gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-01151 · 2026-03-23 · Unknown

Emanuel Culutue Domingos v. Jeremy Casey, Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Barry T. Moskowitz (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:37Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a habeas petition by an Angolan asylum seeker detained for fourteen months under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) without a bond hearing. The court granted the petition in part, ordering an individualized bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge, and denied the request for immediate release without prejudice.

What the court decidedThe model
Petition for writ of habeas corpus granted in part
“For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED IN PART.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the Due Process Clause to § 1225(b)(1) detention, following the prevailing view in the Ninth Circuit and district courts that indefinite detention without a bond hearing violates due process. The application of the Banda factors to the specific facts (14 months detention, government-caused delays due to lack of interpreter) supports the finding of a violation.
Order for individualized bond hearing
“The Respondent is ordered to grant Domingos an individualized bond hearing before a fair, neutral, and open-minded immigration judge in accordance with the requirements ordered above.”
agree with court
The remedy is consistent with Singh v. Holder and subsequent Ninth Circuit precedent requiring bond hearings for prolonged detention. The specific procedural safeguards (neutral judge, burden of proof on government) are appropriate.
Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied in part (release without bond hearing)
“The remedy of release without a bond hearing is DENIED without prejudice.”
agree with court
Denying immediate release in favor of a bond hearing is the standard remedy in these cases, as the court's role is to ensure due process is followed, not to act as the immigration judge determining flight risk or danger.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standard (Due Process applies to § 1225(b)(1) detention), distinguishes contrary or limiting precedents (Mezei, Barrera-Echavarria), and applies a well-established multi-factor test (Banda) to the specific facts. The finding that government-caused delays (lack of interpreter) weigh in favor of the petitioner is supported by the record and Ninth Circuit law. The remedy ordered is consistent with binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Singh).

