Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARTHUR LOPEZ, Case No.: 25-CV-2761 JLS (BLM)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING APPLICATION TO 14 COUNTY OF ORANGE, et al., PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT 15 Defendants. WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS, 16 17 (2) GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ELECTRONICALLY 18 FILE DOCUMENTS, 19 (3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 20 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, 21 (4) DENYING AS MOOT REQUEST 22 FOR APPOINTMENT OF 23 COUNSEL, AND 24 (5) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 25 TO HAVE THE COURT DIRECT US MARSHALS TO PROVIDE 26 SERVICE ON DEFENDANTS 27 (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). 28 1 Presently before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Arthur Lopez’s Complaint (“Compl.,” 2 ECF No. 1), Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs 3 (“IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 2), Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents (“E-File 4 Mot.,” ECF No. 3), Request for Appointment of Counsel (“Request for Counsel,” ECF No. 5 4), and Motion to Have the Court Direct US Marshals to Provide Service on Defendants 6 (“Service Mot.,” ECF No. 5). Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Complaint and the 7 law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application, GRANTS Plaintiff’s E-File Motion, 8 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, DENIES AS MOOT 9 Plaintiff’s Request for Counsel, and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Service. 10 IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 11 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 12 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 13 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee 14 only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1915(a)(1). 16 Section 1915(a)(1) provides: 17 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or 18 proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, 19 by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay 20 such fees or give security therefor. 21 22 As § 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to warrant 23 IFP status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. See 24 Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1915 typically 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 28 Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 1 requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the 2 affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other grounds 3 by, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where 4 it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 5 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont 6 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely destitute to 7 obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 8 1960). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 9 particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. 10 In Plaintiff’s IFP Application, Plaintiff states that his monthly income is $1,330.00. 11 IFP Appl. at 2. Plaintiff lists no employer, savings of $1, and states his monthly expenses 12 total $1,300.00. See generally id. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has adequately 13 demonstrated that paying the $405 filing fee would result in his inability to afford the 14 necessities of life. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application. 15 MOTION TO ELECTRONICALLY FILE DOCUMENTS 16 Plaintiff seeks permission to electronically file in this case. E-File Mot. at 1. 17 Generally, “[e]xcept as prescribed by local rule, order, or other procedure, the Court has 18 designated all cases to be assigned to the Electronic Filing System.” S.D. Cal. CivLR 19 5.4(a). With respect to pro se litigants, however, “[u]nless otherwise authorized by the 20 court, all documents submitted for filing to the Clerk’s Office . . . must be in legible, paper 21 form.” Office of the Clerk, United States District Court for the Southern District of 22 California, Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual, § 2(b) 23 (Sept. 24, 2025) [hereinafter “ECF Manual].2 “A pro se party seeking leave to 24 electronically file documents must file a motion and demonstrate the means to do so 25 properly by stating their equipment and software capabilities in addition to agreeing to 26 27 2 Available at: 28 https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/_assets/pdf/cmecf/Electronic%20Case%20Filing%20Procedures%20Ma 1 follow all rules and policies in the CM/ECF Administrative Policies and Procedures 2 Manual.” Id. 3 The ECF Manual refers to the Court’s official website for CM/ECF technical 4 specifications, id. § 1(i), which include a “[c]omputer running on Windows or Macintosh”; 5 “[s]oftware to convert documents from a word processor format to portable document 6 format (PDF),” such as “Adobe Acrobat 7.0 and higher”; “[i]nternet access supporting a 7 transfer rate of 56kb or higher”; a compatible browser, such as “Firefox 3.5, and Internet 8 Explorer 6.0 and 7.0”; a “[s]canner to image non-computerized documents 400 pixels per 9 inch (ppi)”; and a PACER account. United States District Court, Southern District of 10 California, CM/ECF Information: General Information, 11 https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/cmecf.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2025). 12 Here, Plaintiff has provided the required particulars about his access to technology 13 conforming to the CM/ECF technical specifications noted above, and Plaintiff has agreed 14 to be bound by the rules and policies in the ECF Manual. E-File Mot. at 1. Accordingly, 15 the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s E-File Motion. 16 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 17 I. Legal Standard 18 Because Plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer 19 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 20 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are 21 not limited to prisoners”); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) 22 (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an 23 [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). Under this statute, the Court sua sponte must 24 dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, 25 or seeks damages from immune defendants. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. “The 26 purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 27 bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 28 2014) (citations omitted). 1 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 2 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 3 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 4 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain 5 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 6 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff 8 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 9 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility requires pleading facts 10 supporting a claim for relief, as opposed to conclusory allegations or the “formulaic 11 recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The “mere 12 possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 13 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; 14 see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 15 Independently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires pleadings to state “a short 16 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. 8(d)(1). 18 Rule 8 “applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of 19 Rule 12(b)(6).” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 20 A complaint which is “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely 21 irrelevant” does not meet Rule 8’s requirement of simplicity, directness, and clarity. Id. 22 at 1177–78. 23 Further, courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. See 24 Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). A district court 25 should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the 26 defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 27 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988)). 28 / / / 1 II. Discussion 2 Plaintiff appears to bring claims for: (1) violations under the California Tort Claims 3 Act; (2) tortious interference; (3) negligence; (4) violations under the Americans with 4 Disabilities Act; (5) fraud; (6) civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; 5 (7) infliction of emotional distress; (8) violations under the California Unruh Civil Rights 6 Act; and (9) violations under the Bane Act. ECF 1-1 at 1–4. 7 Plaintiff’s allegations lack the requisite clarity to provide Defendants “fair notice of 8 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 9 (quotation and alteration omitted); see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178 (explaining that a 10 complaint lacking “simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom [a plaintiff is] suing for 11 what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint”). As the Complaint 12 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must sua sponte dismiss 13 it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 14 However, as the nature of Plaintiff’s claims is not fully comprehensible by the Court 15 at this time, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that Plaintiff can plausibly allege facts 16 addressing the deficiencies described in this Order. Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff 17 leave to amend his complaint. 18 CONCLUSION 19 In light of the above, the Court: 20 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2). 21 2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents 22 (ECF No. 3). 23 3. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE 24 for its failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 25 1915(e)(2). Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the dismissal is WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 26 Plaintiff thus has forty-five (45) days’ leave from the date of this Order to file an amended 27 complaint curing the pleading deficiencies noted above. Plaintiff is advised that an 28 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 1 || F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Any amended complaint must be complete in and of itself 2 || without reference to Plaintiff's original Complaint or FAC; claims not realleged in the 3 |}amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Lacey, 693 F.3d 4 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend that are not realleged in an 5 ||amended pleading may be “considered waived”). If Plaintiff fails to amend within the 6 || time provided, the Court will enter a final order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v. 7 || Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of 8 ||the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 9 || complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 10 4. DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Request for Appointment of Counsel (ECF 11 4). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint as provided herein, he may file another 12 request for appointment of counsel. 13 5. DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Motion to Have the Court Direct US 14 || Marshals to Provide Service on Defendants (ECF No. 5). 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: March 19, 2026 18 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28