Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 John Wesley WILLIAMS, Case No.: 24-cv-1382-AGS-AHG 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 5 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 21) 6 Kathleen ALLISON, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 The self-represented inmate here is suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an allegedly 10 ongoing prison sewage saga. The defense moves to dismiss his claims. 11 DISCUSSION 12 For Willams’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must contain sufficient 13 facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 14 678 (2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The defense moves to dismiss claims against 15 all defendants, as well as raising specific arguments for dismissal against the supervisory 16 defendants—“Governor Gavin Newsom, [California Department of Corrections and 17 Rehabilitation] Secretary Kathleen Allison, Warden James Hill, Chief Deputy Warden R. 18 Buckel, and Chief Deputy Warden M. Palmer.” (ECF 21, at 2.) 19 A. Supervisory Defendants 20 The supervisory defendants seek dismissal on two grounds: (1) lack of “specificity” 21 in the “causal link” between them and the alleged violations, and (2) “implausib[ility].” 22 (ECF 21, at 7, 10.) As to the “causal link” argument, the supervisory defendants assert the 23 complaint doesn’t include “the requisite level of specificity” to render them accountable. 24 (Id. at 7.) But plaintiffs need not allege “that a supervisor was physically present when the 25 injury occurred” to adequately allege a supervisor’s section 1983 liability. Starr v. Baca, 26 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). Supervisors may instead be held “individually liable 27 in § 1983 suits when culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.” Id. That 28 is, supervisors are liable for “acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation” or “conduct 1 that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Cunningham v. 2 Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs need only allege “a sufficient causal 3 connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” 4 Hansen v. Beck, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (cleaned up). 5 According to the complaint, defendants “Allison, Newsom, Hill, Buckel, and Palmer 6 have been made aware through endless plum[b]ing work orders and plum[b]ing related 7 complaints” that there was a “constant and reoccurring” “overflood of feces, sewage, and 8 urine” causing a “risk of exposure to airborne contaminates like hepatitis, bacterial 9 infection, and covid-19.” (ECF 1, at 5.) These supervisory defendants, plaintiff alleges, 10 “each limit” the work done to remedy the “ongoing plum[b]ing deficiencies to patch work 11 to avoid addressing the prison[’]s plum[b]ing infrastructure.” (Id. at 14.) They “allow 12 subordinates to require plaintiff . . . to walk in and through the waste floods, enduring cross 13 contamination and the stink in order to receive meals.” (Id. at 6.) These allegations undercut 14 the defense’s position that “there are no specific factual allegations establishing their 15 knowledge that [p]laintiff was subjected to alleged ongoing unconstitutional conditions of 16 confinement.” (See ECF 21, at 8.) Williams alleges much more than “general[] 17 aware[ness],” as the defense contends, and thus sufficiently alleges a causal link to the 18 supervisory defendants. (See id.) 19 But the allegations must also be plausible. The complaint’s allegations meet this 20 standard as to supervisors Hill, Buckel, and Palmer, but not as to Governor Newsom and 21 Secretary Allison. The prison staff allegedly “alerted” Hill, Buckel, and Palmer “of each 22 emergency waste flood through [the] chain of command,” and plaintiff was “told ‘the 23 watch commander and warden know[]’” about these problems. (ECF 1, at 7.) But there are 24 no comparatively specific allegations that implicate Newsom or Allison. It seems 25 implausible that California’s governor and the head of the state correctional system would 26 be informed about plumbing issues at one of the many state prisons. And Williams alleges 27 no details as to how those two defendants would have otherwise been on notice about those 28 issues. His allegations that they generally “ignored the deficient plum[b]ing system” (id. 1 at 10) are “mere conclusory statements” that are “not entitled to be assumed true,” see 2 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 681. So, Williams does not state a cognizable claim against 3 Governor Newsom or Secretary Allison. 4 B. All Defendants 5 Finally, the defense asserts that Williams’s deliberate-indifference claim fails 6 against every defendant because they sent “plumbers” to “regularly respond[]” to the 7 sewage issues. (ECF 21, at 11–12.) A prison employee is liable for deliberate indifference 8 if that “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 9 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Among other things, Williams must show 10 that: (1) “the risk was obvious or . . . that the prison officials were aware of the substantial 11 risk” to inmate health or safety, and (2) “there was no reasonable justification for exposing 12 the inmates to the risk.” Lemire v. California Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 13 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, prison staff are not liable “if they responded 14 reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844. 15 At this early stage, Williams’s complaint adequately alleges that the defendants 16 could readily see that their repeated and woefully unsuccessful responses to the sewage 17 problem were not sufficiently reasonable to shield them from liability. For instance, even 18 the attending plumber admitted that anytime he “fix[es] one flood in one area, it happens 19 somewhere else,” resulting, at least once, in an “overflow” that began in the “dining hall” 20 and “rotate[d]” to the “exercise yard” before reaching the “housing units.” (ECF 1, at 6– 21 7.) Discovery may bear out—or disprove—the complaint’s allegations, but Williams 22 sufficiently states a claim. 23 CONCLUSION 24 The Court must give this self-represented plaintiff “the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe 25 v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). By that lenient standard, he states cognizable 26 claims against all defendants except for Governor Newsom and Secretary Allison. The 27 motion to dismiss those two defendants is GRANTED, but the motion is otherwise 28 DENIED. l Williams now has two options: (1) he may proceed with his lawsuit against the 2 ||remaining defendants or (2) he may amend his complaint to correct the deficiencies 3 identified in this order. If he chooses to amend his complaint, he must file it by April 10, 4 ||2026. The amended complaint must be complete by itself without reference to any previous 5 || pleading. If he does not file an amended complaint by that date, this lawsuit will proceed 6 || with his claims against supervisory defendants Hill, Buckel, and Palmer, as well as against 7 ||the two nonsupervisory correctional-officer defendants, Sergeant K. Juarez and 8 || Officer C. Beltran. 9 || Dated: March 16, 2026 10 4 —— 11 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28