Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JESSIE ADAMS, Case No.: 26-CV-416 JLS (MSB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING APPLICATION TO 14 SERGIO JIMENEZ, PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT 15 Defendant. WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS; AND 16 17 (2) SCREENING COMPLAINT 18 (ECF Nos. 1, 2). 19 20 21 Presently before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Jessie Adams’s Complaint (“Compl.,” 22 ECF No. 1) and Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs 23 (“IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 2). Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Complaint and the law, 24 the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint 25 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 2 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 4 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee 5 only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a)(1). 7 Section 1915(a)(1) provides: 8 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or 9 proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, 10 by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay 11 such fees or give security therefor. 12 13 As § 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to warrant 14 IFP status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. See 15 Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1915 typically 16 requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the 17 affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other grounds 18 by, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where 19 it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 20 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont 21 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely destitute to 22 obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 23 1960). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 24 particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 28 Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 1 In Plaintiff’s IFP Application, Plaintiff states that his monthly income is $1,050.00. 2 IFP App. at 1. Plaintiff lists no assets or employer, savings of $50, and states his monthly 3 expenses total $1,000.00. See generally id. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has 4 adequately demonstrated that paying the $405 filing fee would result in his inability to 5 afford the necessities of life. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application. 6 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 7 I. Legal Standard 8 Because Plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer 9 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 10 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are 11 not limited to prisoners”); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) 12 (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an 13 [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). Under this statute, the Court sua sponte must 14 dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, 15 or seeks damages from immune defendants. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. “The 16 purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 17 bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 18 2014) (citations omitted). 19 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 20 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 21 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 22 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain 23 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 24 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 25 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff 26 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 27 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility requires pleading facts 28 supporting a claim for relief, as opposed to conclusory allegations or the “formulaic 1 recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The “mere 2 possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 3 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; 4 see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 5 Independently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires pleadings to state “a short 6 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. 8(d)(1). 8 Rule 8 “applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of 9 Rule 12(b)(6).” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 10 A complaint which is “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely 11 irrelevant” does not meet Rule 8’s requirement of simplicity, directness, and clarity. Id. 12 at 1177–78. 13 Further, courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. See 14 Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). A district court 15 should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the 16 defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 17 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988)). 18 II. Discussion 19 Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant had ex parte communications with certain 20 individuals,” and that “Defendant conspired with others in violation of due process.” 21 Compl. at 1. Plaintiff does not provide any details about who Defendant is, what Defendant 22 did to violate Plaintiff’s rights, or any additional facts. Id. 23 Plaintiff’s allegations lack the requisite clarity to provide Defendants “fair notice of 24 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 25 (quotation and alteration omitted); see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178 (explaining that a 26 complaint lacking “simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom [a plaintiff is] suing for 27 what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint”). As the Complaint 28 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must sua sponte dismiss 1 || it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 2 However, as the nature of Plaintiffs claims is not fully comprehensible by the Court 3 || at this time, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that Plaintiff can plausibly allege facts 4 || addressing the deficiencies described in this Order. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff 5 || leave to amend his complaint. 6 CONCLUSION 7 In light of the above, the Court: 8 1) GRANTS Plaintiff's IFP Application (ECF No. 2). 9 2) DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE 10 || for its failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 11 1915(e)(2). Given Plaintiff's pro se status, the dismissal is WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 12 || Plaintiff thus has forty-five (45) days’ leave from the date of this Order to file an amended 13 ||complaint curing the pleading deficiencies noted above. Plaintiff is advised that an 14 ||}amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 15 || F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Any amended complaint must be complete in and of itself 16 || without reference to Plaintiffs original Complaint or FAC; claims not realleged in the 17 ||amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Lacey, 693 F.3d 18 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend that are not realleged in an 19 |/amended pleading may be “considered waived”). If Plaintiff fails to amend within the 20 || time provided, the Court will enter a final order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v. 21 || Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of 22 ||the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 23 ||complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 || Dated: March 19, 2026 .

27 United States District Judge 28