Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALEIXI RODRIGUEZ ESTEVEZ, Case No.: 3:26-cv-1038-CAB-SBC 12 Petitioner, ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner Aleixi Rodriguez Estevez’s petition for a writ of 18 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] Petitioner claims 19 he is being detained by immigration authorities in violation of the Fifth Amendment. [Id. 20 at 6–8.] He seeks immediate release or, at minimum, a bond hearing before a neutral 21 decisionmaker. [Id. at 8.] For the reasons below, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the 22 request for a writ of habeas corpus and ORDERS that Petitioner receive an individualized 23 bond hearing. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner is a Cuban citizen who entered the United States without inspection near 26 Key West, Florida on December 22, 2024. [Doc. No. 4 at 2.] He was determined to be an 27 inadmissible arriving alien, placed into removal proceedings, and taken into Immigration 28 1 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). [Id.] He has 2 remained in custody since then. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks 5 to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may 6 grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the 7 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” The petitioner bears the burden of 8 demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-BJC- 9 BJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Jurisdiction 12 Respondent challenges this Court’s jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). [Doc. 13 No. 4 at 4–5.] This Court and innumerable others have repeatedly rejected the same 14 jurisdictional argument under similar factual scenarios. Because Petitioner challenges the 15 legality of his detention and not the decision to commence proceedings, the adjudication 16 of his removal case, or any action to execute a removal order, the Court rejects 17 Respondent’s jurisdictional arguments by adopting and incorporating by reference the 18 same reasoning expressed in Chavez v. Noem, 801 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1138–39 (S.D. Cal. 19 2025). 20 B. Due Process Claim 21 Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing—nearly fifteen 22 months—violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. [Petition at 6.] Respondent 23 counters that the relevant statutory language of § 1225(b)(2) and Supreme Court precedent 24 require Petitioner’s detention until his removal proceedings are resolved. [Doc. No. 4 at 25 5–10.] Respondent cites to Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 26 103, 138–40 (2020) to argue that Petitioner has no due process rights beyond those afforded 27 by statute. [Id. at 7.] The Court has previously discussed that while Supreme Court 28 precedent does establish that the statutory language of § 1225(b) mandates detention, the 1 Supreme Court did not decide the constitutional question of whether indefinite detention 2 is permitted. See L.R.G. v. LaRose, 3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13 at 5–6 (S.D. 3 Cal. Jan. 16, 2026). 4 As to the constitutional question, this Court recently held in L.R.G. that a due process 5 violation may occur when § 1225(b) results in practically indefinite civil detention. 3:25- 6 CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13, at *6; see Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F.Supp.3d 768, 772 7 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding 8 that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an 9 individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). Respondents’ position has also been 10 questioned by the Ninth Circuit: 11 We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our 12 democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation 13 of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our American government. “[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial 14 or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Civil detention violates 15 due process outside of “certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances.” 16 17 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted) 18 (alteration in original). 19 Though there is no brightline test for a violation, this Court and many others have 20 used the Banda test which considers the following six factors to determine when detention 21 under § 1225(b) violates due process: (1) the total length of detention to date, which is the 22 most important factor; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of 23 detention; (4) delays in removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in removal 24 proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings 25 will result in a final order of removal. Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F.Supp.3d 1099, 1106 26 (W.D. Wash. 2019). 27 The first factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor given that he has been detained for over 28 a year. See Sibomana v. LaRose, No. 22-CV-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D. 1 Cal. Apr. 20, 2023) (finding that courts are typically wary of continued custody without a 2 bond hearing when detention extends beyond one year). Regarding the second factor, 3 which consists of the “anticipated duration of all removal proceedings—including 4 administrative and judicial appeals[,]” Petitioner has a final merits hearing scheduled for 5 May 11, 2026. [See Doc. No 4 at 9.] Accordingly, the second factor slightly favors 6 Respondent, as Petitioner’s hearing is scheduled but still months away. As to the third 7 Banda factor, Petitioner’s confinement is similar to penal confinement because, as the 8 Court explained with respect to the petitioner in L.R.G., who was also detained at Otay 9 Mesa Detention Center, Petitioner is detained “in a secure facility, guarded by armed 10 personnel, and has restricted access to outdoor space, activities, and communication.” No. 11 3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13, at *8 (S.D. Cal. January 16, 2026). Thus, the 12 third factor favors Petitioner 13 As to the fourth and fifth factors, Petitioner states that his “detention is [e]xcessive 14 and no longer serves a legitimate civil immigration purpose.” [Petition at 8.] Respondent 15 does not provide any explanation for the delay or argue that Petitioner contributed to the 16 delay. [Doc. No. 4 at 9.] Given Respondent’s lack of explanation for its own delay, the 17 fourth and fifth factors weigh in favor of Petitioner. Finally, the Court finds the sixth factor 18 neutral as it is unclear what the result of Petitioner’s removal proceedings will be. 19 In sum, factors one (the most important), three, four, and five weigh for Petitioner, 20 while factor two slightly weighs against him, and factor six is neutral. The Court thus 21 concludes that Petitioner’s continued mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) without a 22 bond hearing violates his right to due process. Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and 23 individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// I IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s prolonged detention without 3 |}a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court 4 therefore PARTIALLY GRANTS the writ of habeas corpus and ORDERS Respondent 5 ||to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing by April 1, 2026. The Clerk of the 6 ||Court shall close the case on April 10, 2026 unless the Court is notified that the bond 7 || hearing did not occur. 8 It is SO ORDERED. 9 || Dated: March 19, 2026 10 — Gb Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28