Juan Francisco Gonzalez-Monreal v. Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Robert Steven Huie (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an immigration detainee who argued he must be released under Zadvydas v. Davis because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable. The court dismissed the petition, finding Zadvydas inapplicable because the petitioner had not yet received a final order of removal, and denied the associated motions as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus“Accordingly, the Petition is DISMISSED.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that the petitioner was detained pending a removal hearing rather than under a final order of removal. The Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis specifically construed the post-removal detention provision (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)) and does not apply to pre-removal detention. Furthermore, the petitioner's detention of less than five months does not, on its face, constitute a due process violation. The dismissal is supported by the record and the cited authorities. |
Denial of Motion to Appoint Counsel“In light of this disposition, the Court DENIES as moot Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel [ECF No. 2]” | agree with court Because the underlying petition was dismissed, the request for counsel is no longer necessary for the litigation. Denying the motion as moot is a standard procedural consequence of dismissing the main claim. |
Denial of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order“In light of this disposition, the Court DENIES as moot Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order [ECF No. 3].” | agree with court Similar to the motion for counsel, the TRO was sought to secure relief from the detention. Since the court determined the petitioner was not entitled to relief on the merits of the habeas petition, the TRO is moot. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise and directly addresses the legal basis for the petitioner's claim. It correctly distinguishes the petitioner's situation (pre-removal detention) from the holding in Zadvydas (post-removal detention). The application of Habeas Rule 4 to dismiss the petition on its face is appropriate given the clear legal distinction. The reasoning is sufficient to support the result.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN FRANCISCO GONZALEZ- Case No.: 26-cv-1577-RSH-JLB MONREAL, 12 ORDER DISMISSING PETITION Petitioner, 13 v. [ECF Nos. 2, 3] 14 PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 On March 12, 2026, petitioner Juan Francisco Gonzalez Monreal filed a petition for 19 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner 20 has also filed motions to appoint counsel and for a temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 21 2, 3. 22 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 23 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 24 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the 25 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 26 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 27 Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (the “Habeas Rules”) requires summary 28 | ||dismissal of a federal habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any 2 || attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” See also 3 || Habeas Rule 1(b) (permitting district courts to apply Habeas Rules to Section 2241 habeas 4 || proceedings); Lane v. Feather, 584 F. App’x 843, 843 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district 5 || court’s application of Habeas Rule 4 to dismiss Section 2241 petition). 6 Petitioner alleges that he was arrested and taken into immigration custody on 7 || October 20, 2025, and is currently detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San 8 || Diego, California, pending his removal hearing. ECF No. | at 1. Petitioner contends that 9 || pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), he 10 || must be released from immigration custody because there is no significant likelihood that 11 can be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. ECF No. | at 1-2. In Zadvydas, 12 ||the Supreme Court construed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the statutory provision authorizing 13 detention of a noncitizen subject to a final order of removal beyond the 90-day removal 14 || period, and concluded that the “statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits 15 |/an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about 16 || that alien’s removal from the United States.” Jd. at 689. However, Zadvydas does not apply 17 || here because Petitioner is not subject to a final order of removal; instead, he is awaiting his 18 |/removal hearing. Nor does the length of Petitioner’s custody to date—less than five 19 ||months—without more raise due process concerns of prolonged detention. 20 Accordingly, the Petition is DISMISSED. In light of this disposition, the Court 21 ||DENIES as moot Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel [ECF No. 2] and motion for a 22 ||temporary restraining order [ECF No. 3]. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 || Dated: March 16, 2026 25 [eebuet Home %6 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 27 28