27 28 1 voluntarily dismissed Dodge on November 3, 2025. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) After Plaintiff 2 dismissed Dodge, FCA removed this matter to federal court alleging diversity jurisdiction. 3 (Doc. No. 1.) 4 SLP filed the instant motion to withdraw as counsel on February 11, 2026. (Doc. 5 No. 13.) SLP states that “a complete and irreparable breakdown of the attorney-client 6 relationship has occurred that has made it unreasonably difficult for SLP to carry out the 7 representation effectively.” (Doc. No. 13 at 5.) According to the declaration of Rabiya 8 Tirmizi, SLP attempted numerous times to communicate with Plaintiffs, including fifteen 9 (15) phone calls and seventeen (17) emails. (Id.; Declaration of Rabiya Tirmizi (“Tirmizi 10 Decl.”) ¶ 4.) However, Plaintiffs have not responded to SLP. (Doc. No. 13 at 6; Tirmizi 11 Decl. ¶ 5.) 12 On February 12, 2026, the Court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff Penny Ross to 13 respond to SLP’s motion to withdraw by no later than February 20, 2026. (Doc. No. 15.) 14 The Court ordered Ms. Ross to state whether she consents to or opposes SLP’s request to 15 withdraw. (Id.) The Court also required Ms. Ross to address whether she is prepared to 16 pursue her claims and whether she intends to proceed pro se or retain substitute counsel. 17 (Id.) The Court warned Ms. Ross that failing to file a response to SLP’s Motion would 18 result in the Court issuing an Order to Show Cause why this matter should not be dismissed 19 for failure to prosecute. (Id.) Ms. Ross’s deadline to respond the SLP’s Motion passed and 20 the Court received no communication from Plaintiffs. (Id.) Thus, on March 2, 2026, the 21 Court issued and Order to Show Cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for 22 failure to prosecute. (Doc. No. 20.) Plaintiffs’ deadline to respond to the Order to Show 23 Cause has now passed as well and the Court still has not received any communication from 24 Plaintiffs. (Id.) A Show Cause Hearing is scheduled for April 16, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. (Id.) 25 Ms. Ross must appear in person at the Show Cause Hearing. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 Granting or denying a motion to be relieved as counsel is within the discretion of the 28 district court. See United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing 1 denial of motion to be relieved as counsel for abuse of discretion); In re Saber, No. 2 21-55913, 2022 WL 11592836, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2022). An attorney of record may 3 not withdraw as counsel except by leave of court. Beard v. Shuttermart of Cal., Inc., 4 No. 07-cv-594-WQH-LS, 2008 WL 410694, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008). In exercising 5 its discretion, courts commonly consider the following factors when determining whether 6 counsel should be permitted to withdraw: 7 (1) the reasons why withdrawal is sought; (2) the prejudice withdrawal may cause to other litigants; (3) the harm withdrawal might cause to the 8 administration of justice; and (4) the degree to which withdrawal will delay 9 the resolution of the case. 10 Id., at *2. 11 In a federal proceeding, a lawyer’s conduct, including his or her duties to their client, 12 is governed by the ethical rules of the relevant court. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 13 n.6 (1985) (“The state code of professional responsibility does not by its own terms apply 14 to sanctions in the federal courts. Federal courts admit and suspend attorneys as an exercise 15 of their inherent power; the standards imposed are a matter of federal law.”). “When an 16 attorney appears before a federal court, he is acting as an officer of that court, and it is that 17 court which must judge his conduct.” Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964). 18 “Absent specific ethical standards from case law, court rules, and adopted rules of 19 professional conduct, see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 645, ‘those standards promulgated by 20 the American Bar Association’ (“ABA”) offer ‘appropriate guidance for finding the current 21 national standards of ethical norms.’” Suarez v. Del Toro, No. 22-CV-0021-GPC-BLM, 22 2023 WL 149105 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2023) (quoting In re Mitchell, 901 F.2d 1179, 1184 23 (3d Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the Court looks to the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 24 Conduct. See Mitchell, 901 F.2d at 1184; see also Suarez, 2023 WL 149105, at *2 (looking 25 to the ABA Model Rules, rather than the California Rules of Professional Conduct, when 26 analyzing a motion to be relieved as counsel in the Southern District of California). 