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EMANUEL CULUTUE DOMINGOS, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01151-BTM-JLB 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 15 JEREMY CASEY, Warden, Imperial [ECF NO. 1] Regional Detention Facility, 16 Respondent. 17 18 19 Pending before the Court is Emanuel Culutue Domingos’s amended petition for a 20 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated below, the 21 Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the petition and orders the Respondent 22 to provide him with an individualized bond hearing before a fair, neutral, and open-minded 23 immigration judge. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Domingos entered the United States on January 11, 2025, to seek asylum. (ECF No. 26 7-1 (“I-213”), at 2–3; ECF No. 8, Ex. A (“Decl.”), ¶ 7.) He was detained by a Border Patrol 27 Agent twenty miles west of the Calexico Port of Entry. (I-213, 2–3.) Domingos admitted 28 that he was an Angolan citizen who lacked legal entry documents and had crossed the 1 border without being inspected by an immigration officer. (Id. at 3.) Border Patrol began 2 processing Domingos for expedited removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (See id.) 3 An asylum officer later interviewed Domingos to determine if he had a credible fear 4 of persecution or torture. (ECF No. 7 (“Return”), at 2.) Because Domingos’s primary 5 language is Chokwe, the interview was not completed. (Id.) On January 30, 2025, 6 Domingos was given a Notice to Appear form, which placed him in Section 1229a removal 7 proceedings. (Id.) The immigration court was unable to find a Chokwe interpreter for 8 Domingos’s master-calendar hearing on February 11, 2025, so his hearing was continued. 9 (Id.) Each subsequent hearing was continued until March 9, 2026. (See id.; Decl., ¶ 9.) 10 Domingos filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus on February 17, 2026. (ECF 11 No. 1 (“Pet.”).) He is detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility. (Decl., ¶ 13.) 12 He has been in custody for about fourteen months. (Id. ¶ 10.) There is no evidence in the 13 record that Domingos has received a bond hearing. 14 II. DISCUSSION 15 A. Merits 16 The Petitioner claims the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 17 unreasonably prolonged immigration detention without a bond hearing. (Pet., 6.) The 18 Respondent claims that the Petitioner is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). 19 (Return, 3–5.) He claims that noncitizens1 detained under this statute do not have a Due 20 Process right against prolonged detention. (Id. at 5–8.) Furthermore, the Respondent urges 21 the Court to reject the Petitioner’s Due Process claim on the merits because it is not 22 unconstitutionally prolonged. (Id. at 8–10.) 23 The Petitioner does not contest that he is detained under Section 1225(b)(1). (ECF 24 No. 8 (“Traverse”), at 1.) The issue is whether the Petitioner has a right against prolonged 25 detention and, if he does, whether that right was violated by the Respondent. 26 // 27 1 This order uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” 8 U.S.C. 28 1 i. Due Process under Section 1225(b)(1) 2 The facts and legal arguments are similar to those presented in the Court’s recent 3 decision, Amandeep v. LaRose, 2026 WL 684654 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026). The Court 4 adopts Amandeep’s reasoning and applies it here. 5 The Court holds that the Due Process clause prohibits unreasonably prolonged 6 detention without a bond hearing. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This 7 protection extends to those detained under Section 1225, such as the Petitioner. Kydyrali 8 v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of 9 courts across the country in concluding that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 10 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). 11 The Court further holds that the holding of Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 12 Mezei does not apply to this case. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). The petitioner in Mezei had been 13 deemed “a threat to national security.” Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 413–14 14 (6th Cir. 2003). Because the Petitioner here has not received a bond hearing, there has 15 been no determination that he is a danger to national security. The Court also finds 16 unpersuasive the Respondent’s argument that Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison binds this 17 Court to find that noncitizens “have no substantive right to be free from immigration 18 detention.” 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute, Immigration 19 Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009– 20 546, as recognized in Xi v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 298 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th 21 Cir. 2002). “[T]he constitutionality of ‘indefinite’ or ‘permanent’ detention with no 22 prospect of release” was not at issue in Barrera-Echavarria as it is here. Id. at 1450. 23 Having found that the Petitioner has a right against prolonged detention, the Court 24 must determine whether the Petitioner’s detention is so prolonged as to violate the Due 25 Process clause. 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 ii. Prolonged Detention 2 When deciding whether a petitioner’s continued detention would violate the Due 3 Process clause, many district courts have looked to the factors articulated in Banda v. 4 McAleenan: 5 (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal 6 proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings 7 cause [sic] by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.” 8 9 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. 10 Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D. Minn. 2019)). The Court finds it appropriate to apply the Banda 11 test to the Petitioner’s detention as other decisions in this district have done. See, e.g., 12 Sandesh v. LaRose, 2026 WL 622690 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026). 13 The first and “most important factor,” length of detention, favors the Petitioner. 14 Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. The Petitioner has been detained for fourteen months, a 15 length of time beyond what many courts have found unreasonable. See Abdul Kadir v. 16 LaRose, 2025 WL 2932654, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (collecting cases). The Court 17 agrees with the Respondent that the length of a petitioner’s detention does not, by itself, 18 justify granting habeas relief. “But neither does that length of detention serve as a safe 19 harbor or insulate Petitioner’s case from constitutional review.” Sadeqi v. LaRose, 2025 20 WL 3154520, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025). 21 The second factor, likely duration of future detention, considers “the anticipated 22 duration of all removal proceedings—including administrative and judicial appeals.” 23 Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (quoting Jamal A., 358 F. Supp. at 859). The Petitioner 24 has not been scheduled for an asylum merits hearing that would follow a master-calendar 25 hearing. If his claim is denied at a future merits hearing, he will appeal that decision to the 26 Board of Immigration Appeals, and potentially then to the United States Court of Appeals 27 for the Ninth Circuit. (See Decl., ¶ 12.) This process may take years. See Banda, 385 F. 28 Supp. 3d at 1119. The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of the Petitioner. 1 The third factor, conditions of detention, is neutral. “The more that the conditions 2 under which the noncitizen is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger his 3 argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. The 4 Petitioner’s declaration states that he is not sleeping well, cannot communicate with his 5 family, experiences racism, and feels “sad and depressed.” (Decl., ¶ 13.) This differs from 6 descriptions of confinement that the Court has found to resemble penal confinement. See, 7 e.g., Amandeep, 2026 WL 684654 (“[Petitioner] is ‘locked behind razor wire and concrete,’ 8 wears a ‘color-coded jump suit,’ . . . and is ‘guarded at all times with guards authorized to 9 punish [him] for violations of the rules.’” (quoting Petitioner’s Decl., ¶ 10)). Without 10 further information, the Court cannot determine whether the Petitioner’s detention 11 resembles penal confinement. 12 The fourth and fifth factors consider the nature and extent of the delays caused by 13 the parties. The Petitioner argues that the Respondent has delayed his credible fear 14 assessment and removal hearings for more than a year by failing to find a Chokwe 15 interpreter. (Traverse, 10–11.) The Court agrees. The burden is on the Respondent to 16 provide an interpreter for the Petitioner’s immigration proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. 17 § 208.30(d)(5) (“If the alien is unable to proceed effectively in English, and if the asylum 18 officer is unable to proceed competently in a language the alien speaks and understands, 19 the asylum officer shall arrange for the assistance of an interpreter in conducting the 20 interview.” (emphasis added)); cf. Perez-Lastor v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 208 21 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000) (“If an alien does not speak English, deportation proceedings 22 must be translated into a language the alien understands.”). Because the Government could 23 not find an interpreter, the Petitioner’s immigration proceedings were continued. 24 Accordingly, these factors favor the Petitioner. 25 The sixth factor, the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final 26 order of removal, is neutral. The Court “is in no position to judge the likelihood of success” 27 of the Petitioner’s claim for asylum. Sandesh, 2026 WL 622690. 28 1 The first, second, and combined fourth and fifth factors favor the Petitioner. The 2 third and sixth factors are neutral. Taken together, the Court finds that the Petitioner’s 3 prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process clause of the Fifth 4 Amendment. 5 B. Relief 6 To remedy the violation of the Petitioner’s Due Process rights, the Court is ordering 7 an individualized bond hearing with additional safeguards. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 8 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that noncitizens “facing prolonged detention” are 9 “entitled to a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge.”). The remedy of release 10 without a bond hearing is denied without prejudice. 11 The bond hearing must be before a fair, neutral, and open-minded immigration judge 12 who is ordered to determine whether the Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight 13 risk and what bond conditions, if any, would be appropriate to ensure the Petitioner’s 14 appearance. During the bond hearing, the Respondent shall bear the burden of establishing 15 by clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk. See 16 Sandesh, 2026 WL 622690, at *5 (“[I]t [is] appropriate to continue to apply the standard 17 set forth in Singh in the case of bond hearings for those subjected to prolonged detention 18 under § 1225(b) to protect the critical liberty interest and due process rights of such 19 individuals.”). If the immigration judge denies bond, the judge must make specific findings 20 as to why the Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. 21 III. CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED IN 23 PART. The Respondent is ordered to grant Domingos an individualized bond hearing 24 before a fair, neutral, and open-minded immigration judge in accordance with the 25 requirements ordered above. The hearing must be held no later than April 6, 2026. The 26 remedy of release without a bond hearing is DENIED without prejudice. 27 The parties shall file a joint statement as to compliance with this writ and order and 28 the result of the bond hearing by 5 p.m. on April 7, 2026. The Court retains jurisdiction to 1 || enforce the writ. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: March 23, 2026 _ , 4 Honordé Barry Ted ti bar 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28