gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-03507 · 2026-03-15 · Unknown

Jolee Kimble v. Frank Birchank, et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Andrew G. Schopler (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:38Z · confidence high

The court screened an amended complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis, which named forty defendants including judicial officers and various private and public entities. The court dismissed the claims against judicial officers with prejudice and without leave to amend, and dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants for failing to comply with Rule 8, granting leave to file a second amended complaint by April 13, 2026.

What the court decidedThe model
Claims against judicial officers (Birchank, Morris, Braner, Wertheimer, Dunham Ramirez, Fattarsi, and McConnell) are dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.
“So, for the same reasons as last time, the claims against all those individuals are dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.”
agree with court
The court correctly applies the doctrine of judicial immunity, which is absolute for acts performed in a judge's judicial capacity. Because the immunity is absolute, leave to amend is generally futile and therefore properly denied. The order relies on a prior screening order (ECF 4) for the specific factual findings regarding the judicial nature of the acts, which is procedurally appropriate in a screening context.
Claims against remaining non-judicial defendants are dismissed for failing to comply with Rule 8, with leave to amend.
“So, the rest of the amended complaint must be dismissed for failing to comply with Rule 8.”
agree with court
The court finds that the complaint is a 'stream-of-consciousness' that fails to provide fair notice of the claims against the defendants, violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The court cites *Cafasso* and *Twombly* to support the proposition that prolix and confusing complaints violate Rule 8. Granting leave to amend is appropriate where the deficiencies are curable, which is the standard approach for pro se litigants whose complaints are facially deficient but not legally impossible to cure.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory basis for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It properly applies the absolute nature of judicial immunity to dismiss those claims without leave to amend, citing recent Ninth Circuit authority (*Huffman*). For the remaining defendants, the court correctly applies Rule 8 standards, citing *Twombly* and *Cafasso* to justify dismissal for lack of fair notice due to the complaint's confusing and prolix nature. The grant of leave to amend is consistent with pro se litigation standards. The reasoning is complete and supported by the cited authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Jolee KIMBLE, Case No.: 25-cv-3507-AGS-SBC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT 5 v. 6 Frank BIRCHANK, et al. 7 Defendants. 8 9 Self-represented plaintiff Jolee Kimble filed an amended complaint after this Court 10 previously screened out her claims against Superior Court Judge Frank Birchank on 11 judicial-immunity grounds. (See ECF 4 (screening order); ECF 12 (amended complaint).) 12 Although the amended complaint has ballooned to now include forty defendants, it too fails 13 screening. 14 DISCUSSION 15 The Court must screen the complaint of a plaintiff like Kimble who is proceeding in 16 forma pauperis—that is, who has been permitted to proceed without paying the filing fees. 17 The screened complaint must be dismissed if, among other things, it “fails to state a claim” 18 or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915(e)(2)(B). Just like last time, Kimble’s claims against Judge Birchank arise from his 20 actions as a judicial officer and thus must be dismissed. (See generally ECF 4 (discussing 21 judicial immunity).) Moreover, she’s now named several other individuals she identifies 22 as judicial officers—Christopher Morris, Matthew Braner, Adam Wertheimer, Danielle 23 Dunham Ramirez, Jonathan W. Fattarsi, and Judith McConnell—and, to the extent they 24 are even mentioned in the body of her amended complaint, each suffers from the same 25 deficiency. So, for the same reasons as last time, the claims against all those individuals 26 are dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. See Huffman v. Lindgren, 27 81 F.4th 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal “without leave to amend” based 28 on judicial immunity (cleaned up)). 1 As to the remaining nonjudicial defendants, they are an eclectic lot: plaintiff’s 2 (perhaps) ex-spouse, a couple of his family members, the federal Department of Justice, 3 several police departments, some workers at “Cheesecake Factory,” someone who works 4 in “Mental Health” at the “Olive Garden,” child protective services, UPS, multiple courts, 5 California Governor Gavin Newsom, a handful of attorneys, a pediatrician, and a company. 6 (See ECF 12, at 17–26.) Unfortunately, her amended complaint offers little help in figuring 7 out how these seemingly unrelated individuals and entities fit together, much less how this 8 Court has the authority to order the relief she requests. (See id. at 15 (“begging” the Court 9 to “call the FBI and have [the defendants] arrested” and then informing the Court that she 10 had “contacted the FBI on you [meaning the Court] as well”).) 11 Her complaint is written in a stream-of-consciousness style, which is difficult to 12 follow. It provides no clear indication of who many of these defendants are or what claims 13 are being asserted against any of them. As an example, here is a page of the amended 14 complaint: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 | Oia Wal Vanina Wweira he point Nappepingy Al ye | 2 2]) Oyen Yaualet du then fouewr20r MOU en ee 3 31] aval Caneackat §=Quaub Webul (ale GNA then i 4 +] Wp Oy Mind Manming OFF Our ne a : ai, □ 5 S|] Guu auc Voarmens ana Child — □ 6 | □□ 6 || One Cuurgorne NWA ih ne Gale 4 = ee (ali Forni AGA 7 eo AO vial eral ih (\ovY perk ore = 8 ol ty Mu kw, Or OI Dy ns Bera, ar a, Veli TOA ipla- ? 1 Bevin = Dine wk (nanrcle os a ie U1 gue 10 5 Crit cra fale my WA ae 11 13] (ManCR. 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(See generally 27 id.) 28 1 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is 2 entitled to relief,” with allegations that are “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. 3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). This rule is “not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.” 4 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). But the complaint must give “fair 5 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 6 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). “Prolix, confusing complaints impose 7 unfair burdens on litigants and judges.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., 8 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Despite hours spent combing through 9 Kimble’s amended complaint, the Court cannot say with any certainty what any of her 10 claims are against any of these defendants. It falls far short of giving the required notice of 11 her claims. See id. (“While the proper length and level of clarity for a pleading cannot be 12 defined with any great precision, Rule 8(a) has been held to be violated by a pleading that 13 was needlessly long, or a complaint that was highly repetitious, or confused, or consisted 14 of incomprehensible rambling.”). So, the rest of the amended complaint must be dismissed 15 for failing to comply with Rule 8. 16 CONCLUSION 17 The amended complaint is DISMISSED. The claims against the named judicial 18 officers are dismissed without leave to amend. The claims against the remaining defendants 19 are dismissed with leave to amend. By April 13, 2026, Kimble must file any second 20 amended complaint against the nonjudicial defendants, remedying the deficiencies 21 mentioned above. Any second amended complaint must be complete by itself without 22 reference to any previous version of her pleading. Defendants not named and any claims 23 not re-alleged in that complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; 24 Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). If Kimble fails to timely 25 amend, the Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v. Herrera, 26 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the 27 opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint 28 into dismissal of the entire action.”). 1 Dated: March 15, 2026 3 Hon. rew G. Schopler 4 United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28