27 28 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 As a preliminary matter, in the Southern District of California, “[a] motion to 3 withdraw as attorney of record must be served on the adverse party and on the moving 4 attorney’s client.” CivLR 83.3.f.3. “A declaration pertaining to such service must be filed” 5 and failure to “serve as required by [CivLR 83.3] or to file the required declaration of 6 service will result in a denial of the motion.” Id. Here, Counsel has met the notice 7 requirement. (See Doc. No. 14) 8 Turning to the merits of the motion to withdraw, SLP argues there has been a 9 “complete and irreparable breakdown of the attorney-client relationship.” (Doc. No. 13 10 at 5.) And despite dozens of attempts to contact Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have been 11 unresponsive. Under ABA Model Rule 1.16(b), an attorney may withdraw from 12 representation when “the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer 13 regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will 14 withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled.” Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.16(b)(5) 15 (Am. Bar. Ass’n, 1983) (last amended April 14, 2020). Additionally, an attorney may 16 withdraw if representation “has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client,” or if 17 “other good cause for withdrawal exists.” Id. at r. 1.16(b)(6)&(7). 18 The Court finds good cause for withdrawal exists. Plaintiffs have ceased 19 communicating with their counsel rendering it unreasonably difficult for SLP to effectively 20 continue representation. See Osgood v. Main Streat Mktg., LLC, No. 16-cv-2415-GPC- 21 BGS, 2017 WL 7362740, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017) (granting motion to withdraw 22 due to defendants refusing to communicate with counsel); see also McPhail v. FCA US, 23 LLC, No. 24-cv-1879-WQH-DDL, 2025 WL 674602 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) (granting 24 motion to withdraw when there was “a complete and irreparable breakdown of the 25 attorney-client relationship . . . ma[king] it unreasonably difficult . . . to carry out the 26 representation effectively[.]”). 27 Moreover, FCA filed a response to the motion indicating that it does not oppose the 28 withdrawal. ECF No. 19. And Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the withdrawal. It thus 1 appears that the withdrawal will not prejudice any of the litigants. Also, because the case 2 is still in its early stages—the Court has yet to issue a scheduling order and there are no 3 deadlines currently pending—there will be no unnecessary delays caused by the 4 withdrawal. 5 The only potential harm to the administration of justice the Court can identify is the 6 potential that Plaintiffs proceed pro se. But Plaintiffs have known about counsel’s intent to 7 withdraw since at least February 11, 2026, when Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the instant motion 8 and served it on Plaintiffs. (See Doc. Nos. 13; 14.) Plaintiffs have had ample notice of the 9 withdrawal, and the Court has afforded Plaintiffs the opportunity to respond to the motion 10 on two separate occasions. (Doc. Nos. 15; 20.) To-date, Plaintiffs have failed to oppose, or 11 otherwise respond to, the motion to withdraw. Accordingly, the withdrawal will not harm 12 the administration of justice. 13 The Court concludes that SLP has demonstrated sufficient reasons to be relieved as 14 counsel. The Court also concludes that the withdrawal will not prejudice Plaintiffs, harm 15 the administration of justice, or delay resolution of the case. Accordingly, the Court finds 16 that withdrawal is appropriate here. See, e.g., Gurvey v. Legend Films, Inc., No. 09-cv-942- 17 IEG-BGS, 2010 WL 2756944, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 12, 2010) (granting motion to withdraw 18 where good cause existed, the case was “still in its infancy” with “no immediately 19 scheduled hearings,” and the plaintiff had ample notice of counsel’s intent to withdraw); 20 see also McPhail, 2025 WL 674602, at *1 (granting motion to withdraw where the plaintiff 21 ceased communicating with counsel). 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 24 1. The Motion to Withdraw (Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED. SLP and attorneys 25 Rabiya F. Tirmizi, Tionna Carvalho, and Elizabeth A. LaRocque are withdrawn as counsel 26 of record in this action. 27 2. Plaintiffs have twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order to obtain new 28 counsel and have counsel file a notice of appearance. If no notice of appearance is filed, 1 Court will deem Plaintiffs as proceeding pro se. “A party proceeding pro se must keep 2 Court and opposing parties advised as to current address.” CivLR 83.11(b). “Failure to 3 ||comply [ ] may be ground|[s] for dismissal...” CivLR 83.11(a). 4 3. Plaintiffs are again cautioned that there is a show cause hearing scheduled for 5 || April 16, 2026. (Doc. No. 20.) If Plaintiffs fail to appear, in person, at the hearing, this 6 ||matter will be terminated for failure to prosecute. See id.; see also CivLR 83.11 (“Any 7 || person who is appearing propria persona, (without an attorney) (1.e. pro se) must appear 8 || personally for such purpose and may not delegate that duty to any other person, including 9 || husband or wife, or another party on the same side appearing without an attorney.”) 10 4. No later than seven (7) days from the entry of this Order, SLP shall file a 11 certificate of service indicating that it has served Plaintiffs with a copy of this Order. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: March 24, 2026 M4 Hon, Anthony J. attaglia 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28