Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LUJUN WANG, Case No.: 26-cv-1133-JES-BJW 12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT 15 Respondents. PREJUDICE; and 16 (2) DENYING MOTION TO 17 VACATE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AS MOOT 18 19 [ECF Nos. 6, 11] 20 21 Before the Court is Petitioner Lujun Wang’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of 22 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 6. Pursuant to the Court’s Order to 23 Show Cause (ECF No. 8), Respondents filed a return and Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF 24 Nos. 9-10. After due consideration and for the reasons below, the Court DENIES 25 WITHOUT PREJUDICE the petition. The Court also DENIES AS MOOT 26 Respondents’ motion to vacate the Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 11. 27 // 28 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a native of China, and crossed into the United States on February 4, 3 2023. ECF No. 6 at 3. He was apprehended and placed into removal proceedings. ECF No. 4 9 at 1-2. On February 8, 2023, he was released on his own recognizance. Id. Since his 5 release, he has been living in Los Angeles, applied for asylum, obtained a work permit, and 6 has a social security number and driver’s license. ECF No. 6 at 3. 7 On May 29, 2025, after he dropped an Uber customer off in San Diego, he was 8 apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. Id. At that time, 9 he alleges that he was never given any reasons for his detention, nor provided any notice 10 or opportunity to contest his detention. Id. He has since been held at Otay Mesa Detention 11 Center. Id. 12 While he was in detention, on October 3, 2025, Petitioner requested and was granted 13 voluntary departure. Id.; ECF No. 9 at 2. Subsequently, on October 26, 2025, Petitioner 14 filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, which was granted but resulted now in a final 15 order of removal. Id. 16 Based on these facts, Petitioner raises two claims. First, Petitioner argues that 17 Respondents violated procedural due process in the manner that he was re-detained due to 18 his preexisting parole. ECF No. 6 at 4-7. Second, Petitioner argues that removal is not 19 likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 8-12. 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 22 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 23 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 24 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 25 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 26 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 27 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 28 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 1 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 2 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 3 of a district court’s habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 4 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 Respondents argue that with a final order of removal, Petitioner is now detained 7 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. ECF No. 9 at 2. Due to the unique procedural posture of this case 8 resulting in the final order of removal during the pendency of Petitioner’s current detention, 9 the Court agrees. 10 Petitioner was previously released on his own recognizance (“OREC”). Courts have 11 recognized that typically, the term “released on their own recognizance” or “OREC” refers 12 to conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). J.S.H.M v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 13 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025); see also Ortega-Cervantes 14 v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the 15 phrase ‘released on recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 16 1226(a)”). When Petitioner was detained in May 2025, within the borders of the United 17 States, courts have held that such detention is still governed by § 1226. See Salcedo Aceros 18 v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 19 2025) (holding § 1226 applies to petitioner who was paroled into the country on her own 20 recognizance); Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924, at *8 (D. 21 Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (same); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 22 2371588, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (same). 23 However, once an immigration court enters a final order of removal, § 1231 governs 24 the detention. Under this provision, the government “shall remove the alien from the United 25 States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(a)(2)(A). The government 26 shall detain the alien in custody during the initial 90-day removal period by statute. Id. In 27 Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that when the government is unable to remove an alien 28 within 90 days, the alien may seek review of the reasonableness of their continued 1 detention under the due process clause through petition for writ of habeas corpus. 533 U.S. 2 at 687. The Court instructed courts to analyze whether continued detention beyond the 90- 3 day period “exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal,” based on “the 4 [removal detention] statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the 5 moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court has held that it is presumptively reasonable for 6 the government to detain an alien for a period of 6 months while it works to effectuate his 7 removal after issuing a final order of removal against him. Id. at 701. Beyond that period, 8 “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention 9 unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute” and grant the petition for writ of habeas 10 corpus. Id. at 699-700. 11 It is not disputed that there is now a final order of removal against Petitioner. Thus, 12 detention is now governed by § 1231 by statute. The Court finds that the issues raised in 13 the petition related to the validity of detention under § 1226 are no longer properly before 14 it. Under the § 1231 framework as outlined above, Petitioner’s removal period clock started 15 on October 26, 2025, when his removal became final. Thus, to date, his detention period is 16 just under five months, which is still within the presumptively reasonable period articulated 17 in Zadvydas. 18 Accordingly, at this time, the Court must DENY Petitioner’s petition. The denial, 19 however, is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner refiling should his detention post- 20 removal detention extend past the 6-month period of presumptive reasonableness. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES the Petition without prejudice. 23 In light of this ruling, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Respondents’ motion to vacate the 24 order to show cause. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // I The Clerk is directed to close the case. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 || Dated: March 20, 2026 5 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 «